Iran
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -2000
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 2001
The Islamic Republic of Iran* was established in 1979 after a populist
revolution toppled the Pahlavi monarchy. The Constitution ratified
after the revolution by popular referendum established a theocratic republic
and declared as its purpose the establishment of institutions and a society
based on Islamic principles and norms. The Government is dominated by
Shi'a Muslim clergy. The Head of State, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and has direct control of the armed
forces, internal security forces, and the judiciary. Mohammad Khatami
was elected to a 4-year term as President in a popular vote in February 1997.
A popularly elected 290-seat unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly,
or Majles, develops and passes legislation. All legislation passed by
the Majles is reviewed for adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles
by a Council of Guardians, which consists of six clerical members, who are
appointed by the Supreme Leader, and six lay jurists, who are appointed by
the head of the judiciary and approved by the Majles. The Constitution
provides the Council of Guardians with the power to screen and disqualify
candidates for elective offices based on an ill-defined set of requirements,
including the candidates' ideological beliefs. The judiciary is subject
to government and religious influence.
Several agencies share responsibility for internal security,
including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of
Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was
established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces
known as Basijis, and gangs of thugs, known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah
(Helpers of the Party of God), who often are aligned with specific
members of the leadership, act as vigilantes, and are released into the
streets to intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators,
journalists, and individuals suspected of counterrevolutionary
activities. Both regular and paramilitary security forces
committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
Iran has a mixed economy that is heavily dependent on export earnings
from the country's extensive petroleum reserves. The Constitution
mandates that all large-scale industry, including petroleum, minerals,
banking, foreign exchange, insurance, power generation, communications,
aviation, and road and rail transport, be owned publicly and
administered by the state. Large charitable foundations called
bonyads, most with strong connections to the Government, control the
extensive properties and businesses expropriated from the Pahlavi family
and individuals associated with the monarchy. The bonyads exercise
considerable influence in the economy, but do not account publicly for
revenue and pay no taxes. Basic foodstuffs and energy costs are
subsidized heavily by the Government. Oil exports account for
nearly 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Private property
is respected. Although economic performance improved somewhat
during the year due to the worldwide increase in oil prices, performance
is affected adversely by government mismanagement and corruption.
Unemployment was estimated to be at least 25 percent, and inflation was
an estimated 25 percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although efforts
within society to make the Government accountable for its human rights
policies continued, serious problems remain. The Government
restricts citizens' right to change their government. Systematic
abuses include extrajudicial killings and summary executions;
disappearances; widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment,
reportedly including rape; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and
detention; and prolonged and incommunicado detention. Judicial
proceedings were instituted against some government officials for
misconduct. However, perpetrators often committed such abuses with
impunity. A group of 20 police officials was brought to trial in
March for their actions in an attack on a Tehran University student
dormitory in July 1999. All but two were cleared, including the
senior official involved. In December 18 former officials of the
Intelligence Ministry were tried before a military court for the
killings of four dissidents in 1998. The proceedings were closed
and the results of the trial were not made public by year's end.
The judiciary suffers from government and religious influence, and
does not ensure that citizens receive due process or fair trials.
The Government uses the judiciary to stifle dissent and obstruct
progress on human rights. The Government infringes on citizens'
privacy rights, and restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, and
association. The Government closed nearly all reform-oriented
publications during the year and brought charges against prominent
political figures and members of the clergy for expressing ideas viewed
as contrary to the ruling orthodoxy. However, the Ministry of
Culture and Islamic Guidance continued to issue licenses for the
establishment of newspapers and magazines, some of which challenged
government policies. The Government restricts freedom of
religion. Religious minorities, particularly Baha'is, continued to
suffer repression by conservative elements of the judiciary and security
establishment. In July 10 Iranian Jews were tried and convicted on
charges of illegal contacts with Israel, and sentenced to between 2 and
13 years in prison. Three others were acquitted. The trial
procedures were unfair, and violated numerous internationally recognized
standards of due process. The selection of candidates for
elections effectively is controlled by the Government. Intense
political struggle continued during the year between a broad popular
movement that favored greater liberalization in government policies,
particularly in the area of human rights, and certain hard-line elements
in the government and society, which view such reforms as a threat to
the survival of the Islamic republic. In many cases, this struggle
is played out within the Government itself, with reformists and
hardliners squaring off in divisive internal debates. Reformers
and moderates won a landslide victory in the February Majles election,
and now constitute a majority of that body; however, the Council of
Guardians and other elements within the Government blocked much of the
early reform legislation passed by the Majles.
The Government restricts the work of human rights groups and
continues to deny entry to the country to the U.N. Special
Representative for Human Rights in Iran. Violence against women
occurs, and women face legal and societal discrimination. The
Government discriminates against religious and ethnic minorities and
restricts important workers' rights, including freedom of association
and the right to organize and bargain collectively. Child labor
persists. Vigilante groups, with strong ties to certain members of
the Government, enforce their interpretation of appropriate social
behavior through intimidation and violence.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Government has been responsible for numerous extrajudicial
killings. Human rights groups reported that security forces killed
at least 20 persons while violently suppressing demonstrations by Kurds
that occurred in the wake of the February 1999 arrest of Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey (see Sections 1.c., 2.b.,
and 5). Human Rights Watch reported at least four student deaths
in July 1999, when government-sanctioned agitators attacked a student
dormitory during protests in Tehran (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in the absence
of sufficient procedural safeguards. In 1992 the domestic press
stopped reporting most executions; however, executions continue in
substantial numbers, according to U.N. and other reporting. The
U.N. Special Representative cited an estimated 130 executions from
January through July, most of which were reported in the media.
The Government has not cooperated in providing the Special
Representative with a precise number of executions carried out in
Iran. Exiles and human rights monitors allege that many of those
executed for criminal offenses, such as narcotics trafficking, actually
are political dissidents. Supporters of outlawed political
organizations, such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, are believed
to make up a large number of those executed each year. A November
1995 law criminalized dissent and applied the death penalty to offenses
such as "attempts against the security of the State, outrage against
high-ranking Iranian officials, and insults against the memory of Imam
Khomeini and against the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic."
U.N. representatives, including the U.N. Special Representative on Human
Rights in Iran, and independent human rights organizations, continue to
note the absence of procedural safeguards in criminal trials.
Harsh punishments are carried out, including stoning and flogging (see
Section 1.c.). However, cases of stoning apparently are declining,
and the U.N. Special Representative reports no cases over the past year
in which such a sentence was carried out. The law also allows for
the relatives of murder victims to take part in the execution of the
killer.
The Government's investigation into the murder of several prominent
Iranian dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 continued throughout
the year. The case involved the murders, over a 2-month period
from October to December 1998, of prominent political activists Darioush
and Parvaneh Forouhar and writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad
Pouandeh. Political activist Pirouz Davani disappeared in the same
time period and never has been found (see Section 1.b.). In
February after several senior figures of the leadership blamed the
disappearances and murders on "foreign hands," it was revealed that
active-duty agents of the Ministry of Intelligence had carried out the
killings. Minister of Intelligence Qorban Ali Dori-Najafabadi and
several of his senior deputies resigned their posts following these
revelations.
Supervision for the case was placed in the hands of the Military
Prosecutor's office. In June 1999, the Prosecutor's Office
released an initial report on the investigation, identifying a cell
within the Ministry of Intelligence led by four "main agents" as
responsible for the murders. The leader among the agents
reportedly was a former Deputy Minister of Intelligence, Saeed Emami,
who, the Government stated, had committed suicide in prison by drinking
a toxic hair removal solution several days prior to release of the
Government's June report. The report also indicated that 23
persons had been arrested in connection with the murders and that a
further 33 were summoned for interrogation. In the early part of
the year, the Government announced that 18 men would stand trial in
connection with the killings. The trial began in late December in
a military court. The proceedings were closed. However, news
reports indicated that 15 defendants pled guilty during the opening
stages of the trial. The identity of the defendants is still
unknown, but former Minister of Intelligence Dori-Najafabadi has not
been charged. Results of the trial had not been announced by
year's end (see Section 1.e.).
Frustration over the slow pace of the murder investigation and doubt
about the government's willingness to follow the case to its conclusion
were frequent topics of criticism of the Government throughout the year,
particularly by those advocating greater adherence to the rule of
law. Reform-oriented journalists and prominent cultural figures
declared publicly their demands for a full accounting in the case and
speculated that responsibility for ordering the murders lay at the
highest level of the Government. Several citizens, including
prominent investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, were arrested in
connection with statements they have made about the case (see Sections
1.c. and 1.e.). In December, just before Ganji's case went to
trial, the Military Court arrested a lawyer for the family of one of the
victims for violating a public ban on comments regarding the case.
One organization in 1999 reported eight deaths of evangelical
Christians at the hands of the authorities in the past 10 years (see
Section 2.c.). In 1999 an investigative reporter alleged that
officials within the Intelligence Ministry were responsible for the
murders of three prominent evangelical ministers in 1994, a crime for
which three female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization had
been convicted (see Section 2.c.).
Numerous Sunni clerics have been murdered in recent years, some
allegedly by government agents (see Section 2.c.).
The Government announced in September 1998 that it would take no
action to threaten the life of British author Salman Rushdie, or anyone
associated with his work, "The Satanic Verses," despite the issuance of
a fatwa against Rushdie's life in 1989. The announcement came
during discussions with the United Kingdom regarding the restoration of
full diplomatic relations. Several revolutionary foundations and a
number of Majles deputies within Iran repudiated the Government's pledge
and emphasized the "irrevocability" of the fatwa, or religious ruling,
by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, calling for Rushdie's murder. The
15 Khordad Foundation raised the bounty it earlier had established for
the murder of Rushdie.
The Istanbul Court of Appeal upheld in 1998 the conviction of an
Iranian national for complicity in the 1996 murders of Zahra Rajabi and
Ali Moradi, both of whom were associated with the National Council of
Resistance (NCR), an exile group that has claimed responsibility for
several terrorist attacks within Iran. The U.N. Special
Representative reported in 1998 that Italian security authorities
continued their investigation into the 1993 killing in Rome of Mohammad
Hossein Naghdi, the NCR's representative in Italy.
b. Disappearance
No reliable information is available on the number of
disappearances. In the period immediately following arrest, many
detainees are held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and family
members.
Pirouz Davani, a political activist who disappeared in late 1998
along with several other prominent intellectuals and dissidents who
later were found murdered, remains unaccounted for and is believed to
have been killed for his political beliefs and activism (see Section
1.a.).
A Christian group reported that between 15 and 23 Iranian Christians
disappeared between November 1997 and November 1998 (see Section
2.c.). Those who disappeared reportedly were Muslim converts to
Christianity whose baptisms had been discovered by the
authorities. The group that reported the figure believes that most
or all of those who disappeared were killed.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however, there are
numerous, credible reports that security forces and prison personnel
continue to torture detainees and prisoners. Some prison
facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, are notorious for the cruel
and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon political opponents of the
Government. Common methods include suspension for long periods in
contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and,
most frequently, severe and repeated beatings with cables or other
instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners
also have reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete
deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete
blindness. Stoning and flogging are prescribed expressly by the
Islamic Penal Code as appropriate punishment for adultery (see Section
1.a.).
In November investigative journalist Akbar Ganji went on trial for
statements he allegedly made during an April conference in Berlin on
Iranian politics (see Sections 2.a. and 1.e.). He was arrested in
April upon his return to Iran and held over the next 6 months for long
periods in solitary confinement. Ganji told the court that he was
beaten and tortured in prison. Ganji previously had written
articles implicating former President Rafsanjani in a series of murders
of dissidents and intellectuals apparently carried out by security
forces.
In March a gunman shot and severely wounded newspaper editor Saeed
Hajarian, a senior political advisor to President Khatami. The
methods used raised widespread suspicions that the security forces were
involved in the attack. The gunman later was arrested and
sentenced along with four other defendants to 15-year prison sentences.
On July 8, 1999, the Government and individuals acting with the
consent of the authorities, used excessive force in attacking a
dormitory during student protests in Tehran, including reportedly
throwing students from windows. Approximately 300 students were
injured in the incident. The U.N. Special Representative has noted
numerous credible reports that students arrested following the
demonstration were tortured in prison (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and
2.b.).
In May 1999, Brigadier General Gholam-reza Naqdi, a senior Tehran
police official, and several associates, who were accused of using
torture to coerce confessions during the 1998 trial of former mayor of
Tehran Gholam Hossein Kharbaschi, went on trial. It reportedly was
the first prosecution of a government official for torture since the
1979 revolution. The charges were based on the accusations of
numerous Tehran municipality officials and district mayors that
authorities had used torture to coerce admissions of guilt and
statements that implicated the former mayor. The trial of Naqdi
was conducted in closed session before a military court. Naqdi was
cleared of most charges and resumed his duties with the Tehran police
force.
In August 1999, President Khatami was quoted in public remarks as
criticizing the use of torture. He defended the rights of
prisoners as a legitimate concern based on "Islam and human conscience."
Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in
solitary confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to
force confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or
otherwise tortured while in detention. Prison guards reportedly
intimidate family members of detainees and torture detainees in the
presence of family members. The U.N. Special Representative
reported receiving numerous reports of prisoner overcrowding and
unrest. He cited a reported figure of only 8.2 square feet (2.5
square) of space available for each prisoner.
The Government does not permit visits to imprisoned dissidents by
human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
these practices remain common. There is reportedly no legal time
limit for incommunicado detention, nor any judicial means to determine
the legality of detention. Suspects may be held for questioning in
jails or in local Revolutionary Guard offices. Although reliable
statistics are not available, international observers believe that
between scores and hundreds of citizens are detained for their political
beliefs.
The security forces often do not inform family members of a
prisoner's welfare and location. Prisoners also may be denied
visits by family members and legal counsel. In addition, families
of executed prisoners do not always receive notification of the
prisoners' deaths. Those who do receive such information
reportedly have been forced on occasion to pay the Government to
retrieve the body of their relative.
Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the cultural rights of Azeris,
was arrested in December 1999. Azeri groups claim that Chehrangi
was arrested to prevent his registration as a candidate in the February
Majles elections (see Sections 3 and 5).
In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested by security forces
in the cities of Isfahan and Shiraz. Among the group were several
prominent rabbis, teachers of Hebrew, and their students, one a
16-year-old boy. They were held for 14 months or more without
formal charges until their trial began in May. The delay in
clarification of charges appeared to violate Article 32 of the
Constitution, which states in part that in cases of arrest "charges with
the reasons for accusation must, without delay, be communicated and
explained to the accused in writing, and a provisional dossier must be
forwarded to the competent judicial authorities within a maximum of 24
hours so that the preliminaries to the trial can be completed as swiftly
as possible." Ten of the 13 eventually were convicted of charges
relating to illegal contacts with Israel. Governments around the
world criticized the detentions and trial as unfair and in violation of
due process (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
As many as 1,500 students were detained in the wake of student
protests on July 8, 1999, and subsequent riots. Many of them
remained in prison throughout the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and
2.b.).
Numerous publishers, editors and journalists either were detained,
jailed, fined, or prohibited from publishing their writings during the
year (see Section 2.a.). The Government appeared to follow a
policy of intimidation toward members of the media that it considers to
pose a threat to the current system of Islamic government.
Adherents of the Baha'i Faith continue to face arbitrary arrest and
detention. The Government appears to adhere to a practice of
keeping a small number of Baha'is in detention at any given time.
According to the U.N. Special Representative and Baha'i groups, at least
10 Baha'is are in prisons, including 2 who were convicted of either
apostasy or "actions against God" and sentenced to death. In March
1999, the four remaining detainees from the 1998 raid on the Baha'i
Institute of Higher Learning were convicted and sentenced to prison
terms ranging from 3 to 10 years (see Section 2.c.).
The Government enforced house arrest and other measures to restrict
the movements and ability to communicate of several senior religious
leaders whose views on political and governance issues are at variance
with the ruling orthodoxy. Several of these figures dispute the
legitimacy and position of the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei. The clerics include Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan
Tabataei-Qomi, who has been under house arrest in Mashad for more than
15 years; Ayatollah Mohammad Shirazi, who remains under house arrest in
Qom; and Ayatollah Ya'asub al-Din Rastgari, who has been under house
arrest in Qom since late 1996. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri,
the former designated successor of the late Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah
Khomeini, and an outspoken critic of the current Supreme Leader, remains
under house arrest and heightened police surveillance (see Section
2.a.). The followers of these and other dissident clerics, many of
them junior clerics and students, reportedly have been detained in
recent years and tortured by government authorities.
Throughout the year, Iran and Iraq exchanged prisoners of war (POW's)
and the remains of deceased fighters from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war,
adding to the large number of Iraqi POW's returned by Iran in
1998. However, a final settlement of this issue between the two
governments was not achieved, despite such predictions by Iranian
government officials in late 1998. A June 1998 press report
described joint Iran-Iraq search operations to identify the remains of
those missing in action.
The Government does not use forced exile, but many dissidents and
ethnic and religious minorities leave the country due to a perception of
threat from the Government.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system is not independent and is subject to government and
religious influence. It serves as the principal vehicle of the
State to restrict freedom and reform in the society.
There are several different court systems. The two most active
are the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal
offenses, and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter were
established in 1979 to try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to
the Islamic Republic, including threats to internal or external
security, narcotics crimes, economic crimes (including hoarding and
overpricing), and official corruption. A special clerical court
examines alleged transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a
military court investigates crimes committed in connection with military
or security duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary
Guards. A press court hears complaints against publishers,
editors, and writers in the media. The Supreme Court has limited
authority to review cases.
The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible, to
an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic
sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall
be a cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi
resigned as the head of the judiciary in August 1999, and was replaced
by Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme
Court and Prosecutor General also must be clerics.
Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the
civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right
to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of
appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is
no jury system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation is
not addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the
Government advises judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and
interpretation of Islamic law, rather than rely on statutes enacted
during the Pahlavi monarchy.
Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against national
security and other principal offenses are heard, are notorious for their
disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary
Court judges act as both prosecutor and judge in the same case, and
judges are chosen in part based on their ideological commitment to the
system. Pretrial detention often is prolonged and defendants lack
access to attorneys. Indictments often lack clarity and include
undefined offenses such as "antirevolutionary behavior," "moral
corruption," and "siding with global arrogance." Defendants do not
have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary
trials of 5 minutes duration occur. Others are show trials that
are intended merely to highlight a coerced public confession. In
1992 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded that "the chronic
abuses associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are so numerous
and so entrenched as to be beyond reform." The Government has
undertaken no major reform of the Revolutionary Court system since that
report.
In October a former member of a vigilante group, Amir Farshad
Ibrahimi, was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment for defamation after he
stated in a videotape that Ansar-e Hezbollah vigilantes had received
payments from senior clerics and conservative political figures to
organize and carry out attacks on their political opponents. Two
prominent lawyers active in civil liberties cases, Shirin Ebadi and
Mohsen Rahimi, were given suspended sentences and prohibited from
practicing law for 5 years for their role in distributing the tape.
In November a Revolutionary Court began the trials of 16 writers,
intellectuals, and political figures who took part in an April
conference in Berlin on the implications of the February Majles
elections (see Section 3). The 16 defendants, who were arrested in
Iran after the conference and charged with taking part in antigovernment
and anti-Islamic activities, included investigative journalist Akbar
Ganji, newspaper editor Mohammed Reza Jalaipour, Member of Parliament
Jamileh Kadivar, women's rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla
Lahji, opposition politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, student leader Ali
Afshari, and others, including a translator for the German Embassy in
Tehran. The trial was ongoing at year's end.
In late December, a military court began the trials of 18 persons in
connection with the killings of several prominent dissidents and
intellectuals in late 1998. The results of the trial had not been
announced by year's end (see Section 1.a.).
The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system continued
to be a subject of wide debate throughout the year. The clerical
courts, which were established in 1987 to investigate offenses and
crimes committed by clerics, and which are overseen directly by the
Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution, and operate
outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular, critics
alleged that the clerical courts were used to prosecute certain clerics
for expressing controversial ideas and for participating in activities
outside the area of religion, including journalism.
During the latter part of the year, a Special Clerical Court began
the trial of Hojatoleslam Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, a cleric who
participated in the Berlin conference, on charges of apostasy and
"corruption on earth," which potentially carry the death penalty.
Eshkevari has called for more liberal interpretations of Islamic law in
certain areas. In November 1999, former Interior Minister and Vice
President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a
5-year prison term for allegedly publishing "anti-Islamic articles,
insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the
United States," and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the pages of Khordad, a newspaper
that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of his
arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of
the SCC (see Section 2.a.).
In April 1999, a branch of the SCC convicted Hojatoleslam Mohsen
Kadivar, a Shi'a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in
prison for "dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion" in a
series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar
advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and
criticized the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an
interview published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticized certain
government officials for turning criticism against them into alleged
crimes against the State. He also observed that such leaders
"mistake themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the
interests of the system, and in this way believe that they should be
immune from criticism." He also allegedly criticized former
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident
cleric Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar's trial was not open to the
public.
In July 1999, the SCC banned the daily newspaper Salaam and indicted
its publisher, Mohammad Mousavi Khoeniha, on charges of "violating
Islamic principles," "endangering national security," and "disturbing
public opinion." Khoeniha, a cleric, later was sentenced to a
5-year jail term. The charges involved the publication by Salaam
of documents related to the unsolved murders of dissident intellectuals
in late 1998, which indicated a possible connection to senior officials
in the plotting of the murders. The closure of the newspaper led
to peaceful protests by students at Tehran University that later grew
into widespread rioting after aggressive countermeasures were taken by
security forces (see Section 2.b.).
It is difficult for many women to obtain legal redress. A
woman's testimony in court is worth only half that of a man's, making it
difficult for a woman to prove a case against a male defendant.
The Government frequently charges members of religious minorities
with crimes such as "confronting the regime" and apostasy, and conducts
trials in these cases in the same manner as is reserved for threats to
national security. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who resigned as head
of the judiciary in August, stated in 1996 that Baha'i Faith was an
espionage organization. Trials against Baha'is have reflected this
view (see Section 2.c.). The trial of 13 Iranian Jews on charges
related to espionage for Israel was marked throughout by a lack of due
process. The defendants were held for over 1 year without being
charged formally or given access to lawyers. The trial was closed,
and the defendants were not allowed to choose their own lawyers.
Following the trial, defense lawyers told news reporters that they were
threatened by judiciary officials and pressured to admit their clients'
guilt (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
In December 1999, authorities rearrested former Deputy Prime Minister
and longtime political dissident Abbas Amir-Entezam after an interview
with him was published in an Iranian newspaper. Amir-Entezam has
spent much of the past 20 years in and out of prison since being
arrested on charges of collaboration with the United States following
the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by revolutionary militants in
1979. In his original trial, Amir-Entezam was denied defense
counsel and access to the allegedly incriminating evidence that was
gathered from the overtaken U.S. Embassy and used against him.
Since then he has appealed for a fair and public trial, which has been
denied him. He has been a frequent victim of torture in prison; he
suffered a ruptured eardrum due to repeated beatings, and kidney failure
resulting from denial of access to toilet facilities, and an untreated
prostate condition. He reports having been taken on numerous
occasions before a firing squad, told to prepare for death, only to be
allowed to live. Amir-Entezam remained in prison at year's end
(see Section 1.c.).
Independent legal scholar and member of the Islamic clergy
Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was convicted by the SCC in
1998 for his outspoken criticism of the treatment of women under the
law, was released from prison in early in 1999; however, the Government
banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years. Human
Rights groups outside Iran noted reports that Saidzadeh's 1998 sentence
also included a prohibition on publishing. He has ceased authoring
a monthly column on legal issues, many focusing on the rights of women,
since the time of his detention.
In December Judiciary Chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi announced an
initiative to reform the Iranian judicial system. He said that the
country is "still a long way off from having a reformed and developed
judicial organization." He also announced that 40 judges, clerks,
and "middle-men" had been arrested on corruption
charges.
No estimates are available on the number of political
prisoners. However, the Government often arrests, convicts, and
sentences persons on questionable criminal charges, including drug
trafficking, when their actual "offenses" are political.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution states that "reputation, life, property, (and)
dwelling(s)" are protected from trespass except as "provided by law;"
however, the Government infringes on these rights. Security forces
monitor the social activities of citizens, enter homes and offices,
monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without court
authorization.
Organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, an organization of
hard-line vigilantes who seek to enforce their vision of appropriate
revolutionary comportment upon the society, harass, beat, and intimidate
those who demonstrate publicly for reform or who do not observe dress
codes or other modes of correct revolutionary conduct. This
includes women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of the
body except the hands and face, or those who wear makeup or nail
polish. Ansar-e Hezbollah gangs also have been used to destroy
newspaper offices and printing presses, intimidate dissident clerics,
and disrupt peaceful gatherings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
Ansar-e Hezbollah cells are organized throughout the country and linked
to individual members of the country's leadership.
Vigilante violence includes attacking young persons considered too
"un-Islamic" in their dress or activities, invading private homes,
abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of
popular entertainment. Authorities occasionally enter homes to
remove television satellite dishes, or to disrupt private gatherings in
which unmarried men and women socialize, or where alcohol, mixed
dancing, or other forbidden activities are offered or take place.
Enforcement appears to be arbitrary, varying widely with the political
climate and the individuals involved. Authorities reportedly are
vulnerable to bribes in some of these circumstances.
In 1998 security forces conducted a nationwide raid of more than 500
homes and offices owned or occupied by Baha'is suspected of having
connections to the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning (see Section
2.c.). During the raids, instructional materials, office
equipment, and other items of personal property were confiscated.
The effort apparently was designed to disrupt the operation of the
Institute, which serves as the only alternative source of higher
education for most Baha'is, who are denied entry to the state-controlled
university system.
Prison guards intimidated family members of detainees (see Section
1.c.). Opposition figures living abroad reported harassment of
their relatives in the country.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of the press, except when
published ideas are "contrary to Islamic principles, or are detrimental
to public rights;" however, the Government restricts freedom of speech
and of the press in practice. After the election of President
Khatami, the independent press, especially newspapers and magazines,
played an increasingly important role in providing a forum for an
intense debate regarding reform in the society. However, basic
legal safeguards for freedom of expression are lacking, and the
independent press has been subjected to arbitrary enforcement measures
by elements of the Government, notably the judiciary, which see in such
debates a threat to their own hold on power.
Newspapers and magazines represent a wide variety of political and
social perspectives, some allied with particular figures within the
Government. Many subjects of discussion are tolerated, including
criticism of certain government policies. However, the 1995 Press
Law prohibits the publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of
subjects, including material "insulting Islam and its sanctities" or
"promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic
Republic." Generally prohibited topics include fault-finding
comment on the personality and achievements of the late Leader of the
Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct criticism of the current Supreme
Leader; assailing the principle of velayat-e faqih, or rule by a supreme
religious leader; questioning the tenets of certain Islamic legal
principles; sensitive or classified material affecting national
security; promotion of the views of certain dissident clerics, including
Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri; and advocating rights or autonomy for
ethnic minorities.
Oversight of the press is carried out in accordance with a press law
that was enacted in 1995. The law established the Press
Supervisory Board, which is composed of the Minister of Islamic Culture
and Guidance, a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament, and a
university professor who is appointed by the Minister of Islamic Culture
and Guidance. The Board is responsible for issuing press licenses
and for examining complaints filed against publications or individual
journalists, editors, and publishers. In certain cases, the Press
Supervisory Board may refer complaints to the courts for further action,
including closure. The Press Court hears such complaints.
Its hearings are conducted in public and feature the presence of a jury
that is composed of clerics, government officials, and editors of
government-controlled newspapers. The jury is empowered to
recommend to the presiding judge the guilt or innocence of defendants
and the severity of any penalty to be imposed, although these
recommendations are not binding legally. In at least two cases in
1999 (against the newspapers Jame-eh Salem and Adineh), recommendations
made by Press Court juries for relatively lenient penalties were
disregarded by the presiding judge in favor of harsher measures,
including closure. Perhaps because the judgments of the Press
Courts have not been viewed as sufficiently strict by some government
officials, alleged violations of the Press Law increasingly were
referred to the Revolutionary and Special Clerical Courts, in which
defendants enjoy fewer legal safeguards (see Section 1.e.).
In March the outgoing Parliament passed amendments to the Press Law
that gave the Press Court increased procedural and jurisdictional
power. The amendments allowed prosecution of individual
journalists, in addition to their editors and publishers, for a broad
range of ill-defined political offenses. The new Parliament (which
was seated in May), introduced a bill in August to reverse the
restrictive amendments. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei
intervened with a letter to the Speaker demanding that the bill be
dropped from consideration. Semiofficial vigilante groups appeared
outside the Parliament, creating an atmosphere of intimidation.
Despite some strongly worded objections from members, the bill was
withdrawn.
Public officials frequently levy complaints against journalists,
editors, publishers, and even rival publications. The practice of
complaining about the writings of journalists crosses ideological
lines. Offending writers are subject to lawsuits and fines.
Suspension from journalistic activities and imprisonment are common
punishments for guilty verdicts for offenses ranging from "fabrication"
to "propaganda against the State" to "insulting the leadership of the
Islamic Republic." Police raid newspaper offices, and Ansar-e
Hezbollah mobs attack the offices of liberal publications and bookstores
without interference from the police or prosecution by the courts.
The country's record on freedom of expression worsened during the
year. It remained a central issue in the struggle between
hardliners and political reformers. The Government continued its
policy of issuing licenses for new publications, some of which engaged
in open criticism of certain government policies. However, the
Government issued such licenses at a greatly reduced rate during the
year. Beginning in late April, the Press Court closed virtually
all remaining newspapers associated with the reform-oriented
press. Over the course of a few days, the 14 most prominent reform
newspapers were ordered closed, without hearings. By year's end,
more than 30 independent newspapers and journals were closed. A
few mildly proreform newspapers continue to publish; however, these have
been restricted as well. "Hamshahri," a daily newspaper published
by the Tehran municipality, was ordered to restrict its circulation to
the Tehran city limits. Others continue to publish, but only with
heavy self-censorship.
Dozens of individual editors and journalists were charged and tried
by the Press Court, and several prominent journalists were jailed for
long periods without trial. Others have been sentenced to prison
terms or exorbitant fines. Among those imprisoned were Mashallah
Shamsolvaezin, the editor of a number of now-banned newspapers; Latif
Safari, Shamsolvaezin's publisher; and independent journalists, such as
Akbar Ganji, Ahmed Zeidabadi, Massoud Behnoud, Ebrahim Nabavi, and
Ezzatollah Sahabi. In November Ganji went on trial for statements
that he made at a conference in Berlin on Iranian politics (see Sections
1.c. and 1.e.).
The Government monitors carefully the statements and views of Iran's
senior religious leaders to prevent disruptive dissent within the
clerical ranks. In November 1997, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri,
a cleric formerly designated as the successor to Iran's late Spiritual
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, called into question the authority of the
current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, criticizing his increasing
intervention in government policy. The comments sparked attacks by
Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs on Montazeri's residence and a Koranic school in
Qom run by Montazeri. The promotion of Montazeri's views were
among the charges brought against clerics Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah
Nouri at hearings of the Special Clerical Court in 1999 (see Sections
1.e.).
The press reported throughout the year that several persons were
jailed for expressing support for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In
October it was reported that Akbar Tajik-Saeeki, identified as the
prayer leader at a Tehran mosque, was jailed by the Special Court for
the Clergy for signing a petition that protested the continued detention
of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. Support for Montazeri was also one
of the charges included in the wide-ranging indictment of former
Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri (see Sections 1.e.). In December
one of Montazeri's sons was arrested for distributing his father's
writings.
The 134 signatories of the 1994 Declaration of Iranian Writers, which
declared a collective intent to work for the removal of barriers to
freedom of thought and expression, remain at risk. In July 1999,
the Association of International Writers, known by its acronym PEN,
released a statement noting that authorities had never solved the
murders of signatories Ahmad Mirallai, Ghafar Hosseini, Ahmad Modhtari,
Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, Ebrahim Zalzadeh, and Darioush and Parvaneh
Forouhar, nor the disappearance in late 1998 of Pirouz Davani. PEN
had reported in October 1998 that Declaration signatories Mohammad
Pouyandeh, Mohammad Mokhtari, Houshang Golshiri, Kazem Kardevani, and
Mansour Koushan were questioned by a Revolutionary Court in connection
with their attempts to convene a meeting of the Iran Writer's
Association. Mokhtari and Pouyandeh subsequently were murdered,
while signatory Mansour Koushan reportedly fled to Norway.
The Government directly controls and maintains a monopoly over all
television and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflects the
Government's political and socio-religious ideology. Because
newspapers and other print media have a limited circulation outside
large cities, radio and television serve as the principal news source
for many citizens. Satellite dishes that receive foreign
television broadcasts are forbidden; however, many citizens,
particularly the wealthy, own them. In May 1999, the Minister of
Islamic Culture and Guidance stated in public remarks that the
Government might support an easing of the satellite ban. However,
Supreme Leader Khamenei, who makes the ultimate determination on issues
that involve radio and television broadcasting, quickly criticized any
potential change as amounting to "surrender" to Western culture,
effectively ending any further debate of the idea.
The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is charged with
screening books prior to publication to ensure that they do not contain
offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical of
the Government are published without reprisal. The Ministry
inspects foreign printed materials prior to their release on the
market.
Legal scholar Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was convicted
by the SCC in 1998 for his outspoken criticism of the treatment of women
under the law, was released from prison early in 1999; however, the
Government banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years
and prohibited him from publishing (see Section 1.e.).
The Government effectively censors Iranian-made films, since it is
the main source of funding for domestic film producers. Those
producers must submit scripts and film proposals to government officials
in advance of funding approval. However, such government
restrictions appear to have eased since the election of President
Khatami.
President Khatami announced in September 1998 that the Government
would take no action to threaten the life of British author Salman
Rushdie, or anyone associated with his work "The Satanic Verses."
However, his remarks were repudiated by other parties, including the 15
Khordad Foundation, which claims to have financed a bounty for the
murder of Rushdie (see Section 1.a.).
Academic censorship persists. In his 1996 interim report, the
U.N. Special Representative noted the existence of a campaign to bring
about the "Islamization of the universities," which appeared to be a
movement to purge persons alleged to "fight against the sanctities of
the Islamic system." Government informers who monitor classroom
material reportedly are common on university campuses. Admission
to universities is politicized; all applicants must pass "character
tests" in which officials screen out applicants critical of the
Government's ideology. To obtain tenure, professors must cooperate
with government authorities over a period of years. Ansar-e
Hezbollah thugs disrupt lectures and appearances by academics whose
views do not conform with their own. In October 1999, a newspaper
announced that a post-graduate philosophy course taught by Professor
Abdolkarim Soroush at Tehran University was canceled due to threats to
set fire to the classroom by unidentified persons.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution permits assemblies and marches "provided they do not
violate the principles of Islam;" however, in practice the Government
restricts freedom of assembly and closely monitors gatherings to ensure
that they do not constitute uncontrolled antigovernment protest.
Such gatherings include public entertainment and lectures, student
gatherings, labor protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer
gatherings. A significant factor for groups in deciding whether to
hold a public gathering is whether it would be opposed by the
semiofficial Ansar-e Hezbollah, which uses violence and intimidation to
disperse such assemblies.
In August two leading reform intellectuals, Mohsen Kadivar and Abdul
Karim Soroush, were prevented by semiofficial club- and knife-wielding
vigilantes from addressing a student convention in Khorramabad.
Subsequent clashes between students and vigilantes resulted in the death
of a police officer and injuries. The authorities arrested 150
persons.
On July 8, 1999, students at Tehran University who were protesting
proposed legislation by the Majles that would limit press freedoms and
the Government's closure of a prominent reform-oriented newspaper, were
attacked by elements of the security forces and Ansar-e Hezbollah
thugs. Police forces reportedly looked on and allowed repeated
attacks against the students and their dormitory. Human Rights
Watch reported that, according to witnesses, at least 4 students were
killed in the assault on the dormitory, 300 were wounded, and 400 were
detained. The demonstrations continued to grow in subsequent days
to include many nonstudents. Looting, vandalism, and large-scale
rioting began and spread to cities outside Tehran. Student groups
attempted to distance their organizations from these later acts, which
they blamed on government-sanctioned agitators. The Government
intervened to stop the rioting and announced a July 14
counter-demonstration of regime loyalists and off-duty government
workers, many of whom were bussed in from other cities for the
demonstration.
In September 1999, the head of the Tehran Revolutionary Court,
Hojatoleslam Gholamhossein Rahbarpour, was quoted as saying that 1,500
students were arrested during the riots, 500 were released immediately
after questioning, 800 were released later, and formal investigations
were undertaken against the remaining 200. He also announced that
four student leaders were sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court
for their role in the demonstrations. The death sentences
reportedly were commuted to prison terms during the year. The
Special Representative's report stated that about two-thirds of the
students who initially were arrested subsequently were released, but
noted that there has been no formal accounting of all the persons
arrested in connection with the July 1999 demonstrations.
The Government arrested the leaders of the Iran Nations Party in the
aftermath of the July 1999 demonstrations. The party is a secular
nationalist movement that predates the revolution and is viewed as a
threat by certain elements of the Government. The party was
accused of inciting rioters and of encouraging disparaging slogans
against "sacred values." Agents of the intelligence service in
late 1998 killed the former head of the Iran Nations Party, Darioush
Forouhar, along with his wife (see Section 1.a.).
In the aftermath of these events, the Government took action against
members of the security forces for their violent assault on the student
dormitory, and against student leaders, demonstrators, and political
activists, whom it blamed for inciting illegal behavior. In August
1999, the commander of the security forces, General Hedayat Lotfian, was
summoned before the Parliament to explain the role of his officers in
the dormitory raid. He reportedly announced that 98 officers were
arrested for their actions. In February 20 police officers and
officials were tried on charges of misconduct in connection with the
demonstrations. The court found that misconduct had occurred, and
ordered compensation for 34 injured students. However, the court
released all but two of the accused officers.
The Government forcefully suppressed demonstrations by Kurds in the
wake of the February 1999 arrest of PKK leader Abudullah Ocalan in
Turkey. Security forces reportedly killed 20 persons and made
several hundred arrests (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
The Government limits freedom of association. The Constitution
provides for the establishment of political parties, professional
associations, Islamic religious groups, and recognized religious
minorities, provided that such groups do not violate the principles of
"freedom, sovereignty, and national unity," or question Islam as the
basis of the Islamic Republic. President Khatami repeatedly has
declared as a major goal the development of civil society. A
newspaper reported in June 1999 that the Article Ten Commission, a
government body responsible for reviewing applications for the
establishment of political parties, guilds, societies, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), released figures indicating that
as of April, "85 political, 115 specialized, and 26 religious minority
organizations and associations" were active in the country.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government restricts freedom of religion. The Constitution
declares that the "official religion of Iran is Islam and the sect
followed is that of Ja'fari (Twelver) Shi'ism," and that this principle
is "eternally immutable." It also states that "other Islamic
denominations are to be accorded full respect," and recognizes
Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews (Iran's pre-Islamic religions) as the
only "protected religious minorities." Religions not specifically
protected under the Constitution do not enjoy freedom of religion.
This situation most directly affects the nearly 350,000 followers of the
Baha'i Faith, who effectively enjoy no legal rights.
The central feature of the country's Islamic republican system is
rule by a "religious jurisconsult." Its senior leadership,
including the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, the President, the head
of the Judiciary, and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
(Parliament), is composed principally of Shi'a clergymen.
Religious activity is monitored closely by the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Adherents of recognized
religious minorities are not required to register individually with the
Government, although their community, religious, and cultural
organizations, as well as schools and public events are monitored
closely. Baha'is are not recognized by the Government as a
legitimate religious group; rather, they are considered an outlawed
political organization. Registration of Baha'i adherents is a
police function. Evangelical Christian groups are pressured by
government authorities to compile and hand over membership lists for
their congregations. Evangelicals have resisted this demand.
Non-Muslim owners of grocery shops are required to indicate their
religious affiliation on the front of their shops.
The population is approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which 89
percent are Shi'a and 10 percent are Sunni (mostly Turkomans, Arabs,
Baluchs, and Kurds living in the southwest, southeast, and
northwest). Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities
compose less than 1 percent of the population. Sufi brotherhoods
are popular, but there are no reliable figures available to judge their
true size.
Members of religious minorities are allowed to vote, but they may not
run for President. All religious minorities suffer varying degrees
of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in the areas of
employment, education, and housing (see Section 5).
The Government allows recognized religious minorities to conduct
religious education of their adherents. This includes separate and
privately funded Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian schools. These
schools are supervised by the Ministry of Education, which imposes
certain curriculum requirements. With few exceptions, the
directors of these private schools must be Muslim. Attendance at
these schools is not mandatory for recognized religious
minorities. All textbooks used in course work must be approved for
use by the Ministry of Education, including religious texts.
Religious texts in non-Persian languages require approval by the
authorities for use. This requirement imposes sometimes
significant translation expenses on minority communities.
Recognized religious minorities may provide religious instruction in
non-Persian languages, but often come under pressure from the
authorities when conducting such instruction in Persian. In
particular, evangelical Christian and Jewish communities have suffered
harassment and arrest by authorities for the printing of materials or
delivery of sermons in Persian.
Recognized religious minorities are allowed by the Government to
establish community centers and certain cultural, social, sports, or
charitable associations that they finance themselves. This does
not apply to the Baha'i community which, since 1983, has been denied the
right to assemble officially or to maintain administrative
institutions. Because the Baha'i Faith has no clergy, the denial
of the right to form such institutions and elect officers has threatened
its existence in the country.
University applicants are required to pass an examination in Islamic
theology. Although public-school students receive instruction in
Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious minorities
to higher education. Applicants for public sector employment
similarly are screened for their knowledge of Islam.
Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring
heavier punishments than Muslims. Muslim men are free to marry
non-Muslim women, but the opposite does not apply. Marriages
between Muslim women and non-Muslim men are not recognized.
The Government is highly suspicious of any proselytizing of Muslims
by non-Muslims and can be harsh in its response, in particular against
Baha'is and evangelical Christians. The Government regards the
Baha'i community, whose faith originally derives from a strand of Islam,
as a "misguided" or "wayward" sect. The Government has fueled
anti-Baha'i and anti-Jewish sentiment in the country for political
purposes.
The Government does not ensure the right of citizens to change or
recant their religious faith. Apostasy, specifically conversion
from Islam, may be punishable by death.
Although Sunni Muslims are accorded full respect under the terms of
the Constitution, some Sunni groups claim discrimination on the part of
the Government. In particular, Sunnis cite the lack of a Sunni
mosque in Tehran and claim that authorities refuse to authorize
construction of a Sunni place of worship in the capital. Sunnis
also have accused the state broadcasting company of airing programming
insulting to Sunnis. Numerous Sunni clerics have been killed in
recent years, some allegedly by agents of the Government. For
example, Human Rights Watch reported in 1998 the killing of Sunni prayer
leader Molavi Imam Bakhsh Narouie in the province of Sistan
va-Baluchistan in the southeast. This led to protests from the
local community, which believed that government authorities were
involved in the killing.
Majdhub Alishahi, an adherent of the Sufi tradition, reportedly was
executed on charges of adultery and homosexuality after a coerced
confession in 1996. Sufi organizations outside the country remain
concerned about repression by the authorities of Sufi religious
practices.
The largest non-Muslim minority is the Baha'i Faith, estimated at
nearly 350,000 adherents throughout the country. The Baha'i Faith
originated in Iran during the 1840's as a reformist movement within
Shi'a Islam. Initially it attracted a wide following among Shi'a
clergy. The political and religious authorities of that time
joined to suppress the movement, and since then the hostility of the
Shi'a clergy to the Baha'i Faith has remained intense. Baha'is are
considered apostates because of their claim to a valid religious
revelation subsequent to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The Baha'i
Faith is defined by the Government as a political "sect" historically
linked to the Pahlavi monarchy and, therefore, as
counterrevolutionary. Historically at risk, Baha'is often have
suffered increased levels of mistreatment during times of political
unrest.
Baha'is may not teach or practice their faith or maintain links with
coreligionists abroad. The fact that the Baha'i world headquarters
is situated in what is now the state of Israel (established by the
founder of the Baha'i Faith in the 19th century in what was then
Ottoman-controlled Palestine) exposes Baha'is to government charges of
"espionage on behalf of Zionism," in particular when Bahai's are caught
communicating with or remitting monetary contributions to the Baha'i
Faith headquarters.
Broad restrictions on Baha'is appear to be geared to destroying them
as a community. They repeatedly have been offered relief from
abuse in exchange for recanting their faith. Baha'i cemeteries,
holy places, historical sites, administrative centers, and other assets
were seized shortly after the 1979 revolution. None of these
properties have been returned and many have been destroyed.
Baha'is are not allowed to bury and honor their dead in keeping with
their religious tradition. In October 1998, three Baha'is were
arrested in Damavand, a city north of Tehran, on the grounds that they
had buried their dead without government authorization.
In the past, Baha'i marriages were not recognized by the Government,
leaving Baha'i women open to charges of prostitution. As a result,
children of Baha'i marriages were not recognized as legitimate and,
therefore, were denied inheritance rights. However, in April the
Government announced the elimination of the requirement that citizens
indicate religious affiliation at the time of registration of
marriage. This may allow Bahai's to register their marriages
officially, and thereby mitigate some of the legal obstacles that they
face.
Manuchehr Khulusi was arrested in June 1999 while visiting fellow
Baha'is in the town of Birjand, and was imprisoned until his release in
May. During his imprisonment, Khulusi was interrogated, beaten,
held in solitary confinement, and denied access to his lawyer. The
charges brought against him still are unknown, but they were believed to
be related to his faith. The Islamic Revolutionary Court in
Mashhad held a 2-day trial in September 1999 and then sentenced him to
death in February. Despite Khulusi's release, it is unclear if the
conviction and death sentence against him still stand.
Ruhollah Rowhani, a Baha'i, was executed in July 1998 after having
served 9 months in solitary confinement on a charge of apostasy, which
arose from his allegedly having converted a Muslim woman to the Baha'i
Faith. The woman claimed that her mother was a Baha'i and she
herself had been raised a Baha'i. Rowhani was not accorded a
public trial, and no sentence was announced prior to his
execution.
Two other Baha'is, Sirus Zabihi-Moghaddam and Hadayat
Kashefi-Najafabadi, were tried alongside Rowhani and later sentenced to
death by a revolutionary court in Mashad for practicing their
faith. The sentences were reduced during the year to jail terms of
7 and 5 years, respectively.
Baha'i group meetings and religious education, which often take place
in private homes and offices, are curtailed severely. Public and
private universities continue to deny admittance to Baha'i students, a
particularly demoralizing blow to a community that traditionally has
placed a high value on education. Denial of access to higher
education appears aimed at the eventual impoverishment of the Baha'i
community.
The property rights of Baha'is generally are disregarded. Since
1979 large numbers of private and business properties belonging to
Baha'is have been confiscated. In 1999 three Baha'i homes in Yazd
and one in Arbakan were confiscated because their owners were members of
the Baha'i community. In September and October 1998, government
officers plundered more than 500 Baha'i homes throughout the country and
seized personal household effects, such as furniture and
appliances. Seizure of personal property, in addition to the
denial of access to education and employment, is eroding the economic
base of the Baha'i community.
In 1999 authorities in Khurasan intensified their efforts to
intimidate and undermine Baha'i education. Two teachers in Mashhad
were arrested and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. Their
students were given suspended sentences, to be reinstated if the
students again participated in religious education classes. Three
more Baha'is were arrested in Bujnurd in northern Khurasan for
participating in religious education gatherings. After 6 days in
prison, they were released with suspended sentences of 5 years.
The use of suspended sentences appears to be a new government tactic to
discourage Baha'is from taking part in monthly religious
gatherings.
In September 1998, authorities began a nationwide operation to
disrupt the activities of the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning.
Also known as the "Open University," the Institute was established by
the Baha'i community shortly after the revolution to offer opportunities
in higher education to Baha'i students who had been denied access to the
country's high schools and universities. The Institute employed
Baha'i faculty and professors, many of whom had been dismissed from
teaching positions by the Government as a result of their faith, and
conducted classes in homes or offices owned or rented by Baha'is.
During the operation, which took place in at least 14 different cities,
36 faculty members were arrested, and a variety of personal property,
including books, papers, and furniture, either were destroyed or
confiscated. Government interrogators sought to force the detained
faculty members to sign statements acknowledging that the Open
University now was defunct and pledging not to collaborate with it in
the future. Baha'is outside the country report that none of the 36
detainees would sign the document. All but 4 of the 36 persons
detained during the September 1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute had been
released by November 1998.
In March 1999, Dr. Sina Hakiman, Farzad Khajeh Sharifabadi,
Habibullah Ferdosian Najafabadi, and Ziaullah Mirzapanah, the four
remaining detainees from the September 1998 raid, were convicted under
Article 498 of the Penal Code and sentenced to prison terms ranging from
3 to 10 years. In the court verdict, the four were accused of
having establishing a "secret organization" engaged in "attracting
youth, teaching against Islam, and teaching against the regime of the
Islamic Republic." According to Baha'i groups outside
Iran, the four taught general science and Persian literature
courses. In July 1999, Mirzapanah, who had been sentenced to 3
years in prison, became ill and was hospitalized. Prison
authorities allowed him to return home upon his recovery on the
understanding that they could find him whenever necessary. The
other three were released in December 1999.
The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a small
number of Baha'is in arbitrary detention, some at risk of execution, at
any given time. There were at least 10 Baha'is reported to be
under arrest for practicing their faith at year's end, 2 under sentence
of death.
Baha'is regularly are denied compensation for injury or criminal
victimization. Government authorities claim that only Muslim
plaintiffs are eligible for compensation in these circumstances. In
practice, Baha'is continue to be denied most forms of government
employment (see Section 5).
In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a
government policy directive on the Baha'is. According to the
directive, the Supreme Revolutionary Council instructed government
agencies to block the progress and development of the Baha'i community,
expel Baha'i students from universities, cut Baha'i links with groups
outside Iran, restrict employment of Baha'is, and deny Baha'is
"positions of influence," including those in education. The
Government claims that the directive is a forgery. However, it
appears to be an accurate reflection of current government practice.
In his 1996 report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance recommended
"that the ban on the Baha'i organization should be lifted to enable it
to organize itself freely through its administrative institutions, which
are vital in the absence of a clergy, so that it can engage fully in its
religious activities." In response to the Special Rapporteur's
concerns with regard to the lack of official recognition of the Baha'i
Faith, government officials stated that Baha'is "are not a religious
minority, but a political organization that was associated with the
Shah's regime, is against the Iranian Revolution, and engage in
espionage activities." The Government asserted to the Special
Rapporteur that, as individuals, all Baha'is were entitled to their
beliefs and protected under other articles of the Constitution as
citizens.
The Christian community is estimated at approximately 117,000,
according to government figures. Of these the majority are ethnic
Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans. Protestant denominations and
evangelical churches also are active, although nonethnically based
groups report a greater degree of restrictions on their
activities.
The authorities have become particularly vigilant in recent years in
curbing what is perceived as increasing proselytizing activities by
evangelical Christians, whose services are conducted in Persian.
Conversion of a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion can be considered
apostasy. Government officials have reacted to this perceived
activity by closing evangelical churches and arresting converts.
Members of evangelical congregations are required to carry membership
cards, photocopies of which must be provided to the authorities.
Worshipers are subject to identity checks by authorities posted outside
congregation centers. Meetings for evangelical services have been
restricted by the authorities to Sundays, and church officials have been
ordered to inform the Ministry of Information and Islamic Guidance
before admitting new members to their congregations.
As conversion by a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion may be considered
apostasy under traditional Shari'a (Islamic law) practices enforced in
the country, non-Muslims may not proselytize Muslims without putting
their own lives at risk. Evangelical church leaders are subject to
pressure from authorities to sign pledges committing them not to
evangelize Muslims or to allow Muslims to attend church services.
One organization reported in 1999 the deaths of 8 evangelical
Christians at the hands of authorities in the past 11 years, and between
15 and 23 disappearances between November 1997 and November 1998.
Oppression of evangelical Christians continued during the year.
Christian groups reported instances of government harassment of
churchgoers in Tehran, in particular against worshipers at the Assembly
of God congregation in the capital. Cited instances of harassment
included conspicuous monitoring outside Christian premises by
Revolutionary Guards to discourage Muslims or converts from entering
church premises and demands for presentation of identity papers of
worshipers inside. Iranian Christians International (ICI) detailed
the cases of Alireza and Mahboobeh Mahmoudian, converts to Christianity
and lay leaders of the Saint Simon the Zealot Osgofi Church in Shiraz,
who were forced to leave the country permanently in June 1998 after
continued harassment by the authorities. The ICI reported that
Alireza Mahmoudian had lost his job because of his conversion and had
been beaten repeatedly by Basiji and Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs on the
orders of government officials from the Ministry of Islamic
Guidance. His wife, Mahboobeh, also had been the subject of
intimidation, principally through frequent and aggressive interrogation
by government officials.
Estimates of the size of the Iranian Jewish community vary from
25,000 to 30,000. These figures represent a substantial reduction
from the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Jews who resided in the country
prior to the 1979 revolution.
While Jews are a recognized religious minority, allegations of
official discrimination are frequent. The Government's anti-Israel
policies, coupled with a perception among radicalized Muslim elements in
Iran that Jewish citizens support Zionism and the State of Israel,
create a threatening atmosphere for the small Jewish community.
Jewish leaders reportedly are reluctant to draw attention to official
mistreatment of their community due to fear of government
reprisal.
Some outside Jewish groups cite an increase in anti-Semitic
propaganda in the official and semiofficial media as adding to the
pressure felt by the Jewish community. One example cited is the
periodic publication of the anti-Semitic and fictitious Protocols of the
Elders of Zion, both by the Government and by periodicals associated
with hard-line elements of the Government. In 1986 the Iranian
Embassy in London was reported to have published and distributed the
Protocols in English. The Protocols also were published in serial
form in the country in 1994 and again in January 1999. On the
latter occasion they were published in Sobh, a conservative monthly
publication reportedly aligned with the security services.
There appears to be little restriction or interference with religious
practice or education; however, Jews were eased out of most government
positions after 1979. Jews are permitted to obtain passports and
to travel outside the country; however, with the exception of certain
business travelers, they are required by the authorities to obtain
government clearance (and pay additional fees) before each trip
abroad. The Government appears concerned about the emigration of
Jews and permission generally is not granted for all members of a Jewish
family to travel outside the country at the same time (see Section
2.d.).
In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested in the cities of
Shiraz and Isfahan. Among the group were several prominent rabbis,
teachers of Hebrew, and their students. The charges centered on
alleged acts of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense punishable by
death. The 13 were jailed for over 1 year, largely in solitary
confinement, without official charges or access to lawyers. In
April the defendants were appointed lawyers, and a closed trial
commenced in a revolutionary court in Shiraz. Human rights groups
and governments around the world criticized the lack of due process in
the proceedings. The Special Representative characterized them as
"in no way fair." On July 1, 10 of the 13, along with 2 Muslim
defendants, were convicted on charges of illegal contact with Israel,
conspiracy to form an illegal organization, and recruiting agents.
They received prison sentences ranging from 4 to 13 years. Three
were acquitted. Their lawyers filed an appeal and on September 21
an appeals court overturned the convictions for forming an illegal
organization and recruiting agents, but upheld the convictions for
illegal contacts with Israel. Their sentences were reduced to
between 2 and 9 years' imprisonment.
Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the March 1999 arrest of the 13
Jewish individuals coincided with an increase in anti-Semitic propaganda
in newspapers and journals associated with hardline elements of the
Government. Since the beginning of the trial, Jewish businesses in
Tehran and Shiraz have been targets of vandalism and boycotts, and Jews
reportedly suffered personal harassment and intimidation.
Human Rights Watch reported the death in May 1998 of Jewish
businessman Ruhollah Kakhodah-Zadeh, who was hanged in prison without a
public charge or legal proceeding. Reports indicate that
Kakhodah-Zadeh may have been killed for assisting Jews to
emigrate. As an accountant, Kakhoda-Zadeh had provided
power-of-attorney services for Jews departing the country.
The Government restricts the movement of several senior religious
leaders, some of whom have been under house arrest for years (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.), and often charges members of religious
minorities with crimes such as drug offenses, "confronting the regime,"
and apostasy (see Section 1.e.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government places some restrictions on these rights.
Citizens may travel to any part of the country, although there have been
restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas during times of occasional heavy
fighting. Roadblocks and security checks are common on routes
between major cities. Citizens may change their place of residence
without obtaining official permission. The Government requires
exit permits (a validation stamp placed in the traveler's passport) for
draft-age males and citizens who are politically suspect. Some
citizens, particularly those whose skills are in short supply and who
were educated at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit
permits. The Government restricts the movement of certain
religious minorities and of several religious leaders (see Sections 1.d.
and 2.c.).
Citizens returning from abroad sometimes are subject to search and
extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of
antigovernment activities abroad. Cassette tapes, printed
material, personal correspondence, and photographs are subject to
confiscation.
The Government permits Jews to travel abroad, but often denies them
the multiple-exit permits normally issued to other citizens. The
Government normally does not permit all members of a Jewish family to
travel abroad at the same time. Baha'is often experience
difficulty in obtaining passports. Women must obtain the
permission of their husband, father, or other living male relative in
order to obtain a passport. Married women must receive written
permission from their husbands before embarking on a trip outside the
country.
The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in accordance
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The Government generally cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. Although the Government
generally provides first asylum, the Government increased pressure on
some refugees to return to their home countries, particularly as the
economy has worsened.
The country hosts a large refugee population, mostly Afghans who fled
during the Soviet occupation. The Government and the UNHCR
estimate that there are approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees in the
country. Most subsist on itinerant labor, often moving from place
to place within the country. Between April and December, the
government and the UNHCR operated a joint program intended to facilitate
the repatriation of Afghans who did not have a well-founded fear of
persecution. Approximately 133,000 Afghans returned voluntarily
with UNHCR assistance, and another 50,000 returned with help from the
Government. There were reports in late 1998 and early 1999 of a
surge in the numbers of Afghans forcibly repatriated to their country by
government officials and military personnel. Reasons cited were a
worsening economic situation and anger over the murders in August 1998
of nine Iranian diplomats and journalists stationed at the Iranian
Consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif. There also were
reports during this period of civilian mob attacks against groups of
Afghan refugees, which resulted in numerous deaths.
The UNHCR estimates that there were about 386,000 Iraqi Kurdish and
Arab refugees in the country at year's end. Many of these Iraqi
refugees originally were expelled by Iraq at the beginning of the
Iran-Iraq war because of their suspected Iranian origin. In
numerous instances, both the Iraqi and Iranian Governments dispute their
citizenship, rendering many of them, in effect, stateless. Other
Iraqi refugees arrived following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Although the Government claims to host more than 30,000 refugees of
other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans,
Somalis, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, it has provided no information
about them or allowed the UNHCR or other organizations access to
them.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens to Change Their Government
The right of citizens to change their government is restricted.
The Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is selected for a life
term by the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader may also be
removed by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly itself is
restricted to clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by
popular vote from a list approved by the Government. There is no
separation of state and religion, and clerics dominate the
Government. The Government represses any attempts to separate
state and religion, or to alter the State's existing theocratic
foundation. The selection of candidates for elections effectively
is controlled by the Government.
The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed of six
Islamic clergymen and six lay members who review all laws for
consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution. The Council
also screens political candidates for ideological, political, and
religious suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a
theocratic state; clerics who disagree with government policies also
have been disqualified.
Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members of
the Majles, and the Assembly of Experts. Mohammad Khatami, a
former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who was impeached in
1992 by the Majles for "liberalism" and "negligence," was elected
President in May 1997. The Interior Ministry estimated that over
90 percent of the eligible population voted in that election.
During the campaign, there was considerable government intervention and
censorship. For example, the Council of Guardians reviewed 238
candidates, including a woman, but allowed only 4 individuals to
run. Three were clerics; all were men. Khatami won nearly 70
percent of the vote, with his greatest support coming from the middle
class, youth, minorities, and women. The election results were not
disputed, and the Government did not appear to have engaged in
fraud.
Elections were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly of
Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous
candidates, which led to criticism from many observers that the
Government improperly predetermined the election results.
In February 1999, elections for nationwide local councils were held
for the first time since the 1979 revolution. Government figures
indicated that roughly 280,000 candidates competed for 130,000 council
seats across the nation. Women were elected to seats in numerous
districts. The Councils do not appear to have been granted the
autonomy or authority that would make them effective or meaningful local
institutions; doing so could be viewed as a threat to the control of the
central Government.
Iran held elections for its 290 seat Majles in February. Of
over 6,000 candidates, 576 were disqualified before the elections by the
Council of Guardians, which represented a substantial decrease from the
44 percent who were disqualified before the 1996 elections. Most
of those disqualified were outspoken advocates of political reform,
including some of the most prominent supporters of President
Khatami. In addition, an Azeri activist was arrested in December
1999, reportedly to prevent him from registering to run in the elections
(see Sections 1.d. and 5). However, candidates with a wide range
of views were permitted to run. The elections resulted in a
landslide victory for moderate and reform candidates, who now constitute
a large majority in the Majles. Vigorous parliamentary debates
take place on various issues. However, the Supreme Leader and
other conservatives within the Government used constitutional provisions
to block much of the early reform legislation passed by the Majles.
Women are underrepresented in government. They hold 9 of 290
Majles seats. There are no female cabinet members. In 1997
President Khatami appointed the first female vice president (for
environmental protection) since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Masoumeh
Ebtekar, following his inauguration. Minister of Islamic Culture
and Guidance Ataollah Mohajerani appointed a second woman to a senior
post, Azam Nouri, when he chose her in 1997 as his Deputy Minister for
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. President Khatami appointed a
woman to serve as Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs.
Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians elect deputies to specially
reserved Majles seats. However, the UN Special Representative
noted in his September report frequent assertions that religious
minorities are, by law and practice, barred from being elected to a
representative body (except to the seats in the Majles reserved for
minorities), and from holding senior government or military
positions. Religious minorities are allowed to vote, but they may
not run for president.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights
groups. The Government denies the universality of human rights and
has stated that human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a
country's "culture and beliefs."
Various professional groups representing writers, journalists,
photographers, and others attempt to monitor government restrictions in
their field and harassment and intimidation against individual members
of their professions. However, their ability to meet, organize,
and effect change is curtailed severely by the Government.
International human rights NGO's such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International are not permitted to establish offices in or
conduct regular investigative visits to the country. Human Rights
Watch and members of a European judicial monitoring NGO were permitted
to send representatives to Shiraz for the trial of 13 Iranian Jews on
espionage charges (see Section 2.c.). However, they were not
permitted to monitor the trial proceedings.
The ICRC and the UNHCR both operate in the country. However,
the Government did not allow the U.N. Special Representative for Human
Rights in Iran to visit the country during the year. The Special
Representative last was allowed entry into the country to gather
information for his yearly report in 1996. However, the Special
Representative corresponded with government officials during the year,
and received several replies to his correspondence.
The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995
under the authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board
as an observer. In 1996 the Government established a human rights
committee in the Majles. Most observers believe that these bodies
lack independence. The U.N. Special Representative published
statistics provided by the IHRC indicating that in the period from March
1998 to March 1999, 1,051 files were opened on the basis of complaints
received by the organization. Of those the highest number of
complaints were related to the judiciary. Of a total of about
3,000 currently active files, approximately 1,000 were related to women
and women's issues.
In April 1999, Mohammad Zia'i Far, secretary of the IHRC, stated in a
press interview that illegal detention centers continue to exist in
Iran. The press also reported that the IHRC sought permission from
the Special Court for the Clergy to visit imprisoned cleric Mohsen
Kadivar in Evin Prison in March 1999 (see Section 1.e.). The
request reportedly was never answered. Kadivar was released during
the summer. In 1998 Ziaei-Far reportedly complained about the use
by police of "special detention centers" to conduct coercive
interrogations of detainees (see Section 1.c.) and acknowledged
widespread human rights violations. Section
5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
In general the Government does not discriminate on the basis of race,
disability, language, or social status. The Government does
discriminate on the basis of religion and sex.
Women
Although reported cases of spousal abuse and violence against women
occur, the statistics on such reports are not available publicly.
Abuse in the family is considered a private matter and seldom is
discussed publicly. In May 1999, the President's Advisor on
Women's Affairs was quoted in the press as stating that "one cannot
claim that violence against women does not take place in Iran."
The Special Representative noted in his September report that media
reporting on the situation of women has diminished, in part due to the
closure of the reform-oriented press (see Section 2.a.).
Women have access to primary and advanced education; however, social
and legal constraints limit their professional opportunities. In
September the Majles approved a controversial bill to allow single women
to travel abroad for graduate education. The legislation was under
consideration by the Council of Guardians at year's end. Women are
represented in many fields of the work force, and the Government has not
prevented women from entering many traditionally male-dominated fields,
including medicine, dentistry, journalism and agriculture.
However, many women choose not to work outside the home. A 1985
law enacted by the Government instituted 3 months of paid maternity
leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing mothers to feed their
babies. Pension benefits for women were established under the same
law, which also decreed that companies hiring women should provide
day-care facilities for young children of female employees.
The State enforces gender segregation in most public spaces, and
prohibits women mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to
them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses and
enter public buildings, universities, and airports through separate
entrances. Women are prohibited from attending male sporting
events, although this restriction does not appear to be enforced
universally. While the enforcement of a conservative Islamic dress
codes has varied with the political climate since the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1989, what women wear in public is not entirely a matter of
personal choice. Women are subject to harassment by the
authorities if their dress or behavior is considered inappropriate, and
may be sentenced to flogging or imprisonment for such violations.
The law prohibits the publication of pictures of uncovered women in the
print media, including pictures of foreign women. There are
penalties for failure to observe Islamic dress codes at work (see
Section 6.a.).
Discrimination against women is reinforced by law through provisions
of the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those sections
dealing with family and property law. Shortly after the 1979
revolution, the Government repealed the Family Protection Law, a
hallmark bill that was adopted in 1967, which gave women increased
rights in the home and workplace, and replaced it with a legal system
based largely on Shari'a practices. In 1998 the Majles passed
legislation that mandated segregation of the sexes in the provision of
medical care. The bill provided for women to be treated only by
female physicians and men by male physicians and raised questions about
the quality of care that women could receive under such a regime,
considering the current imbalance between the number of trained and
licensed male and female physicians and specialists.
In October the Parliament passed a bill to raise the legal age of
marriage for women from 9 to 15. However, the Council of Guardians
in November rejected the bill as contrary to Islamic law, although even
under the current law, marriage at the minimum age is rare. All
women, no matter the age, must have the permission of their father or a
living male relative in order to marry. The law allows for the
practice of Siqeh, or temporary marriage, a Shi'a custom in which a
woman or a girl may become the wife of a married or single Muslim male
after a simple and brief religious ceremony. The Siqeh marriage
can last for a night or as little as 30 minutes. The bond is not
recorded on identification documents, and, according to Islamic law, men
may have as many Siqeh wives as they wish. Such wives are not
granted rights associated with traditional marriage.
The Penal Code includes provisions that mandate the stoning of women
and men convicted of adultery (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). Under
legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to divorce, and
regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially broadened the grounds on
which a woman may seek a divorce. However, a husband is not
required to cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In 1986 the
Government issued a 12-point "contract" to serve as a model for marriage
and divorce, which limits the privileges accorded to men by custom and
traditional interpretations of Islamic law. The model contract
also recognized a divorced woman's right to a share in the property that
couples acquire during their marriage and to increased alimony
rights. Women who remarry are forced to give up to the child's
father custody of children from earlier marriages. In 1998 the
Majles passed a law that granted custody of minor children to the mother
in certain divorce cases in which the father is proven unfit to care for
the child (the measure was enacted because of the complaints of mothers
who had lost custody of their children to former husbands with drug
addictions and criminal records). Muslim women may not marry
non-Muslim men. The testimony of a woman is worth only half that
of a man in court (see Section 1.e.). A married woman must obtain
the written consent of her husband before traveling outside the country
(see Section 2.d.).
Children
Most children have access to education through the 12th grade (it is
compulsory to age 11), and to some form of health care. There is
no known pattern of child abuse.
People With Disabilities
There is no available information regarding whether the Government
has legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility for the
disabled. However, the Cable News Network reported in 1996 on the
harsh conditions in an institution for retarded children who had been
abandoned by their parents. Film clips showed children tied or
chained to their beds, in filthy conditions, and without appropriate
care. It is not known to what extent this represents the typical
treatment of the disabled.
Religious Minorities
Members of all religious minorities suffer varying degrees of
officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in the areas of
employment, education, and housing. Applicants for public-sector
employment are screened for their adherence to Islam. The law
stipulates penalties for government workers who do not observe "Islam's
principles and rules." Article 144 of the Constitution states that
"the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an Islamic army,"
which is "committed to an Islamic ideology," and must "recruit into its
service individuals who have faith in the objectives of the Islamic
Revolution and are devoted to the cause of achieving its goals."
Apostasy, or conversion from Islam to another religion, is punishable by
death.
The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities suffer
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in
the areas of employment, education, and public accommodations (see
Section 2.d.). For example, members of religious minorities
generally are barred from becoming school principals. Muslims who
convert to Christianity also suffer discrimination. Apostasy, or
conversion from Islam to another religion, may be punishable by
death.
University applicants are required to pass an examination in Islamic
theology. Although public-school students receive instruction in
Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious minorities
to higher education.
Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits and incurring
heavier punishments than Muslims.
Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the arrest of 13 Jewish
individuals in February and March 1999, as well as their subsequent
trial during the year, coincided with an increase in anti-Semitic
propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hard-line elements
of the Government (see Section 2.c.). They also note that the
Shirazi Jewish community, one of the oldest remaining Jewish communities
outside Israel, had been under close surveillance by government
authorities prior to the arrests and had been warned by the authorities
against certain activities, such as the publication in Persian of
scriptures and guidelines for the treatment of kosher foods.
In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a
government policy directive to block the progress of Baha'is (see
Section 2.c.).
Properties belonging to the Baha'i community as a whole, such as
places of worship and graveyards, were confiscated by the Government in
the years after the 1979 revolution and, in some cases, defiled.
Baha'is are prevented from enrolling in universities. However,
other Government restrictions have eased; Baha'is currently may obtain
ration booklets and send their children to public elementary and
secondary schools. Thousands of Baha'is who were dismissed from
government jobs in the early 1980's receive no unemployment benefits and
have been required to repay the Government for salaries or pensions
received from the first day of employment. Those unable to do so
face prison sentences (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Kurds seek greater autonomy from the central Government and
continue to suffer from government discrimination. The Kurds'
status as Sunni Muslims is an aggravating factor in their relations with
the Shi'a-dominated government. These tensions predate the
revolution. Kurds often are suspected by government authorities of
harboring separatist or foreign sympathies. These suspicions have
led to sporadic outbreaks of fighting between government forces and
Kurdish groups. Human Rights Watch reported in September 1997 that
in the wake of the Gulf War and the creation of an autonomous Kurdish
zone in northern Iraq, Iranian authorities increased their military
presence in Kurdish areas of Iran, which often led to human rights
abuses against Kurds. Abuses included destruction of villages,
forced migrations, and widespread mining of Kurdish property. In
1994 government agents killed Dr. Abdul Rahman Gassemlou, a
representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran in Vienna.
In the wake of the February 1999 arrest of Kurdish Workers Party
leader Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey, Iranian Kurds demonstrated in numerous
cities in Iranian Kurdistan. In several instances, security forces
suppressed the demonstrations by force. Human rights groups
reported at least 20 deaths and several hundred arrests during the
violence (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
Azeris are well integrated into the Government and society, but
complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. The Government
traditionally has viewed Azeri nationalism as threatening, particularly
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of an
independent Azerbaijan. Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the
cultural rights of Azeris, was arrested in December 1999.
Azeri groups maintain that the arrest was made to prevent his
registration as a candidate for the February parliamentary elections
(see Sections 1.d. and 3).
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Labor Code grants workers the right to establish unions; however,
the Government does not allow independent unions to exist. A
national organization known as the Worker's House, founded in 1982, is
the sole authorized national labor organization. It serves
primarily as a conduit for the Government to exert control over
workers. The leadership of the Worker's House coordinates
activities with Islamic labor councils, which are made up of
representatives of the workers and one representative of management in
industrial, agricultural, and service organizations of more than 35
employees. These councils also function as instruments of
government control, although they frequently have been able to block
layoffs and dismissals.
In 1991 the Government published a new Labor Code
that allowed employers and employees to establish
guilds. The guilds issue vocational licenses and help members find
jobs.
The Government does not tolerate any strike deemed to be at odds with
its economic and labor policies. In 1993 the Parliament passed a
law that prohibits strikes by government workers. It also
prohibits government workers from having contacts with foreigners and
stipulates penalties for failure to observe Islamic dress codes and
principles at work. Nevertheless, strikes occur, and apparently in
increasing numbers as the economy has worsened. A European-based
labor organization that follows Iranian labor issues reported 181
protests and strikes by workers in the period from March 1998 to March
1999. These reportedly included strikes and protests by oil,
textile, electrical manufacturing, and metal workers, and by the
unemployed.
Newspapers in 1999 reported an "unauthorized rally" by thousands of
workers over the Government's labor policies and the poor economy.
Instances of late or partial pay for government workers reportedly are
common.
There are no known affiliations with international labor
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize independently and negotiate
collective bargaining agreements. No information is available on
mechanisms used to set wages. It is not known whether labor
legislation and practice in the export processing zones differ from the
law and practice in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Penal Code provides that the Government may require any person
who does not have work to take suitable employment; however, this does
not appear to be enforced regularly. This provision has been
criticized frequently by the International Labor Organization (ILO) as
contravening ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. There is no
information available on the Government's policy on forced and bonded
labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment
The Labor Law prohibits employment of minors under 15 years of age
and places special restrictions on the employment of minors under age
18. Education is compulsory until age 11. The law permits
children to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some small
businesses. By law women and minors may not be employed in hard
labor or, in general, night work. Information on the extent to
which these regulations are enforced is not available. There is no
information available on the Government's policy on forced and bonded
labor by children (see Section 6.c.). A 1985 law provides for 3
months of paid maternity leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for
nursing mothers to feed their babies.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code empowers the Supreme Labor Council to establish annual
minimum wage levels for each industrial sector and region. It is
not known if the minimum wages are adjusted annually or enforced.
The Labor Code stipulates that the minimum wage should be sufficient to
meet the living expenses of a family and should take inflation into
account. Under current poor economic conditions, many middle-class
citizens must work two or even three jobs to support their
families. The daily minimum wage was raised in March 1997 to $2.80
(8,500 rials). This wage apparently is not sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Information on
the percentage of the working population covered by minimum wage
legislation is not available.
The Labor Code establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum, with
1 weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid annual
leave and several paid public holidays.
According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by the
Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for promoting
workplace safety and health. The Council reportedly has issued 28
safety directives, and oversees the activities of 3,000 safety
committees established in enterprises employing more than 10
persons. Labor organizations outside the country allege that
hazardous work environments are common in Iran, and result in thousands
of worker deaths per year. It is not known how well the Ministry's
inspectors enforce regulations. It is not known whether workers
may remove themselves from hazardous situations without risking the loss
of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons
The law does not prohibit specifically trafficking in persons;
however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from,
within, or through the country.
*The United States does not have an embassy in Iran. This report draws
heavily on non-U.S. Government sources.
[End.]
©Copyright 2001, US Department of State
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