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course of civilization and pan-Asianism
REPORTER: What do you think of Western civilization?
GANDHI: It would be a good idea. According to the guidelines provided to
those applying for U.S. citizenship, a person may decline to take the oath of
loyalty to the U.S. Constitution if this oath conflicts with a religious
belief. Despite the nation-state's prerogative to make deep claims upon the
loyalty of its citizens, it often recognizes that the highest truths are not
necessarily to be found within the national community, but in a transcendent
or universal realm. Indeed, nations tend to recognize the superiority of
religious truths because their own raison d'etre is often founded in
a spiritual or universal truth. The discourse of civilization in the
era of nation-states is closely tied to this yearning for a
transcendent spiritual purpose.
This essay deals with the transformations in the discourse of
civilization in the twentieth century and its complex relationship
with nationalism, particularly in East Asia. Nationalism and racism
were not the only sources of identity in the twentieth century. For
many millions of people in the world, the older spiritual and
religious ideals incorporated in a new conception of civilization
continue to be an even more potent source of moral authority. The
essay considers the ways in which the ideas of Asian civilization,
East Asian civilization, and eastern civilization were expressed,
realized, and embodied in various intellectual, political, cultural,
and social movements during the interwar years in East Asia. The
critical problem in understanding civilization during this period is
the extent to which it could be identified with or appropriated by a
nationalist goal. Although nationalism, too, sought its ultimate
meaning in civilization, it tried equally to manipulate it for
expansionist purposes. As long as nationalists were able to deploy
civilization as a supplement to nationalism, the civilizational idea
could scarcely realize its promise as the higher authoritative
principle from which the nation-state itself could be judged. PART 1:
A GENEALOGY OF CIVILIZATION
The relationship between nations and civilizations transformed
sometime during or at the end of the First World War. From the late
nineteenth century until that time, the signifier Civilization had
become established as a singular and universal phenomenon in much of
the world (Gong 1984, 12). During this period, Western imperial
nations invoked the signifier to justify their conquest as a
civilizing mission. Whole continents were subjugated and held in
thrall because they were not constituted as civilized nations by
means of a formulation where to be a nation was to be civilized and
vice versa. To be sure, the idea that there were civilizations other
than that of Europe or of Christianity had been around from at least
the eighteenth century; during the nineteenth century, however, the
singular conception of Civilization based originally upon Christian
and Enlightenment values came not only to be dominant but to be the
only criterion whereby sovereignty could be claimed in the world. In
this way, it also became clear that to be a nation was to belong to a
higher, authorizing order of civilization.
Arising in the context of European domination of the non-Western
world this conception could be specifically found in the legal
language of various "unequal treaties" and its interpretation by the
international lawyers of the time. At an explicit level, the term
Civilization in these treaties and interpretations referred
principally to the ability and willingness of states to protect life,
property, and freedoms as rights (particularly for foreigners), but
this usage necessarily also presupposed and demanded the existence of
the institutions of the modern European state, and its goals, values,
and practices, ranging from the pursuit of material progress to
Civilized manners and clothing. By the late nineteenth century,
international law and its standard of "civilization" became
increasingly positivist and reflected the social Darwinist conception
that certain races were more civilized than others. The renowned
scholar of international jurisprudence, James Lorimer, declared, "No
modern contribution to science seems destined to influence
international politics and jurisprudence ... as ethnology, or the
science of races" (quoted in Gong 1984, 49). While a hierarchy of
races with different capacities to achieve civilization seemed
natural, it should be noted that the notion of Civilization did not
theoretically preclude the ability of a "race" to become civilized.1
At the same time, from the late nineteenth century onward, an
alternative formulation of civilization was developing within the
penumbra of this hegemonic conception. Assuming various inchoate
shapes at the intersections of multiple discourses, it would not
become recognizable and dominant until the end of the First World
War. Most significant among these discourses in East Asia were the
older imperial Chinese conception of wenming, the Christian and
particularly Jesuit valorization of Chinese civilization, the
Orientalist studies of Sir William Jones and others in Calcutta, the
world Buddhist revival, and the Herderian notion of Kultur, among
others (Schwab 1984; Bunzl 1996; Ketelaar i99o; Bechert 1984).
Douglas Howland has elegaically documented the death of the imperial
Chinese notion of the civilized world or wenming when the exchanges
between Chinese and Japanese diplomats conducted through "brush-
talk," signifying mastery-and thereby affirmation-of the world of the
written character, became evidently irrelevant to the Japanese and
the world around them. Nonetheless, even as Fukuzawa Yukichi was
exhorting Japan to escape from Asia (datsua) and become Civilized,
both Japanese and Chinese were reworking vestigial expressions of the
old Chinese notions of common civilization (tongwen/dobun, tongjiao/
dokyo) as well as improvisations upon these ideas influenced by
contemporary social Darwinism, for example, the neologism tongzhong/
doshu or common race (Howland 1996, 262 n.22; Reynolds 1993, 22, 28).
While these efforts at the turn of the century may have represented
an effort to create an alternative East Asian civilization, they were
still closely associated with the social Darwinist ideas underlying
Civilization. At any rate they did not make much headway.
Also relevant to the transformation of the conception of
civilization was the emergence of the idea of a world religion. Heinz
Bechert has identified the emergence of "Buddhist modernism" in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century beginning with the Christian-
Buddhist debates in Sri Lanka, the initiatives taken by Sri Lankan
Buddhists and their Western supporters in the Theosophical Society,
and the forging of international links between Buddhists in Sri
Lanka, Japan, and the West. Indeed, Sri Lankans and Japanese Buddhist
thinkers have remained in the forefront of contributions to
contemporary Buddhist thought (Bechert 1984, 274-275).2 In East Asia,
James Ketelaar has demonstrated how Buddhism could survive the
persecution of a new Shinto national cult during the Meiji period
only by refashioning itself as a "world religion." In all of these
cases, the end product resembled much less any particular or lived
experience of Buddhism or Hinduism than an abstract, rationalized,
modernized, and, perhaps most of all, Christianized body of thought
that served to represent the core of another civilization. Central to
this development was the 1893 Chicago Congress of World Religions in
which each of these traditions first gained publicity-indeed, were
publicly produced as world religions (Ketelaar 990).3
Finally, there is a European-specifically German-intellectual
current, identifiable in part with Herder's notion of Kultur/culture
that transmuted into the new idea of civilization by the end of the
Great War. Herder's notion of Kultur is well known and I will trace
no more than its broad outlines here.4 This intellectual tradition
can, significantly, be found in what may be the most important
intellectual statement of the new conception of civilization, Oswald
Spengler's Decline of the West. Ironically, if not unexpectedly,
Spengler does not refer to the entities of his world history as
Civilizations, but Cultures or Kultur. This is because he reserves
Civilization for a stage, the final stage, the frozen stage of a
dynamic, evolving Culture.5 At any rate, for our purposes, his
cultures are equivalent to what we have been calling the alternative
conception of civilization: multiple, spiritual, and-as the highest
expression of a people's achievements, virtues, and authenticity-
authorizing. At the moment of German defeat in war, the Germanic
notion of Kultur gained a significant victory over the notion of a
universal Civilization which measured value only according to certain
Western standards of progress.
To be sure, I am not seeking an explanation for the triumph of
civilization from the history of ideas. Rather, this triumph must be
understood in relation to that other triumph of the world system of
nationstates and nationalism, as a global ideology that ironically
requires the conception of a transcendent civilization. Spengler's
notionsare important partly because they were so influential in
global discourse-relayed to the English speaking world in many ways
by Arnold Toynbee-and thus constructive of this new discourse of
civilization. They clarified the inchoate shapes that had hovered in
the penumbra of Civilization. Moreover, I believe it is important to
recognize that the new discourse of civilization-especially Eastern
civilization-was affirmed in the West before it was confirmed in
Asia. In this sense, too, civilization remains a postcolonial
concept.
Spengler professes to examine two themes: The narrower one is the
decline of the West as a civilization, which as a thing already-
become rather than coming-to-be, was predestined to decline; but his
study also occasioned a new philosophy-"the philosophy of the future"-
of the world-as-history, in contrast to the world-as-nature which had
hitherto been the only theme of philosophy (Spengler 1962, 5). In his
sweeping vision of the new world history, Spengler lays out the basic
features, many of which have endured in our understanding of
civilization to this day. First is the critique of linear history
based on the ancient--medieval-modern division which sets the stage
to make the rest of the world turn around the "little part-world"
that is Europe (Spengler, 12). In its place, Spengler traces many
mighty Cultures that develop upon the model of organisms, each
undergoing its own temporal cycle of rise and decline, and each
developing in isolation from the others. Needless to say, a culture
cannot be judged from the standpoint of another because "truths are
truths only in relation to a particular mankind" (Spengler, 35); also
because the goal of history is to seek the relationship that
"inwardly binds together the expression-forms of all branches of a
culture" (Spengler, 6). Thus does he distinguish the new history from
science and in the process confirms the irreducible authority of
Culture/civilization.
In Spengler, Culture is a fundamentally spiritual or ideal
phenomenon the history of which allows us to grasp its temporal
character, its principle of becoming-of the world-as-history. It is
this ideational or spiritual quality that authoritatively
distinguished it from other Cultures, and would become, or perhaps
already reflected, the most salient characteristic of the new
conception of civilization. Ideas of Eastern versus Western
civilizations which increasingly accompanied the Great War were
premised upon this ideal of civilizational spirituality. In the West,
the most influential scholar to propagate and develop these ideas was
Arnold Toynbee. In the course of over forty years (1 920S-I960s)
during which he wrote the twelve volumes of A Study of World History,
Toynbee broke with the vestigial progressivist vision of (essentially
Western) civilization and even departed in some measure from
Spengler's view of hermetically closed organic civilizations (McNeill
1989 103, 165; Bentley 1996, 7). But perhaps most significant was his
conception of the role of religion in civilizations. In contrast to
Gibbon and others, who often associated Christianity with barbarism
as the destroyers of Civilization, Toynbee, in his earlier volumes,
already viewed religion as a kind of aid to civilization, as a
chrysalis which preserved the germs of an older civilization. By the
1940s, he began to see the rise and fall of civilizations as
subsidiary to the growth of religion (Toynbee 1948, 230-234). In this
way, Toynbee came to reverse earlier notions of Civilization which
were frequently founded upon a notion of disenchantment. Thus did
Toynbee seek to counter James Fraser's view of religion in the West-
that, according to him, echoed Gibbon's-as having sapped the
manliness of early Europe (Toynbee, 228). For Toynbee, from now on,
the goal of history, the historical function of civilization, was to
seek ever-deeper spiritual insight (Toynbee, 238-239). In the final
years of his life Toynbee was drawn to ideas of a common global
civilization originating in the technological achievements of the
West, but spiritually regenerated by the major world civilizations.
It is not surprising to find his ideas fall on fertile ground in
Japan where he was accepted as a major public thinker and conducted a
series of dialogues with the leader of the Soka Gakkai, a new
religion nourished precisely on such ideas of the blending of East
and Western civilizations (McNeill 1989, 269-273).
What were the conditions for the emergence of this new view of
civilization? The view surfaced in tandem with the disillusionment
produced during the Great War with the idea of the "civilizing
mission." "The nature of the battle on the Western Front made a
mockery of the European conceit that discovery and invention were
necessarily progressive and beneficial to humanity," writes Michael
Adas (Adas 1993, io9). Writer after writer denounced the materialism
and destructiveness of Western Civilization. At the same time, the
wider political forces produced by the end of the war and the new
balance of power, namely, the beginnings of decolonization, the
emergence of new nation-states, and the concomitant ascendancy of the
ideology of antiimperialism, found little use for Civilization. To
many in these nascent movements, Civilization was increasingly seen
not only to be compatible with, but to have furnished the moral
ground for, imperialism and war. The final triumph of nationalism or
national self-determination over imperialism as the hegemonic global
ideology was clinched by two political developments: the Soviet
revolution and Woodrow Wilson's advocacy of the right to national
self-determination in the aftermath of the First War (Barraclough
1964, 118-122). The philosophy of Spengler and Toynbee reflected the
world as a newly unified theater of history (Bentley 1996, 3).
Spengler's insistence on seeing Europe as just a bit-part of the
history of humanity (rather than its telos) was well suited to a
changing world where other actors (nations) had learned the language
through which they could demand to be heard. Not only were new
nations beginning to emerge all over the world, from the early part
of the century, they were also telling their histories in the same
linear mode of emergent national subjects linked to classical
civilizations. Thus was nationalism genetically linked to a
universalism greater than itself, just as globalism itself came to be
figured through the language of nationalism.
Notably at the onset of the Second World War, Norbert Elias was to
tell us that Europeans had already been subtly transforming the
notion of Civilization-at least in relation to each other if not to
the world they colonized. Elias defined the idea of civilization
thus: "The concept expresses the self-consciousness of the West. One
could even say: the national consciousness. It sums up everything in
which Western society of the last two or three centuries believes
itself superior to earlier societies or `more primitive' contemporary
ones. By this term Western society seeks to describe what constitutes
its special character and what it is proud of. the level of its
technology, the nature of its manners, the development of its
scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more" (Elias
1978, 3-4). Although Elias notes that this civilization allows
Europeans to think of themselves transnationally as the "upperclass
to large sections of the non-European world" (Elias, 50), he is much
more concerned with its transformation within intra-European
relationships into "national" civilizations. The German bourgeoisie
articulated its role as the leader of the emerging German nation by
championing Kultur, which it opposed to the French idea of
civilization as merely external and superficial court etiquette
(Elias, 29-34). Similarly, the French bourgeoisie in the same century
adapted the courtly notion of civilization into a national
representation with which it opposed the Germans (Elias, 38-40).
Given the thrust, timing, and references in the work, the reader
may well be led to believe that this transmutation of civilization
has much to do with the European national wars that enveloped the
world in the twentieth century. This may thus prefigure the shift
from a singular notion of Civilization to multiple civilizations, at
least within Europe. At the same time, I believe that Elias tends to
conflate civilization with nation a little too readily, particularly
when these nations face societies perceived as radically different.
In doing so, he elides a very significant ambiguity in the new
conception of civilization: that territorial nations are lesser than
the civilizations from which they emanate; that the principle of
civilization is generative of value for the territorial nation; that
the principle of territoriality may also be in conflict with the
principle of civilization; and that nations spend a lot of energy
seeking to match the formal sovereignty deriving from territorial or
civic nationalism with the source of authenticity or truth of the
nation deriving from civilization.
I seek to build my own understanding of the new "civilizations" by
reformulating Elias's insights. First of all, it is necessary not
only to sustain but also highlight the distinction implied in Elias's
analysis, between civilization as equal to the nation and
civilization as transnational.6 Indeed, nations require this duality
because they often need to move between the two positions. New
nations seek the transnational conception of civilization because it
is only as a transterritorial, universal ideal-of say, Islam or
Confucianism-with its potential capacity to reveal the truth of the
human condition and embrace all of humanity, that this
(civilizational) self can achieve recognition from the Other. At the
heart of the critique of Civilization, launched by both Western and
non-Western intellectuals after the Great War, was the betrayal of
the unive\rsalizing promise of the "civilizing mission"a mission
which exemplified the desire not (simply) to conquer the Other, but
to be desired by the Other. In this critique, Civilization had
forfeited the right to represent the highest goals or ultimate values
of humanity and was no longer worthy of being desired, or even
recognized, by the other. In so opposing the legally articulated
notion of the good and valuable posed by Civilization, the
alternative civilizational self had to counterpose a still higher
good and a truth that was authentically universal. Note here the
close relationship, indeed, mirroring, by civilization of the older
Western conception of Civilization. It is the spiritual, moral, and
universal core of civilizations that furnishes nations with the same
kind of authenticating and authorizing function that Civilization
furnished for Western imperialist nations. Note further that the gap
between the territorial nation and civilization is not only
territorial, but principled. Because the spiritual impulse of a
civilization tends to be universalizing, national boundaries are
ultimately artificial and limiting. The transcendent stance of
civilization thus may permit a critique of the nation and, as we
shall see, can produce the problem of loyalties divided between those
to the nation and those to civilization.7
At the same time, there is no doubt that the territorial nation
seeks to equate itself with a civilization. Elias is surely right
about the role of the bourgeoisie-loosely defined-in formulating this
exalted and noble vision of the nation and promoting it as a means of
exercising its hegemony both within and without the nation. In this
aspect, civilization does become the highly self-conscious ideology
of the nation. One might argue that for nations such as China or
India, just as for France or England, one can stretch the nation to
fit the civilization-- territorially, if not in principle. But how
can smaller nations do so? I believe there are several narrative
strategies within the historiography of nations that can be deployed
by many nations to be the true representative or the leader of, if
not equivalent to, a certain civilizational tradition. The most
powerful of these-at least in terms of its impact on the domestic
population-was the Japanese claim of inheriting the leadership of
Asian civilization because of its success in mastering Western
Civilization; we shall deal with this in the next section. But one
can think of how Sri Lankan intellectuals went about constructing a
Buddhist civilization in a way that made it the leader of such a
project. Consider also the promotion of pre-Columbian civilizations
among the relevant Latin American nations or pre-Islamic
civilizations among Middle Eastern nations. Civilization in the era
of nationstates thus needs to both transcend and serve the
territorial nation.
We have noted that civilization both opposes the Civilization of
imperialism, but also depends on it in the way that it authorizes
this opposition for nations. This is most evident in the selection of
those elements and themes from the history of this alleged
civilization and their reconstruction in a narrative that will enable
it to perform this authorizing function. The basic approach involves
combining elements that are a) identical to and b) the binary
opposite of the constituents of Civilization. One strategy is to
rediscover elements identical to Civilized society within the
suppressed traditions of civilization: Confucian rationality,
Buddhist humanism, Hindu logic, and so on. Another strategy
identifies the opposite of the West in Asian civilizations:
"peaceful" as opposed to "warlike," "spiritual" as opposed to
"material," "ethical" as opposed to "decadent," "natural" as opposed
to "rational "timeless" as opposed to "temporal," and more. Finally,
the nation authorizes its opposition to imperialist Civilization by
synthesizing or harmonizing the binaries after the equivalence has
been established. Thus Western materialism will be balanced by
Eastern spirituality and modernity redeemed. Indeed, because the
categories of civilization have to be translated into the new lexicon
of modernity they are more meaningful to a contemporary sensibility
than to the historical society they allegedly represent. In these
ways, civilization is always re-made in reference to Civilization.
Contemporary analysts, such as Samuel Huntington, whose notion of
civilization involves ancient continuities that are, historically and
conceptually, pure and closed entities, are, like contemporary
nationalists, reifying a relatively recent construction.
PART II: ASIAN CIVILIZATION IN JAPAN AND CHINA
The story of how non-Western societies, beginning with Japan,
began to overhaul their entire society and cosmology in an effort to
become Civilized and sovereign, is a well known one. The Meiji period
represented the height of the effort to make Japan a Civilized nation
in the name of bunmei kaika (Civilization and enlightenment). It is
worth reiterating, however, that the roughly ten-year period-between
1894, when it signed the Aoki-Kimberley treaty with Great Britain,
and the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905-during which Japan
succeeded in reversing the unequal treaties and began to gain access
to "Civilized" society, was a time bounded by two successful modern
wars (Gong 1984, 190). For equally well-known reasons detailed in
histories of the modernization of China, it took nearly fifty more
years for China to have its unequal treaties finally abrogated in
1943 and be granted Civilized status. Indeed, the European conception
of Civilization did not penetrate Chinese discourses until the turn
of the century. The great reformer and historian Liang Qichao was
perhaps the most influential advocate of the necessity for China to
become Civilized. Liang was most definitely aware of the legal
dimensions of Civilization and sought to make China into a Civilized
legal nation even before his exile in Japan following the failure of
the 1898 reforms. However, he acquired a fuller understanding of it
during his stay in Japan where, influenced by the writings of
Fukuzawa Yukichi and Kato Hiroyuki among others, he perceived its
significance in relation to the new ideas of History and progress.
Nothing could have been further from the Confucian notion of wenming
when he wrote, "Competition is the mother of Civilization." Through
the writings of Liang and others, Civilization became, in the words
of Ishikawa, a "keyword" in Chinese intellectual discourse by the
first decade of the new century, when essays with titles containing
phrases such as "civilized revolution," "civilized drama," and
"civilized races" began to appear among the modem reading community
(Liang cited in Ishikawa 1995, 8, 9-10). Beginning from the late Qing
reforms at the turn of the century ( 1902), and certainly from the
Republican revolution of 1911, the Chinese regimes tried strenuously
to make Chinese laws fully compatible with the general expectation of
"Civilized" countries through, for instance, the Revised Law
Codification Commission. But because the political situation was
beyond real control, these regimes could not implement this legal and
political system which, according to the 1926 Commission on
Extraterritoriality in China, would make it a Civilized nation (Gong,
157).
But even as the regimes in both countries appeared to embrace the
standard of Civilization in order to become fully sovereign, this
embrace by no means excluded the development of alternative
conceptions of civilization, which, as we have seen, burgeoned
particularly during the First World War. Thus, for instance, Zhang
Binglin and his admirer Lu Xun quickly saw through the universalist
pretensions of Civilization when it was being fervently propagated in
the early i9oos. In Japan the notion of an alternate civilization
centered around the concept of Asia. Although it was a conception
that the Japanese distinctly inherited from the Europeans only in the
nineteenth century, it became a powerful, if changing, spatial
representation in relation to which Japanese identity came to be
repeatedly made and remade (Yamamuro 1994). Among the sharpest
critics of Civilization was Okakura Tenshin, who early on perceived
the critical link between warfare and Civilization in Japan. Among
the first bilingual and bi-cultural thinkers in Meiji Japan, Okakura
was able to gain some distance from the frenzied effort to "escape
Asia" in Japan and build upon emergent Western ideas of an
alternative Asian civilization. The case of Okakura is instructive of
the extent to which the "rediscovery" or production of an alternative
Asian civilization entailed a deep familiarity with European modes of
constructing the idea of a civilization. Indeed, Okakura's conversion
to Asian civilization came during his first voyage to Europe which
turned out to be a voyage of self-discovery. To be sure, he was aware
of differences between Asian "civilizations," but he believed that
they all differed from Western Civilization in principle-in their
promotion of peace and beauty. Okakura saw Japan as the "exhibition
hall" of all of these Asian civilizations but did not advocate what
would become commonplace in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War-
that Japan become the leader of an Asian federation because it could
harmonize the best of Asian civilization with that of Civilization.
Rather he urged the various Asian nations to look within their common
traditions to produce an alternative to the aggressive and dominating
Civilization of the West (Ueda 1996, 16-18).8
As Hashikawa Bunzo has revealed, Pan-Asianism in Japan contained
both of these trends: the solidarity-oriented, non-dominating
conception of Japan's role in reviving Asia, as well as the
conception of Japan as, what we might call in short, the harmonizing
or synthesizing leader. Pan-Asianism in Japan both fed and resist\ed
the nascent imperialism of that nation (Hashikawa 1980, 331-340.
Increasingly after the Russo-Japanese War, however, the view that
Japan was the only Asian nation capable of rescuing Asia and
harmonizing East and West civilizations began to take hold. This then
became the characteristic Japanese response to the aporia of
nationalism: to absorb civilization within the confines of the nation
and to maintain the separation of civilization so it may continue to
perform the authorizing function. Because it "belonged" to Asia, the
Japanese nation could bring to modernity the timeless sacrality of
Asia, and because it had mastered Western Civilization, it could
bring material modernity to Asia. Popular educational journals from
the i9ios reveal the production of this sense of belonging: They
depicted the peoples of Asia as having close cultural and racial ties
with the Japanese but as being without nation-states or a sense of
peoplehood. The message was clear: Given the danger of Western
colonization, it was imperative for Japan as their leader to bring
them into the modern era without destroying their traditions. What is
remarkable is how the idea of the closeness or intimacy with Asians-
the eternal Asians-in the Japanese imagination was produced so
rapidly during the 1910s; indeed, the language of the Twenty-one
Demands made upon the Chinese government in 1915 reflected this
narrative (Yamazaki 1994). It was a compelling narrative precisely
because it made the familial relationship between Asian peoples
appear so natural, and it would compel an entire nation, under the
right circumstances, to pursue its destiny in Asia.
Another more aggressive ideology based upon the confrontation of
Eastern versus Western civilization appeared in the immediate
postWorld War I era. Fueled by the American racial exclusions of
Chinese and Japanese, this ideology would re-appear during the
Pacific War as the theater of an East-West showdown. This tendency
was best represented by the thinker Okawa Shumei and later by
Ishihara Kanji in Manchuria. Okawa (1886-1957), an activist, writer,
student of Indian philosophy, and translator of the Koran, was
significantly influenced by Okakura. Like the latter, Okawa saw an
underlying unity among the different Asian societies-a spiritual,
moral, and timeless essence-- which he opposed to Western
civilization. Unlike Okakura, however, Okawa did not believe in the
value of peace and viewed history in Civilizational terms as progress
born out of conflict and war, most centrally, war between Asia and
the West. The ultimate victory of Asia over the West would be led by
Japan's victory over America which would liberate Asia from the
enslavement of Western colonialism, and which was Japan's moral duty
despite the ingratitude of the Asian peoples. But the first task for
Okawa was to combat the corruption and obstacles that he encountered
in the Taisho state. He was implicated in several terrorist
incidents, including one in which Prime Minster Inukai was
assassinated (Szpilman 1998, 43-47, 50).
That pan-Asian civilizational discourse in Japan had a violent
dimension is well known, but the ideology itself cannot be dismissed
merely as disguised imperialism. In the immediate aftermath of the
war, a group of Japanese Asianists, in alliance with disaffected
Korean elites, sought to create their own utopian, anti-Western
polity called Koryo (Gaoli) nation (1920) in the Jiandao region
between Manchuria and Korea, which had been the heartland of the
ancient Koguryo state. The Japanese involved in this enterprise were
stalwart Asianists involved in the 19 11 Chinese revolution, such as
Suenaga Misao of the Genyosha, and far right political groups like
the Black Dragon society of Uchida Ry&ei; the event was publicized by
the Omotokyo, a syncretic religious cult associated with new world
religious societies such as the Bahai, the Red Swastika Society, and
the Dao Yuan (more below) (Hasegawa 1982, 94). Several circumstances
converged to produce this movement. The evacuation of Russian power
in northeast Asia following the Soviet revolution allowed the
expansion of Japanese power into the region. The erstwhile yangban-
the Confucian elite-were disaffected because of their displacement by
Japanese policies. About one million laboring Koreans in the Jiandao
region of Manchuria were rendered vulnerable by their stateless
condition. Finally, American immigration policies sparked off renewed
anti-Western sentiments.
Uchida's group joined with nativist Korean societies in an
alliance named Isshinkai to create this utopian nation and even
formulated its constitution (Hasegawa 1982, 95). In this
constitution, Confucianism was to be the national religion; property
was to be owned collectively; land was to be distributed according to
the ancient Chinese well-field system; the system of governance was
to be wuwei and its goal datong. Citizenship was to be equal without
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race. Koreans, Japanese,
Chinese, and Asian Russians would all be equal citizens. If we are to
believe the proclamations, the doctrine of equality was of particular
significance because the Isshinkai was opposed to the Japanese state
policies in Korea and viewed the annexation as an imperialist act
which denied the equality of Asian peoples. Thus its ideology
contained elements of a return to East Asian traditions which self-
consciously embedded an opposition to the modern Western or
Westernized state. At the same time it also proclaimed modern notions
of republicanism and equality. Indeed, it prefigured some of the
theoretically radical ideas that were implemented in the puppet state
of Manchukuo (1932-45), such as equality among ethnic groups,
following Kyz)wakai or Xiehehui. While we cannot but see this
movement as an effort to expand Japanese (albeit non-state) power on
the mainland, at the same time we also see how the new ideology of
civilization with its roots in the utopian egalitarianism of
nationalism shaped the movement and its projected political forms. A
similar political adventure in Mongolia designed supposedly to usher
in a new Asian era from the heartland of Asiatic power was led by the
Omotokyo in 1924. This venture was applauded by the Japanese press as
an effort to keep Asia out of Soviet hands (Hasegawa, 100-104).
In China the new civilization discourse and its links to pan-
Asianism has been largely neglected or dismissed in the
historiography precisely because of its association with Japanese
imperialism. During the three decades from 19 11 until 1945, however,
the discourse of Eastern civilization-whether as superior to Western
civilization or as necessary to redeem the latter-actually flourished
in China as an intellectual, cultural, and social movement. To what
extent the discourse of Eastern civilization could be distinguished
from Chinese civilization was both a subject of debate and of
ambivalence. The ambivalence mirrored the structural ambiguity, or
even aporia, to be found in the relationship between nationalism and
civilization noted above. While the (Chinese) nationalist impulse
sought to conflate civilization with the territorial nation, the
spiritual impulses sustaining the formulation of civilization tended
to seek a universal sphere of application, viewing national
boundaries as artificial walls. To some degree, as we shall see, the
modern intellectualist construction of civilization tended towards
the conflation, whereas the more popular, social movements tended to
view civilization more transnationally.
Ishikawa Yoshihiro has persuasively argued that the development of
East-West civilizational discourse among Chinese intellectuals during
the years 1910-19 was closely connected to that in Japan, even though
it would take distinctive shape in China. Through the years 1910-19
and the early 1920s, Japan continued to be the principal lens through
which Chinese gained modern knowledge; there was a steady influx of
Japanese books and magazines together with continuing growth of
translations from the Japanese (Saneto 1940). The new civilizational
discourse also entered through the same routes and brought with it
the particular assumptions upon which it had been constructed or
reconstructed in Japan: the geographical and environmental bases of
civilizational differences, the role of linear progressive history,
the binary construction, the synthesis formulation, and the
redemptive character of Eastern civilization, among others.
One of the more important Japanese influences on Chinese thinkers
during World War I was a middlebrow (ya interi) Japanese writer by
the name of Kayahara Kazan (1880-1951). He was popular with Chinese
intellectuals precisely because his Japanese writing was relatively
lucid and simple. Kayahara's philosophy sought to synthesize the
thought of various Western philosophers such as Hegel, Bergson, and
Emerson, as well as the geographical determinism of Henry Buckle and
Ratzel. Kayahara delineated his own stages of civilization, posited
the distinction between the dynamic northern civilizations of the
Europeans and the "still," southern civilizations, and explained
these in terms of geography and environment. Like other Taisho
intellectuals he too arrived at the necessity of synthesizing the two
civilizations (Ishikawa 1994, 398-403).
Kayahara's impact on Chinese intellectuals was considerable and
one Communist Party member even wrote to Mao urging him to fulfill
the world historical tasks of Lenin and Kayahara. His most
significant impact, perhaps, was upon Li Dazhao, founder of the
Communist Party and librarian at Beijing University, who collected a
large number of contemporary Japanese magazines that included the
writings of Kayahara. This impact was particularly felt by Li's
Spring Youth group which was centrally concerned with the problem of
renewal-the renewal of ancient civilizations such as those of China
and India. Alt\hough Li was perfectly aware of Japanese expansionist
designs embedded in these ideas, Kayahara appears to have influenced
his conception of history and his particular mode of synthesizing
East and West to create a new civilization in the aftermath of the
Great War (Ishikawa 1994, 430). Incidentally, Li Dazhao believed that
the Russian revolution also derived its world significance from
Russia's intermediate geographical and civilizational location, thus
being able to mediate between the East and the West (Ishikawa 1994,
420).
Another important channel for the introduction of civilizational
discourse was the popular Chinese journal Dongfangzazhi (Eastern
Miscellany). Its editor Du Yaquan was a tireless promoter of the idea
of the superiority of the still or quiet civilization of the East
which was obliged to rescue the world from the restless civilization
of the West responsible for the terrible violence of world-wide war.
The editorial essays of the journal frequently dwelt on this theme,
especially towards the end of the war, and the journal often
translated Japanese essays on the problem. In 1919, the Eastern
Miscellany published a translation of a Japanese article entitled
"Chinese Spirit and the European Spirit." Ishikawa has tracked the
chain of writing which led from the writings of an alienated,
diasporic Chinese via Europe and Japan back into China. The article
discussed two essays translated from the English into German by Gu
Hongming, the Malay-born, Britain and German educated, classical
Chinese scholar. One of Gu's essays was titled "Reasons for China's
Opposition to European Concepts" and the Japanese article reported
the reception of his essay by a group of disaffected German
intellectuals (Ishikawa 1994, 415-416). In China it led to a major
debate on the question of Chinese civilization versus Western
civilization in which the giants of Chinese intellectual life,
including Li Dazhao, Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, Hu Shi, Feng
Youlan, Chen Duxiu, Zhang Dongsun, and others, took a position. Thus,
with the publication of this translation in the Eastern Miscellany,
the idea of the acceptability of Chinese civilization entered China
through a complex global loop. This route underscored not only the
emergence of a global intellectual sphere, but the necessity of its
recognition by the Other in order to be affirmed by the self.
The debate in China was framed in terms of whether Chinese and,
more broadly, Eastern traditional civilization could redeem the West.
There were, to be sure, various thinkers who took different positions
in the debate including, for instance, those like Liang Shuming who
believed in the superiority of Chinese civilization, those who
favored a synthesis-such as Li Dazhao and Du Yaquan-though in
different ways, and the mainstream of radical intellectuals who
rejected the value of Chinese civilization. Nonetheless, the debate
underscored certain common assumptions: that the differences between
East and West were civilizational differences, and that such
differences posited holistic, isolated, and pure civilizations. To be
sure, this was assumed even when such thinkers called for the
synthesis of the best qualities of the two. Since the ideas of these
intellectuals are well known, I shall not dwell on them. By the mid-
1920s, however, the discourse begins to appear in cultural,
political, and social practices as well (see Grieder 1981; Alitto
1979).9
Perhaps the least studied and the most successful realm in which
the idea of an Eastern civilization was constructed was culture. We
have a rough idea of how the notion of an essentialized Eastern
civilization was constructed by interactions during the 1920s between
Chinese intellectuals and a host of Western philosophers such as
Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Henri Bergson, Rudolph Eucken, Irving
Babbit, and the Indian, Rabindranath Tagore. Emerging research in a
wide range of cultural practices reveals that perhaps more
significant were the Sino-Japanese exchanges in realms such as the
revival or reconstruction of traditional medicine, in the
reconstructions of Buddhism and Confucianism, and in the
representation of literati and Buddhist art among others as exemplary
of Eastern civilization (Wong 1999). As we have observed earlier,
these representations were made in reference to Western forms in that
their significance developed either in opposition to or in a
prefiguration of the latter.
Its political moment in China is associated with the famous
lecture by Sun Yat-sen in December 1924 in Kobe, Japan, entitled
"Greater Asianism" ("Da Yaxiyazhuyi"). I have discussed this lecture
in some detail elsewhere, so I will only note that its significance
has often been minimized in the historical scholarship perhaps also
because of the later record of Japanese actions in China. Yet Sun
seems to have absorbed the Asian civilizational discourse quite
deeply and spelt out its key political category of wangdao or the way
of the ethical monarchs and peaceful rulership, opposed to the
unethical and violent way (badao) of the hegemon (the way of the
West). Sun was rhetorically skillful in being able to draw the
Japanese into a discourse of solidarity, simultaneously retaining a
Chinese centrality by invoking the imperial Chinese tribute system.
Wangdao was based upon the recognition of the Chinese emperor through
the hierarchical system of reciprocities of the tribute system. Thus
Sun appealed to the Japanese to renounce the Western methods of badao
and return to the Asian method of peaceful solidarity. As it turned
out, the Japanese military appropriated the language of wangdao and
used it to rule China instead. The political interest in pan-
Asianism in China is also indicated by the convening of two
successive Asian People's conferences: in Nagasaki in 1926, and in
Shanghai in 1927. To be sure, these conferences hardly demonstrated
much solidarity, because the Chinese and Korean delegates
understandably used the forum to argue that the condition for Asian
unity must be Japanese renunciation of imperialism (Mizuno 1994)
In any event, Sun's discourse of civilization developed in two
directions which exemplify nationalism's aporetic relationship to the
idea of civilization. On the one hand, the Goumindang (GMD) actively
propagated the idea of two civilizations of the East and West by the
I93os. This notion is perhaps best expressed in its New Life movement
of the 1930s through which it sought to revitalize material modernity
represented by the West by means of an ascetic Confucian spirituality
and morality. Chen Lifu, the theorist of the New Life movement made a
classical statement of the East-West synthesis. Creatively employing
the framework of evolutionism, Chen outlined a parallel material and
spiritual evolutionism. Without spiritual progress, the evolution of
material civilization would inevitably lead to the enslavement of
mankind by things. The role of the New Life movement was to infuse
the moral qualities from the essence of Chinese civilization into the
evolution of material life. Thus will history be propelled into the
civilizational ideal of datong or the Great Unity (Chen 1976, 128,
133).
Note, however, that Chen's civilization is uniquely a Chinese
civilization; it represents that aspect of the new doctrine of
civilization that becomes tied to the nation-state. But for several
reasons, the GMD's equation of civilization and nationalism could not
always work even for its own statist purposes. Sun Yat-sen's
conception of a Pan-Asianism was also centered on Confucian virtues
of the "kingly way," but he saw these ethical and moral goals as
fully Asian in opposition to Chen's conception. This strand of
thought in the GMD was picked up by another leading GMD theorist and
leader, Dai Jitao, who created an institute and a journal in 1930 by
the name of Xin Yaxiya to keep alive Sun's ideas. The publication
well expressed the tensions of the new civilizational discourse in
its mission to both counter European materialist and imperialist
civilization as well as to create a sufficiently trans-Chinese,
Asianist ideology. An important function of this Asianism was to
secure the allegiance of the minority populations who occupied the
vast hinterland over which the nation-state sought to exercise its
sovereignty. Thus, even the Chinese statist conception of
civilization could not fully contain the trans-national impulse
embedded in the conception.
PART Ill: REDEMPTIVE SOCIETIES AND CIVILIZATIONAL DISCOURSE
In China the discourse of civilization was not merely an
intellectual development but became associated with an astonishingly
widespread social movement-a movement whose following exceeded by far
the popular base of any modern movements emanating from the May
Fourth events. Perhaps even more astonishing is the extent to which
this phenomena of what I call "redemptive societies"-determined to
save the world from strife, greed, and warfare, and which affected
the lives of many millions of followers in the first half of this
century-has been ignored by historiography, whether in English,
Chinese, or, to a lesser extent, Japanese. Some might argue that this
historical neglect is a consequence of the highly varied nature of
these societies. They ranged from "morality cultivating" charitable
organizations to occasionally violent, secret-society-like entities,
making them difficult to analyze within a single category.
However, the neglect is just as likely to be a result of modern
nationalist historiography's repugnance towards social movements that
refuse to acknowledge allegiance to the nation-state. Recall the
split, or aporia, in the relationship of nationalism to civilization
whereby the necessary separation of the nation from civilization (as
necessary as the conflation of the two) sanctions divided loyalties.
Despite significant variations, these societies were often defiantly
universalist. Rejected by Chinese \nationalists, they often embraced
the civilization-based rhetoric of the Japanese invaders in the 1930s
and I940s. Given this background, the term "collaborationism"-a
nationalist pejorative-is hardly adequate to characterize their
situation. A study of these groups thus raises buried moral questions
which are made more thorny by our own moral assumptions shaped by the
nation-state.
Some of the more famous of these societies were the Daodehui
(Morality Society), the Dao Yuan (Society of the Way) and its
philanthropic wing, the Hongwanzihui (Red Swastika Society), the
Tongshanshe (Fellowship of Goodness), the Zailijiao (The Teaching of
the Abiding Principle), the Shijie Zongjiao Datonghui (Society for
the Great Unity of World Religions, first organized in Sichuan in
1915 as the Wushanshe), and the Yiguandao (Way of Pervading Unity),
among many others. Our principal knowledge of the spread of these
societies comes from Japanese surveys of religious and charitable
societies in China conducted in the 193os and 1940s. According to
Japanese researchers and officials of the puppet administrations in
north China, these societies claimed to command enormous followings.
Thus the Fellowship of Goodness claimed a following of 30 million in
1929 (Suemitsu 1932, 252), and the Red Swastika Society, a following
of 7 to io million in 1937 (Takizawa 1937, 67). There are also some
notable Chinese works on individual societies, for example, the
famous study of the Yiguandao by Prof. Li Shiyu of Shandong
University who joined the society on several occasions in order to
study them. The few Chinese studies of these societies by modem
intellectuals tend to be dismissive, however. Thus Wing Tsit-chan,
who regards them as "negative in outlook, utilitarian in purpose, and
superstitious in belief" (Chan 1953, 167), cites a figure of merely
30,000 members (not followers) for the Red Swastika Society in 1927
as opposed to Suemitsu's figure of 3 million followers in 1932 (Chan,
164; Suemitsu, 302). Chan, however, does note that the Fellowship of
Goodness claimed more than a thousand branches in all parts of China
proper and Manchuria in 1923 (Chan, 165).10
These societies have to be understood in the complex interplay
between the particular historical tradition of their derivation and
the contemporary global context of the second decade of the twentieth
century. They clearly emerged out of the Chinese historical tradition
of sectarianism and syncretism. While some of these societies were
closely associated with the sectarian tradition, including the
worship of Buddhist and folk deities like the Eternal Mother, they
also represented the late imperial syncretic tradition (sanjiaoheyi)
that combined the three religions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and
Daoism into a single universal faith. Late imperial syncretism, which
urged the extinguishing of worldly desires and engagement in moral
action, gained popularity among the Confucian gentry and the Buddhist
and Daoist laity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Chow
1994, 21-25). The modem redemptive societies inherited the mission of
universalism and moral self-transformation from this syncretism. At
the same time, these societies also retained the association of the
older syncretic societies with sectarian traditions, popular gods,
and practices such as divination, planchette, and spirit writing
(Chow, 22-27). In this way they continued to remain organically
connected to Chinese popular society. Hence, while it might appear
confused to associate these movements with secret societies, it was
their connections to popular culture and local concerns that caused
several of them to blur with secret societies at their rural edges.
The new global context of the twentieth century significantly
transformed the meaning of their project. A number of these societies
were formally established or saw their rapid expansion during the
period from World War I through the 1920s (MDNJ 1934, 4:I; Takizawa
1937, 67cf.; HZN 1941, 505-507cf.), when, as we have seen, a critical
discourse of Western civilization as being overly materialist and
violent began to emerge globally. These societies sought to
supplement and correct the material civilization of the West with the
spiritual civilization of the East. The resultant synthesis they
envisaged took the shape of a religious universalism that included
not only Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, but also Islam and
Christianity. Several of these societies claimed to represent the
essential truth of the five world religions and by spreading this
truth, to bring an end to religious partisanship and achieve world
peace and personal salvation.
Not only did these societies adapt their cosmology to the new
geographical conception of the universe (to include Christianity and
Islam), but some of them also adapted to the temporal vision of a
progressive history. The Morality Society which was established in
1918 declared that it sought to synthesize the scientific view of the
world with the religious and moral visions of Asian thought (MDNJ,
I:3-6). The society of which Kang Youwei was president until his
death in 1927 argued that without moral and spiritual regeneration,
human evolution (jinhua) would stall and turn even more destructive
because of the present trend towards hedonistic materialism (MDNJ,
4:1; Takizawa, 67). Even the Yiguandao, perhaps the least "modem" or
"this-- worldly" of these societies, added the truths of Christianity
and Islam to its earlier synthesis and cross-referenced its own
esoteric temporal scheme with the modem chronology of dynastic and
republican history (Li Shiyu 1948, 50-55).
Their modern orientation is also revealed by their engagement in
contemporary projects. Organized with charters and by-laws, armed
with a strong this-worldly orientation and a rhetoric of worldly
redemption, these societies resembled other modem religious and
morality societies all over the world. The New Religion to Save the
World (Jiushi Xinjiao) sought to save the world not only through
philanthropic institutions such as hospitals, orphanages, and refugee
centers (HZN 194 1, 485-486), but also through dissemination and
publicity (schools, newspapers, libraries, lectures), through
charitable enterprises such as factories and farms employing the
poor, savings and loan associations, and even by engineering projects
such as road and bridge repair (HZN, 491-493). As for the "red
swastika" of the society with that name, while this can, of course,
be understood in Buddhist terms, it was also modeled upon an Eastern
equivalent of the Red Cross Society. The Red Swastika society not
only pursued traditional and modern charities, they also included
international activities, such as contributions to relief efforts and
the establishment of professorships of Esperanto in Paris, London,
and Tokyo (Suemitsu 1932, 292-305, 354). The Zailijiao, which emerged
in the very late Qing period and had established twenty-eight centers
in Beijing and Tianjin in 1913 (HZN, 507-527), appears to have had
forty-eight centers in Tianjin alone by the late 1920s. It was a
strict disciplinarian movement and developed drug rehabilitation
centers using herbal medicines and self-cultivation techniques
(zhengshen) which were said to fully cure over 200 opium addicts a
year (Suemitsu 262-263).
This outer or worldly dimension was matched by a strong inner
dimension relating to moral and religious cultivation of the
individual spirit and body. The relationship between the inner and
outer dimensions is summed up by an interview between a leader of the
Daoyuan (the parent of the Red Swastika Society, with close ties to
the Omotokyo) and Japanese surveyor Suemitsu sometime before 1930
(308-309):
What is the Daoyuan about?
A. To simutaneously cultivate the inner and outer; the inner
through meditation and the outer through philathropy.
Q: What is the dao of Daoyuan?
A: It is the source of all things (wanyou genyuan). It is not a
single religion; it has the power to clarify the good .... Actually
the dao has no name, but we in the human world have to give it a name
to show our reverence. So we revere the founders of the five
religions .... We also respect nature, morality, and cultivate the
self through charity.
The cognitive map of these societies traced a path directly from
the individual to the universal. Self-cultivation (Fiji xiuyang,
xiushen) ranged from practicing charity, to cultivating the habit of
close moral and spiritual introspection, to the exercise of a strict
disciplinary regimen. The disciplinary regimen in some societies
emphasized strict vows of abstinence from drugs, meat, and alcohol,
and sometimes the quasi-renunciation of the family, and in others,
detailed codes of moral behavior and bodily comportment (Suemitsu
1932, 266, 326-328; Takizawa 1937, 76-78; Chan 1953, 164-167). Most
societies combined all three. In the characteristic reciprocal
movement from the self to the universal, these societies frequently
defied political boundaries. For instance, the Yiguandao's
construction of the genealogical transmission of the "way" (daotong)
begins with the Chinese sage kings, Yao and Shun, and follows the
orthodox Confucian line until Mencius. Thereafter, the Confucian
orthodoxy loses the way and the mantle is carried forth by Buddhists
and Daoists. In its genealogical record of masters who continued to
transmit the way, Buddhist teachers from all over India and Central
Asia are cited together with the classical Chinese place names of
their provenance (Li 1948, 51-55). The Yiguandao genealogy reveals
how the geobody of the nation was quite irrelevant to its principally
spiritual mission.
It is in significant part for this reason that the GMD, the
nationalist rulers of China from 1927 until 1949, sought to prohibit
all such societies almost since it first came to power (Otani 1937,
69, 123; Suemitsu 1932, 251, 255). We have seen through Chen Lifu's
nationa\listic conception of civilization outlined earlier, how a
nationalist regime might want to outlaw and persecute many of these
societies including elitist ones like the Morality Society and the
Tongshanshe, which tended to be apolitical, upper-class, gentry-
merchant yangxiu (moral cultivation and philanthropic) societies
(Suemitsu, 25 '). While their defiance of territorial allegiance was
a major underlying reason behind their interdiction, however, the
national question was played out in a complex way. The GMD frequently
condemned these societies as driven by superstitions and dominated by
local bullies and warlords. Behind this rhetoric, though, lay a
strategic representation of modem religion and national tradition. In
this strategy, the GMD produced a realm of legitimate spiritualism
into which it incorporated modern, licensed religions and designated
them as part of China's national civilization. At the same time, many
popular religious traditions were condemned as superstition and
banned (Duara 1995, ch. 3). As we have seen, many of the religious
practices of these redemptive societies were, in fact, drawn from
popular culture. But the regime was also threatened by the
historical, subversive power of these societies deriving from their
transcendent vision. The transnational spiritualism of these
redemptive societies not only transgressed the GMD's definition of
the modem, but its definition of the national boundaries of spiritual
civilization. Certainly the cultural bonds of these societies to
similar Japanese societies such as the Omotokyo made them susceptible
to these attacks.
Before going on to examine their role in the Japanese invasion, we
need to clarify further the civilizational character of these
societies. Many of these societies, particularly those closely
associated with rural or popular culture, saw themselves as restoring
or redeeming lost civilizational values as opposed to advocating
Eastern civilization against, or to supplement, Western civilization.
Thus, they represented an older Chinese understanding of civilization
as "civilizing process"-of bringing true and proper civilizational
virtues to all, rather than self-consciously representing the
civilization of the East or East Asia. This was especially the case
among the more popular societies which David Ownby has identified as
representing a kind of a "fundamentalism," as movements that were
"both against and from within the mainstream." For example, there
were movements which condemned the Buddhist church "for having
abandoned its own mission of self-abnegation and transcendence"
(Ownby 1999, 1528). Ownby's recent study of the apocalyptic Way of
the Temple of the Heavenly Immortals exemplifies how these societies
mediated deeply orthodox or "fundamental" values from Confucianism or
Daoism with popular cultural traditions to reconstruct community
along traditional, even utopian prescriptions (Ownby 2000, 15-20).
These societies are civilizational in the sense used by Robert
Redfield: not only do they mediate between great and little
traditions, they are a means "for communication between components
that are universal, reflexive, and indoctrinating, and components
which are local, unreflective, and accepting" (Redfield 1962-63,
394).
To be sure, the idea of representing the East was by no means
absent among the more upper-class or modernized syncretic societies.
As noted above, the Red Swastika Society or the Morality Society had
well-developed ideas of moral cultivation and public activity which
they saw as part of the Eastern civilizational project of redeeming
the world. But a great number of the followers of these syncretic,
redemptive societies appear to have been centrally focused on their
transcendent vision, and it is perhaps fair to say that at least
through the 1920s, their emphasis on saving humanity tended to be
stronger than the EastWest binary. While the advocates of Eastern
civilization certainly also declared their scope to be universal,
significantly, they found it necessary to stress the Eastern origins,
and hence the distinct authority, of this civilization. This
distinction between scope and origins overlaps the nineteenth-
century ambiguity noted above between civilization as universal or
universalizing and exclusive or national, between process and
achieved fact. While the claim to the authority of, and for, the
East, made civilization attractive to nationalisms (of the East), it
was significantly absent or underplayed in the redemptive societies.
Japanese imperialists sought precisely to appropriate their
universalism and convert it into a more exclusive ideology of Eastern
civilization.
The Japanese invasion of northeast and north China in the 1930s
produced a breakdown in the formal structures of control and
authority, whether of the GMD or the warlords. Secret societies,
sectarians, and even redemptive societies were able to enlarge their
influence in this vacuum. Indeed, in some cases, the Chinese
communists and Japanese forces often competed for their allegiance
(Mitani 1998, 104). Unlike the GMD, which had earlier driven most
groups belonging to all three types of societies underground, the
Japanese military sought particularly to bring the redemptive
societies under their wing. Indeed, researchers like Suemitsu (1932,
208-209) and Otani believed that by forcing them underground, the GMD
had actually increased the association of these societies with the
violent secret societies and made them politically unreliable. As
organizations which promoted a civilizational ideal, these redemptive
societies, as well as selected secret societies that valued
traditional Confucian ideals like zhong and yi, were attractive to
the Japanese imperialists from the early 1930s, when they developed
the ideology of pan-Asianism and Eastern civilizational values versus
Western materialism.
Similar "redemptive" societies in Japan, such as the Shibunkai,
offering Confucianism and Shinto as the spiritual alternative to
excessive materialism and individualism, had begun to grow in
strength...
©Copyright 2001, Journal of World History
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