IŞLĀḤ (A.), reform, reformism.

i.—THE ARAB WORLD

In modern Arabic, the term *iṣlāḥ* is used for "reform" (cf.: *RALA*, xxi (1386/1966), 351, no. 15) in the general sense: in contemporary Islamic literature it denotes more specifically orthodox reformism of the type that emerges in the doctrinal teachings of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, in the writings of Rashīd Riḍā, and in the numerous Muslim authors who are influenced by these two masters and, like them, consider themselves disciples of the Salafiyya (see below). *Iṣlāḥ* will be examined under the following general headings: A. Historical; B. Fundamental principles; C. The principal doctrinal positions; D. *Iṣlāḥ* in the contemporary Arab world.

A.—HISTORICAL.—1.—Background.—The idea of *iṣlāḥ*, so widespread in modern Islamic culture, is also very common in the vocabulary of the Ḳurʾān, where the radicals *ṣ-l-ḥ.* cover a very wide semantic field. Amongst the derivatives of this root employed in the Ḳurʾān are: a) The verb *aṣlaḥa* and the corresponding infinitive, *iṣlāḥ*, used sometimes in the sense of "to work towards peace (*ṣulḥ*)", "to bring about harmony", "to urge people to be reconciled with one another" and "to agree" (cf. II, 228, IV, 35, 114, XLIX, 9, 10), and at others in the sense of "to perform a pious act (*ʿamal ṣāliḥ*)", "to perform a virtuous act (*ṣalāḥ*)", "to behave like a holy man (*ṣāliḥ*, plur. *ṣāliḥūn/ṣāliḥāt*)" (cf. II, 220, IV, 128, VII, 56, 85, 142, XI, 46, 90); b) The substantive *muṣliḥ*, plur. *muṣliḥūn*: those who perform pious acts, who are saintly in spirit, who preach peace and harmony, who are concerned with the moral perfection of their neighbours, and strive to make men better. It is precisely in this sense that the modern Muslim reformists can be defined, reformists who proudly claim the title of *muṣliḥūn*, upon which Revelation confers a certain prestige (cf. Ḳurʾān, VII, 170, XI, 117, XXVIII, 19) The adherents of *iṣlāḥ* consider themselves in the direct line of the reformer-prophets whose lives are quoted as examples in the Ḳurʾān (cf. especially *sūra*s VII, X, XI, XX); but they claim to be influenced above all by the example of the mission of the Prophet Muḥammad, whom they consider to be the Reformer par excellence (cf. *al-Shihāb*, May 1939, 183: *Muḥammad, al-muṣliḥ al-aʿẓam*). Thus *iṣlāḥ* is deeply rooted in the basic soil of Islam, and cannot therefore be viewed solely in relation to the intellectual trends that appeared in the Muslim world at the beginning of the modern period.

2.—The historical continuity of *iṣlāḥ*.— In so far as it is on the one hand an individual or collective effort to define Islam solely in relation to its authentic sources (*i.e.*, the Ḳurʾān and the *Sunna* [*q.v.*] of the Prophet) and on the other an attempt to work towards a situation in which the lives of Muslims, in personal and social terms, really would conform to the norms and values of their religion, *iṣlāḥ* is a permanent feature in the religious and cultural history of Islam. This two-fold approach characterizing *iṣlāḥ* is quite justified from a ḳurʾānic point of view. For a) Islam is simply that which Revelation contains, as it is transmitted and explained by the Prophet (see below: *The return to first principles*). b) To work for the Good, and aspire to improve (*aṣlaḥ*), is simply to attempt to restore Islamic values in modern Muslim society. From this point of view, *iṣlāḥ* can be seen as an intellectual, and frequently practical, response to the injunction of "commanding what is good and prohibiting what is evil" (see on this subject the two fundamental

references, Ḳurʾān III, 104, 110). This canonical obligation (*farḍ, farīḍa*)—a major obligation on the head of the Community (*imām*)—is constantly invoked by the reformers, both as a justification for their action, and as an appeal to the faithful, who are also bound, each according to his social standing and means, to play his part in "commanding the good". (On this important question of Muslim ethics see the classic text of al-Ghazālī in *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn* chap.: *Kitāb al-amr bi ʾl-maʿrūf wa ʾl-nahy ʿan al-munkar*, trans. L. Bercher, *De l'obligation d'ordonner le Bien et d'interdire le Mal selon al-Ghazālī*, in *IBLA*, 1st and 3rd trim. 1955; the neo-Ḥanbalite doctrine (so illuminating for. reformist teaching) in H. Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines ... d'Ibn Taymīya*, 601-5; the position of Muḥ. ʿAbduh in: *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 113 (Fr. trans., 121), and *Tafsīr al-Manār*, ix, 36; a complete account of the question by Rashīd Riḍā: *ibid.* iv, 25-47 on *sūra* III, 104, and 57-64, on *sūra* III, 110; L. Gardet, *Dieu et la destinée de l'homme*, Paris 1967, 445 ff.).

Like all Muslims who cherish an ideal of the pious and virtuous life (*ṣalāḥ*), the reformists like to refer to the many ḳurʾānic verses which praise "those who do works of *iṣlāḥ*" (VI, 42, VII, 170, XXVIII, 19) and particularly to XI, 90, which they hold to be the perfect motto of Muslim reformism: "Ô mon peuple! ... Mon unique désir est de vous rendre meilleurs" (trans. Savary)—"Je ne veux que réformer" (trans. Blachère)—"I desire only to set things right." (trans. Arberry). These scriptural statements are illustrated by the tradition that the Prophet intimated that Islam would need to be revitalized periodically and that in each century Providence would raise up men capable of accomplishing this necessary mission of moral and religious regeneration. (On this tradition, cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 204 b: "At the end...").

The Community has never lacked men willing to assume precisely this prophetic mission. In its early stages and also in its later developments, *iṣlāḥ* has been identified with the service of the *Sunna*, which is thought to provide the best model for the Islamic way of life (cf. Ḳurʾān, XXXIII, 21), as well as supplying the essential elements which lie at the base of the earliest orthodoxy of Islam. The Ḳurʾān is without doubt the most important point of reference for modern *iṣlāḥ*; yet, in its earliest manifestations, it appears to be above all the expression of a total allegiance to the Prophet's Tradition. This active, sometimes militant, allegiance is best expressed in its defence of the *Sunna* against "blameworthy innovations" (*bidaʿ* [*q.v.*]) which are judged incompatible with the objective facts of the Book, the unquestionable teachings of the Prophet, and the testimony of the "pious forefathers" (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*). Upholders of strict primitive orthodoxy were particularly aware of the increase of *bidaʿ*: a) at the dogmatic level: cf. the speculation nurtured by the dawning rationalist theology (*kalām* [*q.v.*]); ḳurʾānic exegesis of Bāṭinī tendency; the theses of extremist Shīʿism; and b) in the sphere of worship: asceticism, excessive piety, paraliturgical practices inspired by Ṣūfism (*taṣawwuf* [*q.v.*]), all of which they believed indicated a spirit of exaggeration (*ghulū*) contrary to the essence of Islamic spirituality Such innovations were held to be blameworthy because they were looked upon as sources of error and seeds of heresy; they therefore seemed to constitute a serious threat to the confessional unity and moral and political cohesion of the *Umma*.

The historical development of *iṣlāḥ* must, it seems,

be related to that new spirit which gave rise to *bidaᶜ*
throughout the cultural evolution of the Communi-
ty. The following are a few milestones:—1. The
political and moral crisis following the battles of
Ṣiffīn (37/657 [*q.v.*]) and Nahrawān (38/658 [*q.v.*])
engendered ardent political and religious polemics be-
tween the Khawāridj [*q.v.*] and the Shīᶜa [*q.v.*] on the
one hand and the supporters of the established
authority on the other. In this climate of schism the
doctrinal tendencies which classical Sunnism decried
as heretical to a greater or lesser extent began to grow
(cf. al-Shahrastānī, *Milal*, i, 27). The period of the
Prophet's companions was hardly over (*ca.* 90/708)
when the theologico-philosophical speculations which
were to disturb the Muslim conscience for many years
began to appear.—2. At the end of the 1st/7th
century, the general evolution of the Muslim commun-
ity was sufficiently advanced for the unity of faith and
monolithic convictions of the first decades to be
replaced by a diversity of intellectual and religious
attitudes towards the ḳurʾānic revelation and the
problems posed by it (predestination and free will,
the problem of evil, the attributes of God, the nature
of the Ḳurʾān, etc.). Despite its dominant position
(at least in theory), official Sunnism was neither
dynamic nor homogeneous enough to condition
effectively the moral and religious behaviour of the
new generations. Many factors (especially socio-
cultural and political ones) gradually weakened the
religious and cultural impact of the *Sunna*, whose
sociological base was anyway being diluted among
the diverse populations of the vast empire. It is
worth noting in this respect the geographical
dispersion and gradual extinction of the main wit-
nesses of primitive Islam, those who were later
called the "pious forefathers". These were essentially
the Prophet's Companions (*ṣaḥāba*)and the most
eminent of their immediate successors (*tābiᶜūn*)
—3. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (died 110/728 [*q.v.*]) marks
the end of the *Sunna*'s first era, before the spread
of the great controversies which were to divide the
Muslims (in the field of ḳurʾānic exegesis, and as a
result of a free philosophical enquiry on the revealed
Book). The famous break between al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī
and Wāṣil b. ᶜAṭā (d. 131/748 [*q.v.*]) prefigures the
doctrinal disputes and later conflicts which resulted
above all in the creation of a Traditional Party (*ahl
al-sunna*), the "pious forefathers" (*ṭāʾifat al-salaf*),
as a reaction against the new sects and tendencies
(Shīᶜa, Khawāridj, Djahmiyya, Muᶜtazila, etc.)
which were judged more or less heretical (cf. H.
Laoust, *Schismes*, 84 ff.).—4. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal
(d. 241/855 [*q.v.*]) represents a strongly entrenched
Sunnism ready to fight the new schools of thought
which questioned the dogma of the primitive ortho-
doxy (cf. his *Radd ᶜala 'l-zanādiḳa wa 'l-djahmiyya*).

The desire to refute the errors of their century,
to combat those sects believed to have introduced
blameworthy innovations into Islam, to bring the
faithful back to the purity of primitive faith and
worship, and to restore the *Sunna* by the study and
imitation of the Prophet's Tradition, these are the
aspirations of many reformers who appear period-
ically in the religious history of Islam from the very
beginnings of Sunnism. For Rashīd Riḍā, in each
generation men emerge who are firmly committed to
the defence of the *Sunna* and the struggle against
bidᶜa (*Tafsīr*, vii, 143); each century has produced
a "regenerator" (*mudjaddid*) of the faith and the
Sunna, men like "the *imām* Ibn Ḥazm [*q.v.*], the
mudjaddid of the 5th century. . ., the doctor of Islam,
Aḥmad b. Taymiyya [*q.v.*], the *mudjaddid* of the 7th

century. . ., the great traditionist (*ḥāfiẓ*) Ibn Ḥadjar
al-ᶜAsḳalānī [*q.v.*] in the 9th century. . ., and the
famous *imām* Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī al-Shawkānī (1173/
1760-1260/1834), the Yemeni *mudjaddid* in the 12th
century." (*Tafsīr*, vii, 144-5). All these men, and each
in his own way, were indisputable architects of *iṣlāḥ*;
among the many others who share this honour, al-
Ghazālī springs to mind. Rashīd Riḍā notes with
regret (*Tafsīr*, vii, 143), however, that such ex-
ceptional men were generally alone (*ghurabāʾ*) in the
world, like Islam itself. (Cf. the *ḥadīth*: "Islam was
born alone, and will become alone again, as at its
beginning. Happy the solitary men. Those are they
who will come to reform that which will be debased
after me" [cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 114 A: "Origin-
ated"]). Although solitary, because of their opposition
to the spirit of their times, and often the butt of
authoritarian arrogance, worldly scepticism, and
the hostility of conformist *ᶜulamāʾ* and sycophants,
the reformers nonetheless committed themselves to
safeguarding the *Sunna* and, through it, the con-
tinuity of the original values of Islam. It is in this
spirit, that of the reformers and renovators who
animated the religious and cultural evolution of the
Umma, and in tune with the defenders of the *Sunna*
and the community's cohesion, that modern Muslim
reformists are attempting to carry out their mission,
over and above all ideologies, tendencies, and sec-
tarianism. On the historical continuity of *iṣlāḥ* from
the age of the Salaf to the dawn of the modern era,
cf. ᶜAlī al-Ḥasanī al-Nadawī, *Ridjāl al-fikr wa 'l-daᶜwa
fī 'l-islām*, Damascus 1379/1960 (ends with Djalāl al-
Dīn Rūmī 672/1273); ᶜAbd al-Mutaᶜāl al-Ṣaᶜīdī, *Al-
Mudjaddidūn fī 'l-islām . . .* (100-1370 H.), Cairo
1382/1962; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman . . .*,
29 ff.; H. Laoust, *Schismes*.

3.—*Iṣlāḥ* in modern Islam.—Viewed as part
of the historico-cultural process outlined above,
the modern reformism of the Salafiyya is an excep-
tionally fruitful period. In the breadth of its first
manifestations, the diversity and stature of the
talents it employed, the energy of its apostolate, and
the relative speed of its diffusion in the Arab world
and even far beyond, *iṣlāḥ* constitutes one of the most
remarkable phenomena in the evolution of Islam since
the end of the 19th century. It is a result of the cul-
tural movement born of the renaissance (*nahḍa* [*q.v.*])
which marked the reawakening of the Arab East
(along with that of the Muslim world in general) as a
consequence of the influence of Western ideas and
civilization. This awakening has been interpreted
as a direct result of the actions of several forceful
Muslim personalities living in the second half of
the 19th century. Those most frequently mentioned
are Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-97 [*q.v.*]), Mu-
ḥammad ᶜAbduh (1849-1905 [*q.v.*]) and Abd al-
Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1854?-1902 [*q.v.*]). However,
the awakening of Arabo-Muslim consciousness was
preceded by a period of gestation which was encour-
aged by a combination of internal and external
factors; most decisive of these were:

a) *The pressure of Wahhābism* [*q.v.*], which aimed
(initially in Arabia) at restoring Islamic piety and
ethics to their original purity and cultivated a sort
of idealization of the primitive Islamic social organ-
ization, that of the "pious forefathers" *al-salaf al-
ṣāliḥ* (hence the tendency called Salafiyya). Despite
their zeal (which sometimes seemed excessive) in
defence of their conception of the *Sunna*, their in-
transigence and their occasionally intolerant strict-
ness, the Wahhābīs never lost sight of the need for a
moral and political renewal of modern Islam. While

appealing to their co-religionists to recognize only the authority of the Ḳurʾān and the *Sunna* in matters of religion (*dīn*), they urged them to abandon superstitions inherited from the Middle Ages and countered the general tendency to fatalistic resignation, reacting against the spirit of *taḳlīd* [*q.v.*] which predominated at that time (end of the 18th- beginning of the 20th century). Through these efforts and their attempt to modernize the values of primitive Islam, *djihād* [*q.v.*], in particular, in the hope of rousing Muslims to a political dynamism equal to their past greatness, the Wahhābīs played an important role in the evolution of modern Islam, thus deserving a place among "the first of those who worked together towards the Arab renaissance" (L. Massignon, in *RMM*, xxxvi (1918-19), 325).

b) *The development of the printed word* through the press and publishing, principally in the Arabic language. In this respect the remarkable role played by the Egyptian printing house at Būlāḳ [see MAṬBAʿA] must be stressed. From 1822 onwards, this became one of the most important tools of the Arab intellectual renaissance. The Egyptians and Syro-Lebanese contributed to the growth of a serious and informative press which reflected the political and cultural aspirations of the nationalist and pro-reformist sectors of the population. (Cf. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Ṭībāwī, *American interests in Syria 1800-1901*, Oxford 1966, 247-53; Ph. K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History*[3], New York 1967, 452-64).

c) *The influence of Western culture.* European penetration of the Arab world in the first decades of the 19th century soon made itself felt, especially at an intellectual level. Cf. H. Pérès, *Les premières manifestations de la renaissance littéraire arabe en Orient au 19e siècle*, in *AIEO Algiers* (1934-5), 233-56; A. Hourani, *Arabic thought* (Bibl.); the succinct statement of the problem by Ḥusayn Muʾnis *La renaissance culturelle arabe*, in *Orient*, nos xli-xlii (1967), 16-27; J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An introd. to the hist. of education in modern Egypt*[1], London 1939, reprinted 1968, 96-287.

d) *The liberal evolution of the Ottoman regime.* This first occurred under the sultan ʿAbd al-Madjīd I [*q.v.*], who inaugurated a policy of reforms (*tanẓīmāt* [*q.v.*]) with the *Khaṭṭ-i sherīf* of Nov. 3 1839 which granted his peoples the first imperial charter guaranteeing civil liberties. Despite the opposition of the traditionalists, these Western-inspired reforms were progressively put into effect, especially after the *Khaṭṭ-i hümāyūn* of Feb. 1 1856, which finally opened the Near East to the ideas and influences of the modern world. Cf. TANẒĪMĀT; F. M. Pareja, *Islamologie*, 339 ff., 583.

e) *The structural renovation of the Eastern churches* and their awakening to Western spirituality and ideas. Cf., *e.g.*, on the exemplary case of the Uniate churches, the monograph by Joseph Hajjar, *Les Chrétiens uniates du Proche-Orient*, Paris 1962. As well as the renewal of local Christianity, thanks to a favourable concourse of religious and diplomatic events, the energy of Catholic and (above all) Protestant missions must be taken into account. On these missionary activities on Islamic soil, see the important material in *RMM*, xvi (1911), *A la conquête du monde musulman* (1 vol.); Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A hist. of the expansion of Christianity*, vi: *The great century* (1800-1914), London 1944, chap. II (*Northern Africa and the Near East*), 6-64; A. al-Ṭībāwī, *American interests in Syria*, 316-24).

This missionary activity did not simply provoke a defensive reaction in the Muslim world. In the eyes of many ʿulamāʾ, it was exemplary from two points of view: it was a remarkable example of zeal in the service of a faith, and the actual content of its preaching was of value. Thus, in imitation of the Protestants, the reformists attached paramount importance to the Scriptures, though without ever losing sight of cultural needs and working towards an ethical and spiritual renewal of Islam. At the same time they aimed at the social and intellectual emancipation of the Muslim population by tirelessly advocating the popularization of modern knowledge.

These different factors (which must be placed in the general context of the Eastern question) gave rise to the intellectual ferment which led to the *nahḍa*. After centuries of cultural stagnation, the Arab renaissance provoked a lively intellectual curiosity in the East. From the beginning of the 19th century, the Arab élites began to acquire modern knowledge, some through translations, others by direct contact with European scientific culture and techniques. A decisive role was played by Arab student missions in Europe, by Western schools (religious and secular) in the Near East, and by national institutions organized on the European model. Cf. on this subject: C. Brockelmann, S II, 730 ff.; Djurdji Zaydān *Taʾrīkh ādāb al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya*[2], Cairo 1914, iv 186-217; Jāk Tādjir, *Ḥarakat al-tardjama fī miṣr khilāl al-ḳarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar*, Cairo [1944]: the important study by J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An introd. to the hist. of education in modern Egypt*; Ph. K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History*, chap. xxxi.

For Arab writers this intellectual activity was accompanied by a historical and sociological enquiry in an attempt to analyse their social and cultural situation in order to determine the exact causes of their backwardness, naturally with a view to remedying it. This is the dominant theme of articles in *al-ʿUrwa al-wuthḳā* (1884), then in *Manār* (from 1898 on), especially those by Rashīd Riḍā and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (cf. for instance, the series of articles in vol. v (1902), under the general title: *al-Islām wa ʾl-Naṣrāniyya maʿa ʾl-ʿilm wa ʾl-madaniyya* (136 p.). This is also the central topic of *Umm al-ḳurā*, in which al-Kawākibī attempts a precise diagnosis of the evils and that sort of general indolence (*futūr*) which characterized the Muslim community at the end of the 19th century (cf. the 7th session, 109 ff. *passim*); on the theme of the "backwardness" of the Muslim peoples, see also two accounts: Muḥammad ʿUmar (d. 1337/1918), *Ḥāḍir al-miṣriyyīn wa-sirr taʾakhkhurihim*, Cairo 1320/1902; Shakīb Arslān, *Limādhā taʾakhkhara ʾl-Muslimūn wa-limādhā taḳaddama ghayruhum*? (Cairo ed. 1939).

The situation of Islam in the modern world thus became one of the most important themes in reformist writings. After Ernest Renan's famous lecture on *L'Islamisme et la Science* (Sorbonne, March 29 1883) and the subsequent controversy between Renan and Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (cf. on this subject Homa Pakdaman, *Djamāl-Ed-Dīn*, 81 ff.), one of the major preoccupations of reformist authors was to refute the thesis that Islam is contrary to the scientific spirit and can thus be held responsible for the cultural backwardness of the Muslim peoples. "We wore out our pens and our voices", cries Rashīd Riḍā "through writing and repeating that the misfortunes of Muslims cannot be blamed on their religion, but rather on the innovations that they have introduced into it, and on the fact that they 'wear' Islam like a fur coat turned inside out" (*Manār*. iii (1900), 244). Cf. also the pleas of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, *al-Islām wa ʾl-Naṣrāniyya*, and Muḥammad

Farīd Wadjdī, *Taṭbīḳ al-diyāna al-islāmiyya ʿala 'l-nawāmīs al-madaniyya*, Cairo 1316/1898.

Having established their view of the situation, the reformists planned ways to stir up a new spirit in their co-religionists and to arouse in the Community the will to break out of its cultural and social stagnation. For this purpose, they continually referred to the ḳurʾānic verse: "Allāh altereth not what is in a people until they alter what is in themselves" (cf. *al-ʿUrwa al-wuthḳā*, no. xvii (Sept. 1884), editorial reproduced by Rashīd Riḍā in his *Tafsīr*, x, 46-52; Muḥammad ʿAbduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 178 (Fr. trans., 121); Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr* x, 41-5, on *sūra* VIII, 54). From this point of view, reformist thought seems to have crystallized around the idea of improvement (*iṣlāḥ*) of the existing situation. To achieve this goal, the adherents of *iṣlāḥ* advocated a struggle against those religious forces (in particular the brotherhoods) and social groups (conservative and traditionalist forces) which they saw as the incarnation of obscurantism. They also supported the reform of archaic teaching methods and courses and the popularization of scientific disciplines and modern techniques. Since they had no training in these last two fields, the reformists could do no more than stress the usefulness of Western sciences and techniques as essential instruments for the material and intellectual progress of the Muslim peoples. However, they devoted the greater and most effective part of their efforts to action in the moral and social fields, where they had more ready access to an adequate vocabulary.

Reformist appeals for social and intellectual evolution (*taḳaddum, taraḳḳī*) concentrated on the need to improve, correct, reorganize, renovate and restore: all these infinitives corresponding, *grosso modo*, to the different meanings of the *maṣdar*, *iṣlāḥ* (cf. Lane, i/4, 1714: ṢLḤ). From then on *iṣlāḥ* became a sort of leitmotiv in reformist literature. In the texts of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, for example, we frequently find this term used as the mark of an impelling idea even in his earliest writings; cf. his first articles in the paper *al-Ahrām* (1st year, 1876) reproduced by Rashīd Riḍā in *Taʾrīkh al-ustādh al-imām*, ii, 20, 22, 34; his articles in the official paper *al-Waḳāʾiʿ al-miṣriyya*, 1880-1 (*ibid.*, 175-81). *Iṣlāḥ* also appears at every opportunity and in its different meanings in the review *al-Manār* (whose first no. dates from 22 Shawwāl 1315/16 March 1898). We find, for example, the following usages: *al-iṣlāḥ al-dīnī wa 'l-idjtimāʿī* ("religious and social reform", i (1898), 2); *iṣlāḥ kutub al-ʿilm wa-tarīḳat al-taʿlīm* ("improvement of textbooks and reform of teaching methods", *ibid.*, 11); *iṣlāḥ dākhiliyyāt al-mamlaka* ("reform (or reorganization) of the internal affairs of the Empire", *ibid.*, 736); *iṣlāḥ al-nufūs* ("regeneration of souls", *ibid.*, 737); *iṣlāḥ al-ḳaḍāʾ asās al-iṣlāḥ* ("law reform, as a basis for general reform", *ibid.*); in the editorial of the 40th no. (1898), Rashīd Riḍā calls for a "renovation from the pulpit eloquence" (*iṣlāḥ al-khiṭāba*); in no. 42, p. 822, he proposes: *muḥāwara fī iṣlāḥ al-Azhar* ("exchange of views on the reform of al-Azhar").

These few references show the variety of uses to which the concept *iṣlāḥ* was put. However, the following areas seem particularly to have attracted the attention of reformist authors: a) *Teaching*. The question of the reorganization of Muslim teaching, especially in institutes of higher education like al-Azhar, occupied an important place in the work of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā (cf. the account of the action carried out in this sphere by shaykh

ʿAbduh in *Taʾrīkh al-ustādh al-imām*, i, 425-567). This problem can be linked to that of the reorganization of the mosques and *waḳf* possessions. Better management of these would supply the educational system with increased means and new buildings. (Cf. Rashīd Riḍā, *op. cit.*, i, 630-45; *al-Manār wa 'l-Azhar, passim*). b) *Law*. The reform of the Muslim legal system was also one of the constant preoccupations of the reformists (see the numerous articles in *Manār* on this subject and the *Report* made by Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Muftī of Egypt, *Taḳrīr muftī al-diyār al-miṣriyya fī iṣlāḥ al-maḥākim al-sharʿiyya*, Cairo 1318/1900; cf. on this subject *Taʾrīkh al-ustādh al-imām*, i, 605-29). c) *The Religious Brotherhoods*. The reformists never ceased to press for the reform (if not for abolition pure and simple) of the brotherhoods, which they accused of maintaining blameworthy innovations in religious life, of encouraging the people in superstitious beliefs and practices, and of continuing to use a reactionary system of teaching in their educational establishments (cf. the articles in *Manār*, under the heading: *al-Bidaʿ wa'l-khurāfāt*; Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār wa 'l-Azhar, passim*). In their attempt to reform Muslim educational and legal systems and religious practice, the supporters of *iṣlāḥ* were aware that they were attacking the traditional structures of Muslim society, yet they felt it was essentially to renovate these structures so that a new much-needed social and cultural dynamism should be given to the Community. But their task did not stop there. For the *iṣlāḥ* advocated by Muḥammad ʿAbduh and his close supporters necessitated a vast movement of renovation which would embrace all sectors of Muslim life. Thus we see them advocating *iṣlāḥ* in purely secular domains (for example, language and literature, the organization of schools, the administration, the military regime, etc.). They believed that the *ʿulamāʾ* worthy of the name should devote themselves to an overall reform of Muslim social organization, and not just to a limited religious reformism.

These calls for a general *iṣlāḥ* were fairly well received in Arab and Muslim intellectual circles at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. From the period of *al-ʿUrwa al-wuthḳā* (1884) on, the combined efforts of al-Afghānī and ʿAbduh, and other propagandists of the quality of al-Kawākibī, succeeded in definitively integrating the idea of *iṣlāḥ* into modern Muslim thinking. From then on, no intellectual in the Arab world could remain indifferent to the reformist phenomenon (cf. *al-Manār*, i, (1899), 949: *al-iṣlāḥ al-islāmī wa 'l-ṣiḥāfa*: *iṣlāḥ* had become one of the principal and most topical subjects in the Arab and Turkish press; *Umm al-ḳurā*, 3). In literary circles, many profoundly secular writers and poets joined forces with the advocates of *iṣlāḥ*. Their sympathies did not lie with the religious movement, but with the powerful ferment that it then represented for Muslim society and for Arabs in general. For them, *iṣlāḥ* signified an appeal for progress, a breath of renewal and the promise of a better future for the Arab nation. Its fundamental call for religious renovation and moral regeneration was blurred in the eyes of many intellectuals by its social and cultural implications. Gradually *iṣlāḥ* acquired the shape of a sort of myth which attracted all, believers and unbelievers, Muslims or not, who were struggling for the social and cultural emancipation of their people. (The impact of *iṣlāḥ* in non-Muslim circles is apparent in writers like Salāma Mūsā; cf. *Tarbiyat Salāma Mūsā*,

Cairo 1944, 52 [Eng. trans. Schuman, *The education of Salāma Mūsā*, Leiden 1961, 35]). This is why, concurrently with the religious reformists (the Salafiyya), some concerned secular intellectuals took up the cry for *iṣlāḥ*, though with a purely social and cultural connotation. The most typical figure of this secular reformist current is the ʿIrāḳī poet Djamīl Ṣidḳī al-Zahāwī (1863-1936 [*q.v.*]), who advocated a form of *iṣlāḥ* devoid of any religious content (his beliefs are expressed in: *nas̲h̲arṭu fī 'l-nāsi ārāʾan urīdu bi-hā/iṣlāḥa dunyā-humū lā 'l-ṭaʿna fī 'l-dīni*).

The relative receptivity of Arab intellectual circles (more or less influenced by Western culture) was a determining factor in the diffusion of *iṣlāḥ*. The reformists found allies, if not true sympathizers, among publicists and men of letters who were exasperated by the conservatism of the "old turbans", the defenders of clerical and university tradition (of al-Azhar, al-Zaytūna, etc.), by the apathy of the masses, and by the sluggishness of the political and administrative machine. Thus in the East as in the Maghrib, the younger progressive intellectuals drew close to the reformists, who in their eyes represented a dynamic party which, in the face of different forms of foreign domination, proclaimed the right of their peoples to education, progress and national dignity.

But *iṣlāḥ* also benefited from a measure of support in liberal Sunnī circles. Frightened by the prospect of society drifting away from Islam in the more or less distant future, and by the dynamism of Christian missionary work in Muslim lands, they were happy to witness the birth of a movement which was profoundly attached to the *Sunna*, and firmly committed to the defence of the faith, while at the same time recognizing the need for social evolution and modern scientific and technical development in the Arab world.

Yet, despite the interest that it aroused in the young progressive generation and enlightened Sunnīs, *iṣlāḥ* encountered some difficulties at the outset. From its inception, the movement was suspect to the powers then ruling the major part of the Arab world (Turkey, England, France), because of its cultural and political orientation (exaltation of Arabism, Panislamism). Its social and political stand brought down on it the hostility of the ruling classes and the administrative authorities of the *status quo* (university, magistrates, religious hierarchy, brotherhoods). By its declarations of war on every sort of *bidʿa*, on magical and religious superstitions, on customs "worthy of paganism" (*djāhiliyya*), and by the rigorously monotheist theology (*tawḥīd*), which led it to see manifestations of *s̲h̲irk* in many naive forms of popular piety, *iṣlāḥ* distressed conformist circles. For the same reasons is was mistrusted by ordinary people, who were attached to traditions and rites that they regarded as an integral part of religion.

Inevitably, *iṣlāḥ* was strongly attacked on several fronts (cf. for example, the long quarrel between supporters of *iṣlāḥ* against the defenders of the educational and doctrinal traditions of al-Azhar, in Ras̲h̲īd Riḍā, *al-Manār wa 'l-Azhar*). After all, it was a movement vowed to political resistance (anti-imperialist, if not anti-Ottoman) and social change (aimed at the traditional framework of Muslim society), and geared to moral and spiritual reform, attacking in particular certain ecclesiastical structures which were held as sacred (notably the brotherhoods and religious orders) and certain aspects of popular

religiosity. Lacking a single magistrature amongst the *umma* and unable to invoke the moral authority of a reforming Church, the Salafiyya were open to the charge that they were changing and destroying the holy Sunnī tradition. They had to wage an unceasing struggle for acceptance of the sincerity of their intentions and what they saw as the eminently Islamic character of their attempts at reform. Nevertheless, neither the traditionalist Sunnīs nor the members of the brotherhoods were disposed to recognize the legitimacy of their efforts (cf. *Manār*, i, 807, 822; Ras̲h̲īd Riḍā attacked by his adversaries; Ras̲h̲īd Riḍā, *Taʾrīk̲h̲ al-ustādh al-imām*, *passim*: the difficulties Muḥammad ʿAbduh met with when he was Muftī of Egypt; Ẓāfir al-Ḳāsimī, *Djamāl al-Dīn al-Ḳāsimī*, 594; the bad reception given to Ras̲h̲īd Riḍā by the *ʿulamāʾ* of Damascus, 603-4; the lack of success of the Salafiyya in Syria; A. Merad *Le Réformisme musulman ...* Book i: *the resistance of Algerian Sunnism and brotherhoods to reformist propaganda*). Whether presented as a "road to damnation" (*ḍalāla*) in the wake of the Wahhābī "heresy", or hastily assimilated to the progressive trends that were more or less favourable to the secularization of Muslim society, the Salafiyya movement met with strong opposition in Egypt and Syria, as in Algeria and Tunisia. Its adversaries rejected it in the name of the *Sunna*, which, in their eyes, could have no other form than that of classical Sunnism. The real meaning of *iṣlāḥ* appears when we examine its fundamental principles and its main doctrinal lines.

B.—FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.—In origin, *iṣlāḥ* is a religiously inspired movement. Yet an examination of the roots of the movement reveals that the arguments put forward by its proponents sounded a less profoundly moral and spiritual note than a social and cultural one. In the first reformist manifestos—the articles of Muḥammad ʿAbduh (and al-Afg̲h̲ānī) in the paper *al-ʿUrwa al-wuthḳā* (1884)—social, cultural and even political considerations are more important than religious ones. In his *Umm al-ḳurā* and in his *Ṭabāʾiʿ al-istibdād*, al-Kawākibī made similar efforts. In the early stages of his review *al-Manār* (1898), Ras̲h̲īd Riḍā also paid a great deal of attention to social and cultural questions. Like his masters, he wished to persuade Muslims that the improvement of their moral and material condition depended upon a regeneration of Islam; this was to be accomplished by a "return to first principles", in order to rediscover Islamic teachings and values in all their authenticity and richness. The whole of the later reformist debate hinges on this essential theme.

The Return to First Principles.—The theme of the return (*rudjūʿ*) to first principles is omnipresent in reformist literature. This constant reference to the beginnings of Islam is one of the most striking characteristics of *iṣlāḥ*, and the reason why the reformists of the Salafiyya have sometimes been accused of "addiction to the past". The need for a return to first principles is justified, in the doctrine of *iṣlāḥ*, by arguments of a canonical and historical nature. The former, drawn from the Ḳurʾān, can be resumed as follows: Islam in its entirety is contained in the Scriptures (Ḳurʾān, V, 3, VI, 38); the teaching of the Prophet—inspired by God (LIII, 3-4)—is the natural complement of revelation. The Religion can be received only from the hands of God and his Messenger (IV, 59), and Muslims must abide by what the Messenger of God has transmitted, in all matters of command and interdiction (LIX, 7). For the reformists, consequently, fidelity to Islam

is essentially defined by faithfulness to the two Sources, Revelation and the Prophet's *Sunna*.

The canonical argument, supported by an argument borrowed from historical tradition, is in fact a maxim attributed to Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795 [*q.v.*]): "The later success of this Community will only ensue through those elements which made for its initial success" (*lā yaṣluḥu ākhiru hādhihi 'l-umma illā bi-mā ṣaluḥa bihi awwaluhā*). Now, we are told, the objective basis of the historical success of the Arabs was Islam (that is the Ḳurʾān and the *Sunna*) authentically received and fully accepted (cf. Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, x, 437, xi, 210 (important) ix, 293; *Shihāb*, March 1939, 58). Like their far-distant predecessors (*Salaf*), Muslims of today could achieve temporal power (*siyāda*) and know the happiness of moral well-being (*saʿāda*), provided that they armed themselves with those moral convictions that constituted the strength and grandeur of the Salaf, and that they strove to demonstrate to contemporary Muslim society the values of faith and the general teachings of Islam, in their authentic purity (cf. Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, ii, 339-41, x, 210; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 287 ff.). What exactly is this authenticity? The reformist reply is clear and simple: the whole of Islam is contained in the Scriptures and the *Sunna*, with the addition, solely as a guide and not as a canonical source, of the tradition of the Salaf. This position is not fundamentally different from that of traditional Sunnism. What distinguishes *iṣlāḥ* from the classical doctrine in this respect is the meaning given by the reformists to each of these three basic references.

1.—The reference to the Ḳurʾān.—On this point, *iṣlāḥ* has, in principle, the same position as the Salaf. This is true of the nature of the Ḳurʾān, its status as a canonical source, and the way of approaching its exegesis.

a) *Iṣlāḥ* identifies the Ḳurʾān with the Word of God, uncreated, intangible, unalterable (Ḳurʾān, XLI, 42, XV, 9), and affirms the eternity and universality of its message (XXXIV, 28, VI, 90; *Manār*, i, 1; Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, ii, 163, iii, 289). Holding stringently to the dogma of the "uncreated Ḳurʾān" it rejects the harmonizing synthesis of Ashʿarism, since this does not simply reaffirm the stance of the Salaf (cf. Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, ix, 178). This explains why the Salafiyya have never been able to supply the Muslims of their time with an original interpretation of the Ḳurʾān, despite the return to favour of reason in modern Islam (cf. R. Caspar, *Le renouveau du Moʿtazilisme*, in MIDEO, iv (1957), 141 ff.), and despite the historical investigations and psychological analyses made in the light of the *Sīra* by European orientalists and a few contemporary Muslim authors which have given us a better knowledge of the Prophet's personality. Their doctrine, immobilized by a desire to remain faithful to the past and to the positions—sometimes negative—of the Salaf, has prevented them from acquiring a deeper knowledge of the historical, sociological and psychological discoveries which would have given them a truer understanding of the problems of revelation and inspiration. (On the subject of the *waḥy* [*q.v.*], cf. the decisive statement by Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, xi, 146-94, in which he reaffirms the thesis of the revelation "that came down from God", without attempting to introduce any nuances into the traditional explanation; hence his long rebuttal (*ibid.*, 169-78) of the ideas expressed on this subject by certain authors, notably by E. Dermenghem (in *La Vie de Mahomet*, Paris 1929, chap. xviii)).

When discussing the nature of the Ḳurʾān, Muḥammad ʿAbduh attempted to go further than traditional dogma in the original edition of his *Risālat al-tawḥīd* (Būlāḳ 1315/1898). The original text (28, Fr. trans., 33, 1.2, to 34, 1.4), expurgated at this point by Rashīd Riḍā (2nd ed., Cairo 1316/1908), is once more available in the ed. of the *Risālat al-tawḥīd* prepared by Maḥmūd Abū Rayya (Cairo 1966, 52-2). Rashīd Riḍā himself vigorously affirmed the divine character of the Book (*Tafsīr*, i, 132-3, 220, vi, 71, viii, 10, 280, 303, ix, 178, xii, 499), wholly discounting any rationalist interpretation. The same stance is clear in the works of Ibn Bādīs, in his ḳurʾānic commentary on the *Shihāb*: "The Ḳurʾān is the Word of God and His Revelation" (Jan. 1934, 55).

b) *The Ḳurʾān, primary canonical source*. The Ḳurʾān is "the foundation of the religion" (*asās al-dīn, Tafsīr*, i, 369, vii, 139, 198, ix, 326; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Feb. 1936, 95); more than that, it really constitutes religion in all its richness, *bal huwa 'l-dīn kulluhu* (*Tafsīr* vi, 154-67, vii, 139, 198, ix, 326). With the ḳurʾānic revelation, religion was accomplished, according to the divine proclamation: "Today I have perfected your religion.." (V, 4). By "religion", explains Rashīd Riḍā (taking up "the opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās and the majority of the Salaf"), is meant the following: "matters of faith (*ʿaḳāʾid*), legal injunctions (*aḥkām*) and ethical ones (*ādāb*)" (*Tafsīr*, vi, 166, at the foot of the page).

The Ḳurʾān is thus the supreme source of the religion. Moreover, it contains, in prototypal form, everything needed for the historical life of the Community. Paraphrasing XVII, 13, Ibn Bādīs concludes: "All that the servants of God have need of to acquire happiness in the two worlds, that is true beliefs, solid moral virtues, just laws, generous sentiments, all this has been clearly expressed in the Ḳurʾān" (*Shihāb*, Dec. 1929-Jan. 1930, 7). As far as the political organization of Muslim society and the running of its affairs are concerned, the Ḳurʾān only gives general indications, leaving to the lawful rulers of the Community, the *ūlu 'l-amr*, the task of making decisions according to circumstances and in the best interest (*maṣlaḥa*) of Muslims (cf. *Manār*, iv (1901), 210; *Tafsīr*, iii, 10-1, 12 (important), iv, 199-205 (important), vi, 123, vii, 140-1, 191, xi, 264). The Ḳurʾān is the supreme authority of Islam, and, as such, the problem of its understanding (and consequently of its exegesis) is of capital importance, for the way in which the Revelation is understood governs the manner in which the message is translated into action.

c) *The exegesis of the Ḳurʾān*. Linguistically, the content of the Ḳurʾān is presented in two categories (cf. III, 7). Most of the verses have a self-evident meaning (*muḥkam*) and pose no problems of interpretation. Certain other verses can be the cause of some uncertainty (*mutashābih*) if their apparent sense is adhered to. In this case, the Believer must accept the revealed fact as it is presented (*imrār*) in its most literal sense, showing a confident belief in the truth it contains, a truth which transcends the immediately perceptible linguistic message (cf. *Tafsīr* viii, 453, x, 141). God being the only one to know the reality of the *mutashābih*, the Believer must have the wisdom and humility to commend himself to Him (*tafwīḍ, taslīm*). In the eyes of Muḥammad ʿAbduh this act of faith acquires the value of a canonical obligation (*Tafsīr*, i, 252). This is also the position of Rashīd Riḍā and Ibn Bādīs (cf. *Tafsīr*, iii, 167, iv, 256, vii, 472, viii, 453, ix, 513, x, 141, xii, 378; *Shihāb*, Jan. 1934, 6 June 1939, 206).

The reformist doctrine on the subject of ḳurʾānic exegesis can be defined in relation to the problems of interpretation, *taʾwīl* [*q.v.*], and commentary, *tafsīr* [*q.v.*].

Iṣlāḥ severely condemns subjective interpretation *taʾwīl*), which claims to analyse a "hidden" sense beyond the literal sense, and a more or less gratuitous symbolism beyond the apparent images. On the subject of III, 7, Rashīd Riḍā clearly defines the reformist position (*Tafsīr*, iii, 166 ff.). *Taʾwīl* is a typical example of *bidʿa* (*ibid.*, x, 141), since it cannot be justified either by the *Sunna* or by the tradition of the Salaf, who avoided interpreting uncertain passages (*mutashābih*) of the Scripture by relying on their own understanding (see also Muḥammad ʿAbduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 7 [Fr. trans., 8]). The Salafiyya's distrust of *taʾwīl* includes all esoteric and mystical interpretations and those of the supporters of a rational explanation at any cost. Cf. *Tafsīr*, i, 252-3, iii, 172-96: an explanation of the reformist doctrine of the subject of the *taʾwīl*, with lengthy quotations from Ibn Taymiyya; criticism of the tendentious exegesis of the "men of *bidaʿ*" (Djahmiyya, Ḳadariyya, Khawāridj, Bāṭiniyya, Bābiyya, Bahāʾiyya, etc.), ix, 131-2; the "heretical" exegesis of the Bāṭiniyya and of excessive Ṣūfism; iv, 191; exegesis which is "orientated" in favour of one sect or another, and which in fact results in giving a purely arbitrary sense to the revealed statement. This is *taḥrīf* itself [*q.v.*], a concept applied in the Ḳurʾān to the "Possessors of the Scriptures" (*ahl al-kitāb*) and applied by the modern reformists to stigmatize the use of the ḳurʾānic exegesis for partisan ends (cf. *Tafsīr*, i, 430, iv, 97, 282, vii, 506; *Shihāb*, Sept. 1935, 344-5). Included in the term *taḥrīf* are pseudo-erudite commentaries which embroider the text with "false legends" (*abāṭil wa-khurāfāt*), in the style of the *isrāʾīliyyāt* [*q.v.*] so frequently denounced by the reformist authors (*Tafsīr*, i, 8, 18, 347, ii, 455, 471, iv, 466, vi, 332, 355-6, 449, ix, 190, 414, x, 384, xi, 474; *Shihāb*, July 1939, 254). The same warnings were issued against interpretation of the ḳurʾānic passages dealing with the unknowable, *ghayb* [*q.v.*] (cf. *Tafsīr* i, 252, iii, 166 ff., iv, 254 ff. on III, 173, IX, 513; *Shihāb*, Oct. 1930, 534; Jan. 1934, 1-9).

Reformist exegesis tends to banish *taʾwīl* in favour of simple commentary, *tafsīr*, and lays down the principle that, apart from a few verses containing a certain mystery (particularly on the subject of divine attributes, *ṣifāt*, and the states of future life, *aḥwāl al-ākhira*), ḳurʾānic revelation can be made just as comprehensible to contemporary Muslims as it was to the Salaf. Thus, the function of *tafsīr* is revitalized. Freed from its historico-legendary husk and from commentaries of a largely grammatical and rhetorical nature, *tafsīr* becomes a preparation for reading and meditating upon the Ḳurʾān. Those commentators whose primary interest was in the didactic aspect of *tafsīr* have woven a veritable screen (*ḥidjāb*) between Muslims and their sacred book (*Tafsīr*, iii, 302). According to the reformists, the essential aim of *tafsīr* is to elucidate the moral values and spiritual "direction" (*hady*) which nourish religious feeling and guide the piety of the faithful (*ibid.*, i, 25); it must not be seen as a demonstrative discipline capable of establishing scientific and verifiable truths and satisfying the modern mind which is avid for rationality. The reformist commentators (and above all Rashīd Riḍā and Ibn Bādīs) were in no way tempted by scientific exegesis, and, with the odd exception, did not give in to the fashion for

compromise which was widespread in their day (cf. the typical case of a Ṭanṭāwī Djawharī (1862-1940), in *MIDEO*, v (1958), 115-74). Consequently Rashīd Riḍā criticizes the lack of discernment with which Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī [*q.v.*] appeals to the scientific culture of his time to pad out his important commentary. He deplores an identical tendency amongst "contemporary commentators [...] who display so much seemingly scientific erudition in their *tafsīr*s that they succeed in diverting the reader from the object of the Revelation" (*Tafsīr*, i, 75). Moreover, when speaking of the biblically inspired stories recounted in the Ḳurʾān, Rashīd Riḍā, quoting Muḥammad ʿAbduh, criticizes those who would like to base the truth of the Book on the veracity of the facts it offers to the meditation of the Believers. "The Ḳurʾān is no more a historical work (*taʾrīkh*) than a narrative work (*ḳaṣaṣ*): it is only a moral guide and a source of edification" (*Tafsīr*, ii, 471). The historicity of the ḳurʾānic story is less important than its moral content and its virtue as a source of inspiration. The role of the reformist commentator is above all to bring the ḳurʾānic message as close as possible to the minds and hearts of Muslims. In his task, his goal will of course be to establish the meaning of the verses as exactly as human understanding permits. This implies a profound knowledge of all the resources of Arab lexicography and philology. There are some verses whose message is readily apparent; in some cases, what is revealed can be made more explicit with the help of references and parallels found in the Ḳurʾān itself (*tafsīr al-Ḳurʾān bi 'l-Ḳurʾān*); in other cases it is necessary to employ early exegesis by returning to the versions given by the Great Companions and their principal disciples amongst the *tābiʾūn*, following the explanations supplied by the Prophet in person as part of the revelation. Any exegesis not based on proofs (*dalāʾil*) taken from the *Sunna* (in the absence of explicit scriptural reference) is suspect and thus unacceptab e (Muḥammad ʿAbduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 129 (Fr. trans., 137); *Tafsīr* i, 8, 174-5, iii, 327). Hence the idea of the fundamentally complementary nature of the Scripture and the *Sunna*.

2.—The Sunna.—From the standpoint of *iṣlāḥ* the *Sunna* must be placed next to Revelation as second canonical source. However, reformist teaching is not in complete agreement on whether it is a constitutive source, like Revelation, or simply an explanation of the latter. The following are the main doctrinal positions:

The Sunna is of the same essence as the Ḳurʾān.— This is the point of view of Ibn Bādīs, who affirms the profound unity that links the *Sunna* and the Scriptures. "The expression: 'Revelation of the Lord compassionate', [Ḳurʾān, XXXVI, 58] means that the religion is, in its entirety, a revelation from God . . . for the source of Islam . . . is the Ḳurʾān, which is a divine revelation, and the *Sunna*, which is also a revelation, as these words of the Almighty prove [quotation of LIII, 4]" (*Shihāb*, Feb. 1936, 95). This radical position is similar to that of the Ẓāhirite Ibn Ḥazm, who also held the *Sunna* to be on a par with Revelation (cf. his *Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām*, Cairo 1345/1927, i, 121-2. *Ḥadīth* provides an argument in favour of this thesis (cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 223 A: "—revealed to Muḥammad by Djibrīl just as the Ḳurʾān was revealed"). It was only partially shared by Rashīd Riḍā, but he admits that "revelation is not limited to the Ḳurʾān" (*Tafsīr* . . ., ii, 139, v, 279, 470). Some of the Prophet's teachings, on the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ḳudus*)

have the same importance as the Ḳur'ān, but their level of expression does not assume the inimitable nature of the latter (*ibid.*, v, 279, § 3).

The Sunna makes Revelation explicit.—All the reformist authors agree on this point. The Ḳur'ān clearly says that the Prophet's mission is to make manifest to men (*li-tubayyina li 'l-nās*) the true meaning of the Scriptures (*Tafsīr* . . ., ii, 30, vi, 159, 472, vii, 139, viii, 255, 309; *Shihāb*, Oct. 1930, 532; Feb. 1932, 73). The *Sunna* is second in importance to the Book, since it is an explanatory instrument (*Tafsīr* . . ., iv, 18, on III, 101); the Ḳur'ān constitutes the totality of the religion, and the *Sunna* is an integral part of the latter only in the sense that it explains what was revealed (*ibid.*, ix, 326). Herein lies the status of the *Sunna* as the second canonical source.

By *Sunna* is meant only the texts of *Ḥadīth* the authenticity of which has been duly established (cf. Muḥammad ʿAbduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 129 [Fr. transl., 132]), a very limited number of traditions which refer above all to the dogmas of faith and the forms of worship (e.g. prayer, pilgrimage). Beyond these descriptive traditions of holy acts, the remaining traditions about which there is no doubt (e.g. those with a moral content) "do not number more than a dozen" (*Risālat al-tawḥīd*, ed. Rashīd Riḍā 202 note 2; *Tafsīr* . . ., v, 365). A tradition is not necessarily to be believed just because it is attributed to the Prophet, even if it carries the authority of an eminent traditionist or famous teacher. Rashīd Riḍā cites the example of Ghazālī, who gave as authentic traditions which were "insignificant or simply invented" (*Tafsīr*, vii, 31). He was also severely critical of the apocryphal traditions (*mawḍūʿ*), attributing their origin to various factors: *zandaḳa* [*q.v.*], sectarianism, flattery towards rulers, human error, and senile forgetfulness. Moreover, rigorism and puritanism encouraged the traditionists to incorporate into *Ḥadīth* moral maxims which they considered just as edifying as certain traditions called "weak".

The problem of the authenticity of *Ḥadīth* is extremely important from the reformist point of view, for the authenticity of a *sunna* is the basis of its authority as a canonical source. All that is transmitted by the Prophet originates from God and must therefore be an article of faith for Believers (Ḳur'ān, IV, 80: "Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allāh"). Thus Muslims have every right to reject any normative tradition the authenticity of which is not absolutely beyond doubt, as is the Ḳur'ān. Hence the necessity of great care in distinguishing between the *Sunna*, which carries the same authority as Scripture, and the traditions whose authenticity has not been completely established, even if they are in harmony with the "spirit" of the Salaf. In fact, the Salafiyya only recognize the normative value of a very small number of *ḥadīth*s which are held to be rigorously authentic: *aḥādīth mutawātira, wa-ḳalīlun mā hi* (*Manār*, iii, 572). By stating that Muslims are obliged to follow "the Ḳur'ān and the *Sunna*, and them alone" (al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḳurā*, 73; Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr* . . ., *passim*; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Feb. 1936, 95), the reformists based their doctrine on the teachings of the Prophet (cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 130 A: "Clinging to Ḳur'ān and Sunna alone"; 223 A: "Confining oneself to Ḳur'ān and Sunna"). But, bearing in mind their very limitative conception of the *Sunna*, they maintain in fact that Islam as a religion (*dīn*) can essentially be reduced to the Ḳur'ān.

The doctrine of *iṣlāḥ* tends to attach a greater importance to the Ḳur'ān as a source than to *Ḥadīth* as it has generally been accepted in classical dogmas. This trend is taken to its logical conclusion in the works of recent authors, who reduce the authority of *Ḥadīth* almost out of existence in favour of the Ḳur'ān and *idjtihād* [*q.v.*] (cf. Maḥmūd Abū Rayya, a former disciple of Rashīd Riḍā: *Aḍwā ʿala 'l-sunna al-muḥammadiyya*, Cairo 1958; and on present positions on the subject of *Ḥadīth*: *REI*, 1954, *Abstracta*, 117-23; G. H. A. Juynboll, *The authenticity of the tradition literature*, Leiden 1969).

Logically, Islam could no doubt be defined exclusively in relation to the Ḳur'ān, a thesis upheld by another disciple of Rashīd Riḍā, Muḥammad Tawfīḳ Ṣidḳī, in his work *al-Islām huwa 'l-Ḳur'ān waḥdahu* which is a programme in its own right (*Manār* ix (1906), 515-25, 906-25). For this author, the foundations of Islam are the Book of God and Reason. Any doctrinal element imputed to Islam which satisfies neither the criterion of the given facts of the Ḳur'ān nor the fundamental demands of reason must be declared unacceptable. Elsewhere, M. T. Ṣidḳī demands complete freedom in evaluating the *Sunna*. It must be limited in so far as it is in disagreement with the objective facts of the Book, but where it puts forward principles of wisdom (*ḥikma*) there is nothing to prevent the Believer from referring to it, as he might to any (profane) source. The Salafiyya certainly do not go to quite these lengths. The thesis of Muḥammad Tawfīḳ Ṣidḳī (presented with some reservations by Rashīd Riḍā) was immediately refuted by a defender of the classical doctrine (cf. Ṭāhā al-Bishrī, *Uṣūl al-Islām: al-Ḳur'ān, al-Sunna, al-idjmāʿ, al-ḳiyās*, in *Manār*, ix, 699-711). In the eyes of the Salafiyya Islam cannot be reduced to matters of faith and canonical obligation (*ibādāt*) which can only be held to be true in so far as they originate from Revelation and the very small number of *ḥadīth*s shown to be authentic (*mutawātir*). Islam is also a political and social system, a complex of ethical values, a culture. In matters of usage (*ʿādāt*) and human relations (*muʿāmalāt*) determined by a socio-cultural framework which is not ruled by scriptural dispositions (*naṣṣ*), the *Sunna* and the traditions of the Salaf are helpful and instructive; they are indeed exemplary and worthy of the attention of Muslims as an excellent reference for both action and moral life. Beside these two sources, *iṣlāḥ* attaches great value to the tradition of the Salaf, which it holds to be eminently representative of the Prophet's tradition and thus indispensable for anybody who wishes to grasp the authentic message of Islam at its source.

3.—**The tradition of the Salaf.**—To a large extent, *iṣlāḥ* appeals to the tradition of the Salaf as an explanatory source for the *Sunna* and an important reference point for understanding the general meaning of Islam. The term *salaf* designates a fact that is both historical and cultural. It implies firstly the idea of anteriority (cf. Ḳur'ān XLIII, 57), which in classical usage is naturally linked with the idea of authority and exemplariness. The Salaf are precisely the "virtuous forefathers" (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*), the predecessors whose perfect orthodoxy, piety, holiness, and religious knowledge make them men worthy of being taken as models and guides. But, in the absence of sure and sufficient biographical references, these are difficult to ascertain. It is not so much their personal qualities, however striking, that make for the authority of the Salaf, but rather their historical experience, their contact with the

Prophet in some cases and with his Companions and Successors in others. Among the innumerable witnesses of primitive Islam, the Salaf are exemplary. They represent a certain form of Islamic orthodoxy at a given period of history. Hence the need to sketch the historical context of the Salaf. The chronological points of reference are inexact and often contradictory. By *salaf* was meant, for example:—a. the "Mother of the Believers", ʿĀ'isha, and the Patriarchal Caliphs, as well as Ṭalḥa and Zubayr (Lane, Book iv, 1408 C);—b. the principle *tābiʿūn* (*ibid.*);—c. the Prophet's Companions (al-Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, ed. Maʿārif, i, 93);—d. The Companions and their successors (*tābiʿūn*, on the one hand in relation to the founders of the four *madhhabs* (cf. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal who talks of "our pious forefathers", *salafūna al-ṣāliḥ*, Wensinck, *Concordances* ...., i, 505 B); and on the other the latter and their immediate disciples in relation to succeeding generations (al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn*, ed. Khayyāṭ, iii, 676-7). In the works of modern reformist authors the definition of the Salaf is just as vague. For Rashīd Riḍā they are the most eminent representatives of the primitive Islamic community, *al-ṣadr al-awwal* (*Tafsīr*, ii, 81, vii, 143, 198), those of the "first epoch", *al-ʿaṣr al-awwal* (*ibid.*, vi, 196, iii, 572), which covers the first three generations, *karn* (this term is not to be taken in the modern sense of "century" but in that of a "generation of men" (*djīl*) who lived during the same period of seventy to eighty years [*ibid.*, xi, 314, xii, 190]). In the works of Rashīd Riḍā and Ibn Bādīs we find the same traditional definition of the three first generations; *i.e.*, that of the Prophet and his Companions (*ṣaḥāba*), that of their Followers (*tābiʿūn*) and that of the Successors of the latter, *atbāʿ al-tābiʿīn* (*Tafsīr*, viii, 50; Shihāb, April 1937, 434), generations "which surpass in excellence (*khayriyya*) all others, as is witnessed by the Impeccable [*i.e.*, Muḥammad]" (Shihāb, Feb. 1932, 66, allusion to the *ḥadīth*: "the best of generations is mine, then the following, then that which comes after", cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 48A, lg. 40: "the best. . .". This is worth comparing with the other *ḥadīth*, quoted by al-Shāfiʿī, *Risāla*, ed. A. M. Shākir, 474, no. 1315: "Honour my Companions and those who follow them and those who follow these; after which untruth will appear", cf. Wensinck, *Handbook* 48 B "Muḥammad admonishes. . .").

A few chronological points of reference will serve as rough definitions of the three groups which make up the Salaf:—a) The *ṣaḥāba* (or *aṣḥāb*), who date from the first conversions (at Mecca in 610 and Medina in June 621) until the death of Anas b. Mālik (91/710 or 93/712), considered to be the last survivor of the Prophet's Companions (cf. Ibn Ḥadjar al-ʿAskalānī, *Iṣāba*, i, 138; Ibn Ḥazm, *Iḥkām*, iv, 152);—b) The *tābiʿūn*: a large number of these were contemporaries of the Prophet's Companions; some might even have been alive during the Prophet's lifetime but without satisfying the conditions which would have permitted them to be classed among the *ṣaḥāba*. The last of the *tābiʿūn* died around 180/796 (*e.g.*: Hushaym b. Bashīr al-Sulamī, d. 183/799. He transmitted to Mālik and Sufyān al-Thawrī among others).—c) The *atbāʿ al-tābiʿīn*. There are no sufficiently precise criteria enabling us to define exactly this group of men; the reformists refer to them less frequently than to the other two, especially on the important question of ḳur'ānic exegesis (cf. *Tafsīr*, iii, 179, 208). In fact, they are essentially the most eminent disciples of the great *tābiʿūn*, *kibār al-tābiʿīn* (like al-Ḳāsim b. Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr, 101/720; al-Shaʿbī, d. 104/723; al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī,

d. 110/729; Ibn Sīrīn, d. 110/729). The middle of the 3rd/9th century can be taken as the *terminus ad quem* of this last group of Salaf. Also covered by the term Salaf are "the doctors of the second and third generations" (*Tafsīr*, ii, 82), notably the founders of the four Sunnī *madhhabs* and a certain number of their contemporaries, the strongest religious personalities from the early days of Islam, such as al-Awzāʿī (d. 157/774), Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), al-Layth b. Saʿd (d. 175/791) and Isḥāḳ b. Rāhwayh (d. 238/853, cf. *Tafsīr*, vii, 552, viii, 453). Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) would appear to be one of the last representatives of the age of the Salaf.

In reformist usage, the Salaf are sometimes mentioned in opposition to the *Khalaf* or "later generations", under whose influence the message of Islam has been obscured, if not distorted, by innovation, the fanaticism of the Schools, and the mushrooming of sects (cf. *Tafsīr* viii, 269). This conception might appear simplistic, implying that reformists should cut themselves off from the cultural current which has never ceased to refresh the body of the *Umma* throughout the centuries. In fact the position of the Salafiyya is more subtle: outside the period of the Salaf defined above, the modern reformists do not refuse to take into consideration the contributions made by the "independent" (*mustaḳill*) doctors —independent of the Schools and Parties—who, following the example of the Salaf, were free from all sectarianism and all narrowmindedness, and whose only concern was to safeguard the integrity of the *Sunna* and the unity of the Community. Thus Abū Isḥāḳ al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) is highly esteemed by Rashīd Riḍā (cf. the eulogistic article that he devoted to him in *K. al-Iʿtiṣām*, Cairo 1332/1914, i, 1-9; *Tafsīr*, vi, 156-63, vii, 193). Moreover, the Salafiyya venerate a number of outstanding Sunnī teachers and mystics such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Djuwaynī (d. 438/1047), his son the Imām al-Ḥaramayn (d. 478/1085), and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), even though they came later than the Salaf (cf. *Tafsīr*, xi, 378). These they consider as "guides to salvation" (*aʾimmat al-hudā*), seeing them as bearers of the light which brought about the periodic revival of Muslim spirituality. In the line of such men who rejuvenated Islam and faithful transmitted the ideas of the Salaf is Muḥammad ʿAbduh; to the supporters of modern reformism he is the master (*al-ustādh al-imām*) the one who really inaugurated the renewal of Islam at the dawn of the 20th century.

Fidelity to the moral and religious tradition of the Salaf is a fundamental demand of *iṣlāḥ*. Besides the two sources, the reformists proclaim this tradition as their only basic point of reference, justifying their attitude by the following arguments:—a) *The Salaf received the sacred inheritance from the Prophet* (the dogmas of the faith, the form of worship), and transmitted it faithfully, in word and deed, *ḳawlan wa-ʿamalan* (*Tafsīr*, vi, 277). They are the guarantors of the *Sunna* (*ibid.*, ii, 30, 82), and their liturgical tradition must be adhered to as an ideal norm, in the sense that it actualizes the spirituality of the Prophet, and to imitate this must be the highest ambition of every Muslim.—b) *The Salaf best understood and followed the ḳurʾānic message*, as it was handed down to them fresh from the Revelation (*ghaddan kamā unzila*). After the Prophet, they are most qualified to interpret the Scriptures (*Tafsīr*, iii, 178, 182, vi, 196; cf. R. Blachère, *Introd. au Coran*, 225 ff.). Their reading and their meditations on the Book are indispensable for a modern understanding of the Ḳurʾān, which must avoid being both too literal or too subjective—and thus arbitrary—

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12 years before the Hidjra        Beginning of Muhammad's preaching
                                  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────── 610
                                  │ First conversions at Mecca              :
15 months before the Hidjra       ├─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─:─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ - VI. 621
                                  │ First conversions at Medina         Class I
                                  │                                        :
The Hidjra                        │··············································· IX. 622
                                  │                                        :
                                  │ Death of the Prophet                    :
Year 10                           ├─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─:─ ─ ─ - VI. 632
                                  │                              Class II  :
                                  │ The last Companions (I)             :   :
Death of Anas 91-3                ├─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ↓:─ ─ ─ - 710/12
                                  │                                 Class III
                                  │ The last of the tābiʿūn (II)           :
c. 180                            ├─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ↓ ─ ─:─ - c. 796
                                  │                                        :
                                  │ The last of the atbāʿ al-tābiʿīn (III) :
Death of Ibn Hanbal 241           └─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ↓─ - 855
                                  ↑        approximate limit of the age of the Salaf        ↑
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c) *The Salaf are the best source of information we have about the life* of the Prophet and about the way he put the Revelation into practice. On many factual points their unanimous accounts (*idjmāʿ*) are irreplacable, rounding off information given by the two sources. The Salaf thus provide the necessary framework for an understanding of the Revelation and the *Sunna*.

A complement to the *Sunna* and a source of inspiration in Islamic life (in spiritual matters as well as in secular acts), the tradition of the Salaf is more than an object of veneration for the modern reformists. The Salafiyya do not wish to be a group frozen in admiration of an ideal image of Islam reflected by the Salaf. They aspire rather to live Islam within modern society, in a simple and true manner, following the example of the Salaf. Moreover, for the theoreticians of *iṣlāḥ*, this ideal expresses their desire to rebuild the Muslim personality, not by copying foreign values and cultures but by drawing from the moral and cultural tradition of early Islam. It is this ideal that Ibn Bādīs defended in his column in *Shihāb*: *Ridjāl al-Salaf wa-nisāʾu-h* ("[famous] Men and Women in early Islam"): "Our aim is to make our readers aware of a number of our pious forefathers—men and women—underlining the eminent qualities they owed to Islam and the lofty acts they performed in its service; for their example can strengthen the hearts of Muslims, contribute to their moral improvement, inspire them with great projects, and breathe new life into them. There is no *life* for the generation of today without the *life* of the Salaf, which is nothing but their living history and the everlasting memory of them" (*Shihāb*, Jan. 1934, 14). In like manner, reformist authors tended to exploit systematically the historical and literary facts relating to the Salaf in order to point moral as well as social and political lessons. (Cf. the examples given in *Tafsīr*, iii, 92: ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, 374: Abū Ṭalḥa Zayd b. Sahl; 375: ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar; 376: ʿAbd Allāh b. Djaʿfar; vii, 21-23: ʿUthmān b. Maẓʿūn and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib; viii, 225: Zayd b. ʿAlī and his companions, cited as martyrs (*fidāʾiyyūn*) of religious and political *iṣlāḥ*; x, 654-5: ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf; see also the examples presented in A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 287 ff.; ʿUbāda b. al-Ṣāmit and his wife Umm Ḥarām, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, Bilāl b. Rabāḥ, al-Nuʿmān b. ʿAdī al-ʿAdawī; 325-6: Laylā al-Shifāʾ bint ʿAmr). Biographical literature concerning the beginnings of Islam (beyond that of the *Sīra* itself) became an inexhaustible mine of historical and moral meditation for the reformists (cf. the column of *Manār*: *Āthār al-salaf ʿibra li 'l-khalaf*: that of *Shihāb* (already referred to): *Ridjāl al-salaf wa-nisāʾu-h* (from 1934 on); the lyrical and moralizing odes to the glory of the Patriarchal Caliphs like the *ʿUmariyya* (Feb. 1918, 190 lines) by Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm (d. 1932) and the *ʿAlawiyya* (Nov. 1919, more than 300 lines) by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib (d. 1931); Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, *Maʿa 'l-raʿīl al-awwal²*, Cairo, 1378/1958).

The historico-cultural importance of the Salaf in the methodology of *iṣlāḥ* is considerable. Even though the Salafiyya give priority to the two sources, they put forward the principle that the Revelation and the *Sunna* inaugurated a new order in human history, and that that order became a complete living reality in and through the acts of the Salaf. Thus the reformist conception of Islam could be summarized in a statement of the following type: "The constituents of Islam are the ḳurʾānic revelation, Muḥammad's *Sunna*, and the tradition of the pious forefathers (*wa-mā kāna ʿalayh al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*)", viewing this tradition from the aspect of its moral and dogmatic content (*Tafsīr*, vii, 143, 198, ix, 132, xi, 378; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Feb. 1934, 99). Because they felt it was the concrete expression of the ideal "way" of Islam, the reformists continually cite the tradition of the *Salaf* in support of their missionary activity (*daʿwa*) and their teaching in matters of ḳurʾānic exegesis or social and political ethics. This fidelity to the Salaf governs one of the main doctrinal premises of *iṣlāḥ*.

C.—THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINAL POSITIONS.—*Iṣlāḥ* aims at a total reform of Muslim life.

1.—*For the reform of worldly matters*, *iṣlāḥ* employed oral teaching (*waʿz, irshād*) in mosques and through cultural circles well-disposed toward the Salafiyya movement. Screened by their educational and scholastic (*al-tarbiya wa 'l-taʿlīm*) or charitable (*khayriyya*) works, these associations attempted to implement the great aims of the reformists. In addition, *iṣlāḥ* was diffused by means of many publications and periodicals, some of which, like the *Manār* in the East (1898-1935), run by Rashīd Riḍā, or the *Shihāb* in the Maghrib (1924-39), edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Bādīs, had a deep and lasting influence.

The general reformist themes propagated among the masses can be summarized as follows: the restora-

tion of worship to its original form (which entailed certain liturgical changes, minor in themselves, but extremely irritating to traditionalist Sunnīs); preaching against a host of practices which seemed religious but had no foundation either in the Prophet's *Sunna* or in the tradition of the Salaf (funeral rites such as the public recitation of the Ḳurʾān over the tomb, the celebration of the *mawlid* [*q.v.*] etc.); and warning against pious beliefs and practices which the Salafiyya felt bore traces of the survival of paganism or the manifestation of *shirk* [*q.v.*] (cult of the saints, invocation of the dead, etc.). The reformers also exhorted the faithful to unite, to worship in solidarity aside from the divergences of Schools and to overcome the traditional opposition between Sunnism and Shīʿism; and they encouraged the development of a moral censorship designed both to ensure the canonical obligation to obey God and eliminate Evil, and also to cleanse Muslim society of vice, gambling, the use of alcoholic beverages and drugs, etc. The education of Muslim men (and especially women) in elementary hygiene and domestic economy (including the encouragement to save) was important, as was the cultivation of a taste for order and work well done. Other educational aims were the awakening of the Muslims' intellectual curiosity, so that they might study modern science and foreign languages; and the support of projects for youth such as scouting, artistic activities, cultural activity within the many circles (*nādī*) and associations of Young Muslims (*djamʿiyyat al-shubbān al-muslimīn*). All this comprised an attempt to hasten the birth of new Muslim men, capable of facing fearlessly—and without the risk of alienation—the problems of the contemporary world.

2.—*For theoretical reform.* It is important to stress that the principal reformist authors were above all men of action who did not have the time to elaborate well-developed doctrinal works. The main religious ideas of Muhammad ʿAbduh are set out in his *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, in 133 small pages. The rest of his teachings can be found scattered piecemeal through the bulky *Tafsīr* by Rashīd Riḍā, where his work cannot easily be distinguished from his disciples'. Al-Kawākibī (who died prematurely in 1902) produced no more than two essays: *Ṭabāʾiʿ al-istibdād* and *Umm al-ḳurā*, which contain only a small proportion of theoretical thought. The Algerian reformer, Ibn Bādīs, who, like ʿAbduh, introduced many new ideas throughout his life, left no more than a series of articles of ḳurʾānic commentary (that is, about 500 octavo pages), published in the *Shihāb* (cf. A. Merad, *Ibn Bādīs, commentateur du Coran*). There remains the considerable work of Rashīd Riḍā, in particular his *Tafsīr* (*Tafsīr al-Manār*), which is the most important source for the study of the dogmatic positions of modern *iṣlāḥ*. The many secondary reformist authors simply developed the ideas of their masters when they were not simply imitating their writings and teaching.

The efforts of the Salafiyya centered particularly on criticism of the fashionable doctrines of their time, either on the grounds that they were a rigid form of classical doctrine (that of the Sunnī schools), or that they were rash analyses and formulations, the result of a modernism that was dubious in principle and incompatible with the criteria of orthodoxy which *iṣlāḥ* had set up. At the same time, the reformists attempted to work out "ideal" Islamic positions, bearing in mind the objective facts given in the two sources and the fundamental conceptions of the Salaf; the latter were essentially viewed through the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya and his pupil Ibn

Ḳayyim al-Djawziyya (d. 751/1350), whom they considered the soundest authorities on the tradition of the Salaf (cf. *Tafsīr*, i, 253: it is thanks to these two that the author adhered so serenely (*iṭmaʾanna ḳalbī*) to the doctrines attributed to the Salaf). From the critical works and commentaries of the reformists (cf. *Bibliography*) we can distinguish the following doctrinal positions:

I.—*Methodology.*—The dominant Sunnī doctrine based canonical knowledge (*ʿilm*) on four fundamental sources (*uṣūl* [*q.v.*]): the Ḳurʾān, the *Sunna*, the *idjmāʿ* and the *idjtihād* (cf. al-Shāfiʿī, *Risāla*, 478-9, nos. 1329-2; J. Schacht, uṢŪL, in *EI¹*; idem, FIKH, in *EI²*). Starting from these four sources, juridical and moral rules (*aḥkām*) are deduced according to well-defined criteria which are the subject-matter of the science of the *uṣūl*. *Iṣlāḥ* adheres to the classical theory of the four sources (*Tafsīr* v, 187, 201, xi, 267), without accepting traditional criteria in their entirety (*ibid.*, v, 187, 201, 203, 208, 417). The reformist stance can be summarized under the following headings: the authority of the two Sources; the rejection of *taḳlīd*; a new conception of *idjtihād* and *idjmāʿ*; and the necessary distinction between the *ʿibādāt* and the *ʿādāt*.

1.—*The two Sources* (Ḳurʾān and *Sunna*) constitute the basis of the whole legal system in Islam. Their authority frees Muslims from exclusive submission to traditional doctrinal authorities, thus effectively wiping out the divergences (*ikhtilāf*) between Schools (*madhāhib*), the secular opposition between Sunnīs and Shīʿism, and the hatred nurtured in Sunnī circles for sects felt to be heretical (particularly all Khāridjism, in its present form of the Ibāḍiyya [*q.v.*]), By returning to first principles, Muslims will be able to overcome the divisive effect of the Schools but will still be able to take up all that is best from each of the many contributions (Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, March 1936, 654, Nov. 1938, 230). This would permit, for example, the possibility of an eventual unification of Muslim legislation. By preaching tirelessly for a return to first principles, the reformists were led to voice severe criticism of the orthodox Schools and their teachers, the fuḳahāʾ (cf. al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḳurā*, 72 ff.; Muḥ. ʿAbduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 15, 101, (Fr. trans. 19, 107); Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, ii, 258-9, iii, 9-11, iv, 49, 280, vii, 145 and following references). In their eyes, the Schools generally identified themselves with trends hostile to reason and science (*Tafsīr*, ii, 91-3); they hindered the research carried out by *idjtihād* and consequently helped to stop the cultural progress of the Community; they in fact gave priority to the study of *fiḳh* over knowledge based on the Ḳurʾān and on the Prophet's *Sunna* (*ibid.*, v, 106, 120, ix, 129-30, x, 429); they placed the authority of the "doctors" higher than the authority of the only legitimate and worthwhile *madhhab*: that of the Salaf (*ibid.*, ix, 133). By encouraging the unconditional submission of the masses to their doctors, the Schools ignored ḳurʾānic teaching, which says that Muslims must cling together (*djamīʿan*) to the one and only rope of salvation, the rope of Allāh (*ḥabl Allāh*), which is the Ḳurʾān (cf. the commentary of Rashīd Riḍā on this ḳurʾānic ref. (III, 98): *Tafsīr*, v, 20 ff.). The return to the two sources (and to the tradition of the Salaf) would thus be a unifying and reconciling factor for Muslims. Freed of their fanaticism and mutual prejudices, Muslims could reunite in the fundamental unity of their *Umma*, rediscovering their original fraternity, over and above their ethnic and cultural ties. (The theme of the return to first principles was a powerful argument in favour of pan-Islamism, an idea dear to the reformist authors).

Can the return to first principles advocated by the Salafiyya be seen as reactionary? The reformists were not trying to restore to the old symbols (such as *sunna*, *umma*, *djamāʿa*, *imām*, *dār al-islām*, *idjmāʿ*, *idjtihād*) the exact same significance they had had at the time of the Salaf. Rather, such a return expresses their desire to take the two sources as an essential (but not exclusive) basis for their reflection, in order to solve the moral problems that the modern world poses to Muslims. The use to which they put certain symbols found in the Ḳurʾān or the *Sunna* sometimes corresponds to preoccupations arising from daily life in the modern world. Behind what appears to be a fundamentalist return to the sources of Islam, the Salafiyya are in fact attempting to work towards a moral and doctrinal renewal by searching for subtle concordances between the Scriptures and present-day realities (see, *e.g.*, the concepts of *shūrā* (Ḳurʾān, II, 233; III, 159) and of *ūlū 'l-amr* (Ḳurʾān, IV, 59) and their respective interpretations by Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr* ii, 414, iv, 199-205, v, 180-190). A logical consequence of the principle of a return to the sources is the rejection of *taḳlīd* [*q.v.*] and the search for new ways of practising *idjtihād*.

2.—*Taḳlīd*. The reformists vigorously criticized the spirit of servile dependance upon traditional doctrinal authorities (notably in the orthodox Schools). The concept of *taḳlīd* obviously does not apply either to the pious imitation of the Prophet, which is held to be a canonical obligation (cf. Ḳurʾān IV, 59, XXXIII, 21), nor to the trusting acceptance of the tradition of the Salaf, whose moral and doctrinal authority is loudly proclaimed by the reformists (see above). In these cases, the word *ittibāʿ* (active fidelity) to the traditions of both the Prophet and the Salaf was used instead of *taḳlīd*. (Cf. in this respect the distinction made by Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, v, 238). Such a fidelity regulates and inspires the general mission of *iṣlāḥ*, which offers the imitation of the Prophet as an "ideal of knowledge and action" (H. Laoust, *Essai*, 226). For Ibn Bādīs, the better the imitation the better is the reformist mission (*daʿwa*) accomplished (*Shihāb*, April 1935, 8). *Ittibāʿ* is the attempt to reach authenticity; it is the opposite of the spirit of speculation and innovation (*ibtidāʿ*), which is as reprehensible at a religious level as is the passive acceptance of the teachings of authority. In any case, *taḳlīd* is quite different from the attempt to model one's life on the exemplary lives (*iḳtidāʾ*) of people who, because of their piety or holiness, are worthy of imitation (*Tafsīr*, vi, 415). Finally, the considered acceptance of interpretations supplied by the most eminent *mudjtahid* cannot be described as *taḳlīd*, since they do not claim to be legislators (*shāriʿūn*) independent of God and His Prophet, but only sound guides to a better understanding of the divine Law and the *Sunna* (*ibid.*, v, 238). The same applies to the obedience which is normally due to the *ūlū 'l-amr* (Ḳurʾān, IV, 59), who work together in explaining the Law, in applying it and, generally, in putting Ḳurʾānic values into practice at every level of Muslim life. The reformist criticism of *taḳlīd* is aimed both at mindless conformism and the deliberate support given to social and political structures which prevent progress and personal initiative in the name of a static vision of religion and culture. For the *muḳallid*, the reformists feel, religious life is merely the expression of acquired habits and the passive acceptance of the *status quo*; their worship is reduced to verbal formulae which have no profound meaning; and religious rites dwindle to mechanically

repeated acts which have no reforming and sanctifying value. Looked at in this light, *taḳlīd* is the opposite of the spiritual and ethical demands made by the Ḳurʾān.

The Ḳurʾān contains many statements condemning mindless submission to those who went before, to the "fathers" (*ābāʾ*), a theme much used by reformist writers: *Tafsīr*, i, 425, iv, 63 (the refusal to see *taḳlīd* as the distinctive mark of Islam); viii, 21, (ref. to *sūra* XC), ix, 570, x, 428 (*taḳlīd* is condemned by the Ḳurʾān); i, 425, ii, 83, vii, 143 (it is strongly discouraged by the Salaf and the first great thinkers); v, 296, viii, 30, 144 (it is a source of error); i, 448, iii, 236, v, 296 (it is an obstacle to personal meditation on Revelation); ii, 76, viii, 169, ix, 179, x, 432 (it encourages a new form of idolatry: the excessive veneration of authorities and masters); i, 429, iii, 202, 258, iv, 49, vii, 145 (it leads to sectarianism and fanaticism); ii, 76, 108, viii, 399 (it is a cause of disunion and weakness in the Community). Since it sets greater store on arguments from authority than on personal thought and experience, *taḳlīd* is contrary to the spirit of Islam, which recognizes in reasoning beings the faculty of taking decisions in all conscience (*ibid.*, xii, 220-1; see also Muḥammad Iḳbāl's remarks in *The Reconstruction* . . ., 125-9 [Fr. trans., 136-41]). The reformist argument makes continual appeals to this sort of objection when denouncing the illegitimate (*buṭlān*) and illicit (*taḥrīm*) nature of *taḳlīd* and stressing its negative effects on Muslim teaching and ethics. *Taḳlīd* is also blamed for the cultural stagnation of Islam and the passive submission of the Muslim masses to traditional religious structures (*ʿulamāʾ* and *shaykh*s of the brotherhoods); cf. *Tafsīr*, iii, 325-7, x, 425-35, xii, 221; Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Waḥda al-islāmiyya*, *passim*; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Nov. 1932, 552-57; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 275-6. In the reformist view, the concept of *taḳlīd* inevitably brings to mind that of *idjtihād*, with which it forms one of the antithetical couples (*tawḥīd/shirk*, *sunna/bidʿa*, *ittibāʿ/ibtidāʿ*, *salaf/khalaf*) around which the doctrine of *iṣlāḥ* is firmly articulated.

3.—*Idjtihād*. *Iṣlāḥ* affirms the necessity and legitimacy of the use of the *idjtihād*, which Rashīd Riḍā sees as "a life-force in religion" (*ḥayāt al-dīn*, *Tafsīr*, ii, 399). The fiction of the "closing of the gate" of *idjtihād* (from the 4th/10th century on) is thus abandoned and with it the whole heritage of interdictions and myths which weighed heavily on the Muslim conscience for so long. But the reformists did not regard the opening of the mind to *idjtihād* as absolute freedom for the critical spirit to call everything into question. Complete liberty of conscience in religious matters would lead to speculation without end (*ibid.*, viii, 317), which was not what the Salafiyya wanted. Conservative Sunnism nevertheless blamed *iṣlāḥ* for encouraging innovation and favouring doctrinal "anarchy" (*ibid.*, ii, 273, xi, 253). The theme of *taḳlīd* has been a constant source of misunderstanding between the reformists and their traditionalist adversaries, because neither agreed on the definition of this principle nor on the extent to which it can be applied. The traditionalists, who thought of religion (in its broadest sense) as a divine work which is perfectly complete (Ḳurʾān, V, 5), were afraid that modern criticism might use *idjtihād* to undermine the essential foundations of Islam. But the reformist conception of *idjtihād* also had its limiting conditions.

Firstly, *iṣlāḥ* defined an intangible sphere, which included the dogmas of the faith (*ʿaḳāʾid*), fundament-

al worship (*ʿibādāt*) and canonical prohibitions (*taḥrīm dīnī*), which are all based on the Scriptures, either because of their explicit and formal nature or because of the irrefutable authenticity of their interpretation (*mā huwa ḳaṭʿī 'l-riwāya wa 'l-dalāla: Tafsīr*, i, 118 (bis), xi, 268, 265; *al-Waḥda al-islāmiyya*, 136). In this domain there is no room for *idjtihād* (*Tafsīr*, v, 211, viii, 217, x, 432, xi, 268), for it would be intolerably presumptuous to attempt to question fundamental religious facts, which form "a divine institution, revealed by God" (*ibid.*, ii, 18, x, 432). Apart from these sacred matters, *iṣlāḥ* permits the use of *idjtihād*, while placing it on two distinct planes, each with a particular significance.

a)—As an effort to understand the two sources, *idjtihād* is part of the right—and duty—of every Muslim to seek to understand by himself Revelation and the *Sunna* (*ibid.*, ii, 399). One of the fundamental ideas of reformist preaching was that Muslims must feel personally concerned with the Word of God and the teaching of the Prophet which illuminates it. Constant meditation on the Scriptures, patient efforts to analyse and understand all the resources that it offers, should permit every Muslim to steep himself in the divine message and draw from it principles of moral and spiritual conduct (*hidāya*). This purely interior form of *idjtihād* helps to nourish the Muslim's spirituality and guide his conscience in his moral judgements and practical choices. Its implications are largely personal (cf. *Tafsīr*, i, 118,: the individual *idjtihād* in matters of worship, *ʿibādāt shakhṣiyya*). *Idjtihād* is also very important for the Community, which should employ a constant effort to interpret the two sources to determine the general principles of its "politics" (social, economic, foreign, etc.), in accordance with the fundamental commands of the Ḳurʾān and the *Sunna*.

b)—In so much as it is a constructive effort with implications both for the Community and in practical affairs, at a legislative rather than dogmatic level, *idjtihād* comes under the authority of the *ūlū 'l-amr* [*q.v.*]. These latter are the legitimate holders of authority (Ḳurʾān, IV, 59) and because of their responsibilities, their religious knowledge, and their particular abilities are in charge of "binding and unbinding" (*ahl al-ḥall wa 'l-ʿaḳd*), that is the right to decide in the name of the Community and in its best interests. (On the definition and role of the *ūlū 'l-amr*, cf. H. Laoust, *Essai*, 596, and *Traité de Droit Public d'Ibn Taymiyya* (on the latter's point of view); al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḳurā*, 58; Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr* ii, 492, iii, 11-12, iv, 199-205 (important), v. 180-1 Muḥammad ʿAbduh's position), 211-2, vii, 140, 198, viii, 102, xi, 164). The acts of the *ūlū 'l-amr* should aim to bring about the moral good (*iṣlāḥ*) and material welfare (*maṣāliḥ*) of the Community. Their competence extends to affairs that are normally the responsibility of political leaders, but does not include matters of worship and personal status (*ibid.*, v, 211). In these matters, *idjtihād* would constitute a veritable heresy (*ibid.*, xi, 253). Muslims could refuse to recognize the *ūlū 'l-amr* (political and religious chiefs) who attempted to use their *idjtihād* in the sacred domain (*ibid.*, viii, 308), which is the "right of God" (*ḥaḳḳ Allāh*) over men (*ibid.*, viii, 288). Hence those attempts at *idjtihād* suggested by some Arab heads of state in order to reform certain aspects of Muslim personal status which they considered incompatible with the spirit of contemporary civilization were invalid. In all that concerns canonical prescriptions which are authentically founded on the two sources, the role of the *ūlū 'l-amr* is essentially

to safeguard orthodoxy, by making sure that the *Sunna*, as it was formulated by the Salaf, is respected in its entirety (*ibid.*, iii, 11-12). This is a natural corollary of the reformist doctrinal principle maintaining that *idjtihād* is incompatible with certainty (*yaḳīn*) emanating from the absolutely evident facts of the Scriptures (*ibid.*, ii, 18, 109). The Salafiyya only allow the use of *idjtihād* in the absence of any explicit scriptural reference (*naṣṣ*), prophetic tradition (*sunna*) or general consensus (*idjmāʿ*)—in this case the consensus of the Prophet's Companions—that would resolve a given problem (*ibid.*, viii, 219).

Given this important restriction, we can distinguish two types of problems to which the *idjtihād* of the *ūlū 'l-amr* is normally applicable. i)—Purely secular business (administrative organization, scientific and technical questions, military and diplomatic affairs, etc.). In these fields, the *ūlu 'l-amr* are quite free to chose and decide, in so far as their choices are governed by the overriding interests of the Community, in line with the specific goals of Islam. ii)—On the other hand, in business which has some connection with canonical doctrine, the *idjtihād* of the *ūlū 'l-amr* could necessitate the interpretation of ḳurʾānic texts whose apparent sense is not certain, *ẓannī al-dilāla* (*Tafsīr* ii, 109). In this case, to be acceptable, the interpretation must lead to conclusions that are in agreement with the two sources in spirit and letter, for it is understood that *idjtihād* can only be used in the context of the two sources and can only refer to the textual sources and different indications (*dalāʾil, ḳarāʾin*) that they offer. It is a basic principle in *iṣlāḥ* that consideration of the best interests of the *Umma* would never result in solutions incompatible with the spirit, and even more, the objective facts of the Ḳurʾān and the *Sunna*.

In this light, *idjtihād* is not unlike the method of *ḳiyās* [*q.v.*] as it is defined, for example, in the *Risāla* of al-Shāfiʿī (cf. J. Schacht, *Origins*, 122 ff.). *Iṣlāḥ* denounces the "false *idjtihād* and the bad *ḳiyās*" (*Tafsīr*, iii, 238, v, 203), which would allow the incorporation into religious law (*sharʿ*) of elements based merely on individual opinion (*raʾy* [*q.v.*]) or on more or less arbitrary preferences (*istiḥsān* [see ISTIḤSĀN and ISTIṢLĀḤ]). In religious matters *raʾy* is held to be a sort of "calamity" (*baliyya*), for it only serves to hide dangerous innovations (*ibid.*, viii, 398). While the reformists are very suspicious of *ḳiyās, raʾy* and *istiḥsān* according to the technical use of the *fuḳahāʾ*, they nevertheless accept these very modes of reasoning and judgement in certain clearly laid-down conditions (*e.g.*, the *raʾy* of the most eminent religious men among the Companions (*ʿulamāʾ al-ṣaḥāba*); explanatory *raʾy* on the subject of ḳurʾānic exegesis; the *raʾy* of the members of the *shūrā* (*djamāʿat al-shūrā*), those responsible for the temporal affairs of the Community (*ibid.*, vii, 164)). On the different aspects of this question cf. *Tafsīr* vii, 164 (on the recommended *raʾy, maḥmūd*); vii, 190 (on the acceptable *ḳiyās, ṣaḥīḥ*); vii, 167 ff. (on the evil of rejecting *ḳiyās* totally [cf. Ibn Ḥazm, *Iḥkām*, vii, 53 ff., viii, 2 ff.] or of using it without restriction or intelligence). Throughout this debate, Rashīd Riḍā adopts—*grosso modo*—the neo-Ḥanbalite point of view, according to Ibn Ḳayyim al-Djawziyya (*Iʿlām al-Muwaḳḳiʿīn*). In short, *raʾy* and *ḳiyās* are only particular aspects of *idjtihād* and, like the latter, are only acceptable in matters outside worship (*ʿibādāt*). When determining rules and legal statutes (*aḥkām*), *idjtihād* in all its forms is only to be used when there are no antecedents in either the Ḳurʾān or the *Sunna* nor in the irrefutable

practice of the Patriarchal Caliphs (*Tafsīr*, vii, 164). Beyond the attempt at personal interpretation of the divine Word, and the desire to be open to the grace (*hudā*) which flows from it, reformist doctrine limits *idjtihād* to the type exercised by the *ūlū 'l-amr* in public affairs of a secular nature. But so that it should not be a source of quarrel and conflict, the *idjtihād* of the *ūlū 'l-amr* must be derived from mutual consultation (*shūrā*) in accordance with the ethical demands of the Ḳur'ān (XLII, 36). The Community is not bound by the personal and may-be even contradictory opinions of individual *mudjtahids*. Its acceptance by the *ūlū 'l-amr* is a condition *sine qua non* of the validity of their *idjtihād*. Moreover, from the reformist point of view, this represents the most perfect form of *idjmā'* [*q.v.*], by means of which the *Umma* will be able to solve the innumerable problems of its adaptation to the realities of the modern world.

4.—*Idjmā'*. On this point (as on *idjtihād*), the reformist position is very different from the doctrine of the classical theoreticians of the *uṣūl* (cf. al-Shāfi'ī, *Risāla*, 471 ff.; Ibn Ḥazm, *Iḥkām*, iv, 132-235 (a criticism of Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Shāfi'ī ideas on the subject); H Laoust, *Contribution à une étude de la méthodologie canonique d'Ibn Taymīya*, Cairo, 1939; idem, *Essai*, 139 ff.; J. Schacht, *Origins*, 82-94; Muḥammad Iḳbāl, *Reconstruction...*, 164 ff.; L. Gardet, *Introduction...*, 403 ff.; idem, *La Cité Musulmane,* 119-29; see also: ISJMĀ'). *Idjmā'* is recognized as third of the fundamental sources of Islam (and not only of the "Law"; cf. al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḳurā*, 104; *Tafsīr*, v, 187, xi, 267); but the reformists do not accept the traditional classification and formulations which arose from it (*Tafsīr*, v, 203-9). For them, classical conceptions of the subject are not justified by the two sources, (*ibid.*, v, 213) even though the idea of *idjmā'* is implicitly contained in the Ḳur'ān (IV, 115) and the *Sunna* (cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 48A; Ibn Ḥazm, *Iḥkām*, iv, 132 ff.). This methodological principle must not be defined in terms of the concept of "unanimity" (*idjmā'*) but rather in terms of that of the "community" (*djamā'a*), the latter being understood as "the legitimate custodians of authority" (*ūlū 'l-amr*) instead of in the usual sense of the Muslim community as a whole (*Tafsīr*, v, 213-4). Thus the reformists do not confer on *idjmā'* the status of either a general consensus of the Community (cf. al-Shāfi'ī, *Risāla*, 403, no. 1105 and 471 ff.), or that of a unanimous agreement of the *mudjtahids* of a given period on a given question (*ibid.*, v, 417). Like the doctrinal line of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and the neo-Ḥanbalite school, the Salafiyya limit (*ḥaṣara*) *idjmā'* at a canonical level to that of the Prophet's Companions (al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḳurā*, 67, 103; *Tafsīr*, ii, 108, 454, v, 187, 206, vii, 118, viii, 254, 428). Any *idjmā'* later than the era of the Companions is without value, particularly if it ratifies doctrines that contradict the tradition of the latter: *idjmā' al-mukhālifīn* (*Tafsīr*, v, 206, vii, 198). Just as matters concerning worship (*'ibādāt*) are to be judged with reference to the consensus of the Companions (including, if need be, that of the *tābi'ūn*,), which is the sole criterion of orthodoxy, the agreement of the *ūlū 'l-amr* on secular matters is a criterion of legality, for they are the custodians of the Community's legitimacy (*ibid.*, iii, 12: the *ūlū 'l-amr* are those whom the *Umma* recognizes as having controlling power over the leaders and their public acts, *tadj'aluhum musayṭirīn 'alū ḥukkāmihā wa-aḥkāmihā*). The obediance due to the *ūlū 'l-amr* (by virtue of sūra IV, 59, constantly invoked by the

reformists) is justified not by the argument of infal-libility (*'iṣma* [*q.v.*]) but by considerations of public interest (*maṣlaḥa*; *ibid.*, v, 208). To summarize reformist thought on the matter, Rashīd Riḍā defines the consensus of the *ūlū 'l-amr* as the "true *idjmā'* that we hold to be one of the bases of our Law (*sharī'a*)" (*ibid.*, v, 190).

In the absence of any consultative system in Islam that would enable the function of the *shūrā* to be exercised at Community level, most reformist authors have felt the need to fill the gap by using *idjmā'*, modernizing its form and content. But the thinking of the Salafiyya on this theme was never sufficiently elaborated for us to be able to define a coherent reformist doctrine on the practical application of *idjmā'* in the contemporary Muslim world. Muḥammad Iḳbāl (1934) expressed the wish that the *idjmā'* should be organized in the form of "a permanent legislative institution" (*Reconstruction..*, 164). Rashīd Riḍā (1922) considered the idea of using the *Djamā'a*, a consultative body appointed to assist the supreme head (*al-imām al-a'ẓam*) of the Community (cf. H. Laoust, *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rashīd Riḍā*, 1938, 21 ff.), but such a notion has meaning only within the perspective of a restoration of the Caliphate. With greater realism, Ibn Bādīs sets aside the problem of the Caliphate ("that vain fancy") and suggests the establishment of a *Djamā'at al-Muslimīn*, a sort of permanent assembly composed of men of learning and experience, which would be designed to study specifically Muslim problems in order to find Islamic solutions. This important moral and religious body, acting in the name of the whole Community, would serve no one state and would be of a totally apolitical nature, so that its essential independence and liberty would be guaranteed (cf. A. Merad, *Réformisme*, 376 ff.; idem, *Ibn Bādīs Commentat.*, Chap. IV).

Though they never managed to agree on the practicalities of its establishment, the reformists did tend to see the institutionalization of *idjmā'* as a decisive step in the evolution of the *Umma* in accordance with Islamic principles and the ideals of the Salafiyya All who wrote on these lines held in common the idea that the *Djamā'a* would be the privileged setting of the Community's *idjmā'*. It would play two roles: at a religious level, it would effect regulations by stating the orthodox position on matters that gave rise to serious disagreement (*ikhtilāf*); in secular affairs, it would be the instigator of action, through applying the principle of *idjtihād* in the vast area within its competence. It would thus work towards preventing any confusion between the respective levels of the *'ibādāt* and the *'ādāt*, and would contribute to encouraging the free enquiry that the Community requires in the spheres of applied science and material progress.

5.—*The distinction between the* '*ibādāt* and the '*ādāt*. Following the neo-Ḥanbalī school (cf. AḤMAD B. ḤANBAL; H. Laoust, *Essai*, 247-8, 444), modern *iṣlāḥ* tends to make a clear distinction between the concerns of the *'ibādāt* [*q.v.*] and those of the *'ādāt*. Once again they justify their stand by the principle that in matters of worship everything has been completely and definitely decided by God (Ḳur'ān) and the Prophet (*Sunna*); for the rest, that is to say everything concerned with the organization of material life, the *ūlū 'l-amr* are free to come to their own decisions (see above: *idjtihād*).

a)—The *'ibādāt* come under commands (or interdictions) originating from the Ḳur'ān or from formal prescriptions laid down by the Prophet. They cover

all acts (including those of worship) and observances (of *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* [*q.v.*]) which constitute the service of God (*taʿabbud*). It is out of the question for any-body to introduce the slightest innovation, either because of an *idjtihād* or out of simple religious zeal. The fact of recognizing the inalterable quality of the *ʿibādāt*, the very centre of faith, is itself an act of fidelity in what the Believers hold in certainty from God and his Prophet; it is the sign of a sincere and total belief in the latter's *Sunna*.

b)—The *ʿādāt* (habits, customs, usage) cover a vast field of "earthly affairs" (*umūr dunyawiyya*) "which are individual or communal, particular or general" (Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, vii, 140), and above all affairs of a political and legal nature (*ibid.*, iii, 327, vii, 140, 200) which vary according to time and place. It is thus not a matter merely of the traditional legal rules (*muʿāmalāt*) or matters of "customary right", as the term *ʿāda* [*q.v.*] is understood in the usual classical sense of *fiḳh*. In the domain of the *ʿādāt*, the reformists counsel tolerance (*ʿafw*) and claim for the *ūlu 'l-amr*, if not for private individuals, freedom of decision and the free exercise of *idjtihād* (al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḳurā*, 67; *Manār*, iv, 210, vii, 959; *Tafsīr*, iii, 327, vii, 140-41, 191).

By virtue of this distinction, the reformists showed a prudent reserve about everything that has not been expressly decided by God or prescribed by the Prophet. For Rashīd Riḍā that which has not been prohibited by God cannot be prohibited by Man; that which God has made licit, Man cannot make illicit (*Tafsīr*, vii, 169); that which God has passed over in silence must be held to be tolerable, *ʿafw* (*ibid.*, iii, 328, vii, 169). The "wise men" of the religion have no right to make things permitted or forbidden. Their role is simply to put into practice the revealed Law (*sharīʿa*): in this function only is obedience due to them. As for the ḳurʾānic or proph-etic references to certain secular matters (the use of food and remedies, etc.), they cannot be taken as binding: they are simply "suggestions" about what is preferable and not canonical prescriptions, *irshād lā tashrīʿ* (*ibid.*, vii, 201).

The distinction between the *ʿibādāt* and the *ʿādāt* permitted the Salafiyya to condemn the prolif-eration of devotional practices and interdictions propagated throughout the centuries in the name of Ṣūfism and eventually adopted by popular religion, even though they are not based on the Ḳurʾān and the *Sunna*. It enabled them, moreover, to point to their pruning of classical judicial and moral doctrine (by means of *fatwās*) and the reduction of traditional observance, in support of their claim to be the apostles of a disciplined and discreet religious temper, which they believed to be closer to the spirit of moderation that had characterized au-thentic Islam (the "gentle religion", *al-ḥanīfiyya al-samḥa*), and more in harmony with the modern world. This distinction would also encourage a more tolerant view of local legal and social usage through classifying them as *ʿādāt*, and permit the toning down of doctrinal differences (*ikhtilāf*) between the important currents in the Islamic world; perhaps it would also weaken the religious quarrels inherited from old schisms. Taken to its logical conclusion, this attitude would make it possible to envisage calmly the coexistence—in the bosom of the *Umma*—of different political, socio-economic and idealogical systems, provided that the fundamental unity of Muslims in faith and worship was safeguarded and their common attachment to the essential content of Islamic law (*sharīʿa*) unimpaired.

However, such a distinction between the *ʿibādāt* and *ʿādāt* has more of an apologetic value than any real practical implication. The fragmentary (and rather vague) notions on this subject put forward by Rashīd Riḍā and al-Kawākibī do not enable us to make an exact analysis of which aspects of traditional Muslim legislation must be considered fundamental, and thus untouchable, and which can be subsumed under the *ʿādāt*. The postulated tolerance in matters of *ʿādāt* is itself ambiguous, because of the restrictive conditions—derived from the Ḳurʾān—which were put forward by the Salafiyya each time they were obliged to define their political, economic, social or cultural standpoints (although these are, in theory, the field in which *ʿādāt* can be used). In the reformist perspective, indeed, there are few matters that can be envisaged independently of the moral commands and general principles contained in Revelation and the *Sunna*; and whatever creative ac-tivity is envisaged, its goal must be examined in the light of the ethical and religious criteria of the two sources. *Iṣlāḥ* admits of the possibility of adapting Muslim institutions and life to the realities of the modern world, so long as this adaptation does not result in the destruction of the fundamental values contained in the two sources. Thus, on the subject of feminism and the relations between the two sexes, the Salafiyya declare themselves favourable to the emancipaţion of Muslim women, but not to the extent that the liberalization of their legal status would come into conflict with the legal dispositions estab-lished in the Ḳurʾān, or the family and sexual ethics of Islam (cf. on this subject, *Tafsīr*, xi, 283-87: "Islam confers on women all human, religious and civil rights"; Rashīd Riḍā, *Nidāʾ li 'l-djins al-laṭīf*, Cairo 1351/1932; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 315-31 ("Les Réformistes et le Féminisme")).

Although they claim the necessity of distinguishing between profane and religious matters, between man's relations with God and merely human activi-ties (which are not ruled by scriptural commands), the Salafiyya did not make any decisive contribution to the separation of theology and law. From their point of view, the ambiguity of the relationship *dīn/sharīʿa* (which they never really attempted to clarify) makes any systematic criticism of traditional legal and moral doctrine that attempts to establish a clear-cut distinction between purely religious and social matters extremely difficult and *a priori* suspect. (It is worth noting the vigorous reaction of the reformists against the attempts made by ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziḳ (1888-1968), in his *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm*, Cairo 1343-44/1925, to dissociate institutional and political problems from moral and theological ones; cf., Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, 179 ff.). Rashīd Riḍā notes in passing the respective values of the concepts *dīn* and *sharīʿa*, which he considers it unjustifiable to confuse (*Tafsīr*, vi, 147), but he does not draw any logical conclusion from the distinction. The distinction *dīn/sharīʿa* (which is no less vital than that between the *ʿibādāt* and the *ʿādāt*) could have had important consequences had it been the point of departure for serious re-search into the possibilities of rigorously limiting the field of application of "religious law", and thus removing from the "sacred" domain everything that did not have a fundamental link with belief or worship and should therefore come under *idjtihād*. It was left to Modernism (*tadjdīd* [*q.v.*]) to undertake this research (cf., *e.g.*, the essays of Muḥammad Aḥmad Khalaf Allāh, in particular his *al-Ḳurʾān wa-mushkilāt ḥayātinā al-muʿāṣira* (Cairo 1967), in

which he proclaims the legitimacy of "a new inter-
pretation of the fundamental principles of the _sharīᶜa_,
in the light of modern experience" (31)). Incomplete
though it be, the distinction between the ᶜ_ibādāt_
and the ᶜ_ādāt_ suggests a need for rationality and a
desire to be pragmatic, which served the Salafiyya
as an argument against the stubborn conservatism
of the traditionalists (_djumūd_) and in support of the
broadmindedness of _iṣlāḥ_ on the subject of progress
and the modern world. At the same time it is a
reply to those who preach out-and-out modernism,
to the detriment of fidelity to authentic Islam (as
it was illustrated by the tradition of the Salaf).
The reformists see in this modernism a renunciation
of the "spirit of compromise" which their apologetics
present as the ideal tendency of Islam.

II—A p o l o g e t i c s.—Alongside criticism of the
traditional aspects of Islam as they appear in
conservative Sunnism, in the magical and super-
stitious beliefs of popular religion and in the religious
systems of the brotherhoods, apologetics form an
important part of the principal reformist works.
Though centred on internal problems of Mus-
lim society, and often argued with missionary zeal,
reformist apologetics are also addressed to the "ad-
versaries" of Islam either directly (cf. Muḥammad
ᶜAbduh, _al-Islām wa 'l-radd ᶜalā muntaḳidīh_, art.
of 1900, Cairo 1327/1909 (Fr. trans., Ṭalᶜat Ḥarb,
L'Europe et l'Islam, Cairo 1905); idem, _al-Islām wa
'l-Naṣrāniyya_, art. of 1901, in _Manār_), or indirectly,
in the form of warnings to Muslims against the se-
ductions of Western civilization and ideologies. In
both cases, the reformists attempted to demonstrate
the excellence of Islam, as a "religion", as an ethical
code, and as a legal, social and political system. Such
apologetics develop along the following broad lines:

1.—_The liberating message of Islam._—a. As a
spiritual message. Here the argument is confined
essentially to the exaltation of _tawḥīd_ [_q.v._] as a
principle of human liberation. M o r a l   l i b e r a t i o n:
the affirmation of divine unity abolishes all worship
that is not directed to God (the Unique), and all pre-
tension to infallibility, since the only infallible source
is the Revelation and the Prophet, who is inspired
by God (this argument is elsewhere used to refute
taḳlīd [_q.v._], to the extent that the latter supposes
submission to an authority which is believed, or
pretends to be, infallible). On the other hand, the
affirmation of divine transcendance condemns any
domination based on the principle of intercession
(_shafāᶜa_ [_q.v._]). Consequently, _tawḥīd_ denies any
legitimacy to intermediary structures between man
and God (as in institutional Churches), and destroys
any need for the belief in the mediating function of
certain categories of men (saints, mystics, etc.).
S o c i a l   L i b e r a t i o n: belief in the omnipotence of
God is the basis of men's equality, for all men are
equally subject to God and all men participate equally
in the eminent dignity of their condition (cf. Muḥam-
mad ᶜAbduh, _Risālat al-tawḥīd_, 155-6; Fr. trans., 106;
Eng. trans., 125); it emancipates minds from all
resigned or passive submission, either to arguments
based on authority (_taḳlīd_), or to a status of inferior-
ity or slavery imposed by the "great" (cf. _Ḳurʾān_,
XXXIII, 67, XXXIV, 31-4,; _alladhīn ustuḍᶜifū_). The
form of worship itself (common prayer, pilgrimage,
etc.) underlines the egalitarian character of Islam.—b.
The liberating message of Islam is also illustrated by
the ethics of the Ḳurʾān and the _Sunna_ which ac-
cept the fundamental unity of mankind and reject all
discrimination based on differences of race or social
condition (cf. Muḥammad ᶜAbduh, _Risālat al-tawḥīd_,

172; Fr. trans., 116-7; Eng. trans., 135; _Tafsīr_, 448 ff.;
an identical position in Muḥammad Iḳbāl, _Recon-
struction_ 89; Fr. trans., 103).

2.—_The universal quality of Islam._—a. _As a
religion_ (_dīn_). Reformist apologetics merely take up
the traditional theme of the universality of Muḥam-
mad's mission (ᶜ_umūm al-baᶜtha_). For the Prophet
was "elected to guide all nations towards Good (. . :)
and call all men to a belief in the One God" (Muḥam-
mad ᶜAbduh, _Risālat al-tawḥīd_, 139; Fr. trans., 95;
Eng. trans., 114; cf. also, _Tafsīr_, vii, 610, on sūra VI,
90). Like many other Muslim thinkers in our own
time, reformist authors believe that Islam is the
perfect universal religion, since it incorporates what
is essential in previous revelations (and especially
Judaism and Christianity) and perfects their message
(cf. Muḥammad ᶜAbduh, _Risālat al-tawḥīd_, 166 ff., Fr.
trans., 112 (bottom) ff.; Eng. trans., 132 ff.; _Taf-
sīr_ . . ., x, 448-456).—b. _As a social, legal and
political system_ (_sharīᶜa_). The reformists proclaim
the excellence, eternal nature and universal charac-
ter of Islamic law, in opposition to human legislation,
which is always imperfect, despite constant revision
and correction. The _sharīᶜa_—at least in those parts
that are based on the Revelation—draws its essence
from divine wisdom; it is thus the legislation best
suited to the needs (_maṣāliḥ_) of men (_bashar_) in all
places and at all times (Ibn Bādīs, _Shihāb_, Jan. 1934,
57; _Tafsīr_, vi, 146) for it envisages man's well-
being from two points of view, those of earthly hap-
piness and of their future salvation (an idea dear to
the reformists and developed at great length by
Rashīd Riḍā, _Manār_, i, (1898), 1, v, (1902), 459-65;
Tafsīr, i, 11, ii, 330-41, x, 210, 437; cf. also Muḥam-
mad ᶜAbduh, _Risālat al-tawḥīd_, 124; 169; Fr. trans.,
84, 115; Eng. trans., 104, 134). This does not mean
that the Salafiyya think of Muslim legislation as
a closed system, sufficient unto itself in its definitive
truth and perfection. Though they believe that
certain rulings of the _sharīᶜa_ (_e.g._, the personal
status of woman) are ideal norms, which neither
the old legislations (of the biblical sort for example),
nor modern legislation (inspired by western concepts)
are capable of matching, they do not dismiss the idea
that Muslims can copy certain doctrines upheld in
advanced countries. However, the Salafiyya refuse
to admit that all aspects of western progress are good,
and that one has to accept _en bloc_ the triumphant
civilizations of Europe or America, for fear of
seeming reactionary (Ibn Bādīs, _Shihāb_, Jan. 1932,
11). Moreover, the _ūlu 'l-amr_ ought to co-operate
in the adaptation of Muslim legislation (by means of
reciprocal consultation (_shūrā_) and _idjtihād_), taking
into account new realities, but respecting absolutely
the fundamental aspects of the Law and observing
the general ethics of Islam. The Salafiyya constantly
repeat that in areas of every-day life, Islam gives
man entire freedom (_fawwaḍ_) to act according to his
well-being in the world (_Tafsīr_, ii, 205: ref. to the
ḥadīth: "You are best placed to judge worldly
affairs", vi, 140; Ibn Bādīs, _Shihāb_, Oct. 1930, 70).
From the preceding, the reformists drew arguments to
establish the liberal nature of Islam and to justify its
ability to adapt (not, of course, as a _dīn_, but as
sharīᶜa) to all human situations at any time and in
any place.

3.—_The liberal spirit of Islam._—Outside matters
of faith and the unalterable elements of the _sharīᶜa_
(both of which were expressly laid down in Reve-
lation), Islam assigns no limit to the exercise of
reason. This aspect of reformist apologetics, which
has been amply dealt with by Muḥammad ᶜAbduh

(*Risālat al-tawḥīd*, *passim*), Ra_sh_īd Riḍā (cf. J. Jomier, *Le Comment. coran. du Manâr*, chap. III), and Ibn Bādīs (cf. A. Merad, *Ibn Badis, Commentat. du Coran*, chap. II, Vth), will not be discussed in detail here. On the problem of faith and reason (*'aḳl*), the reformist position is that the ḳur'ānic message addresses itself both to the conscience (*wuḏjān*) and to the mind (*fikr*), and requires not only acceptance by faith but understanding by means of reason. If the Ḳur'ān limits reason, it is only in those areas which are part of the unknowable (*ghayb* [q.v.]), and to prevent man from falling into inevitable errors and attributing to God things which are not part of His Being.

The reformists frequently invoke the argument of reason in order to maintain not only that Islam puts no obstacles in the way of intellectual research and the exercise of *'aḳl*, but even that it positively encourages both and incites men to cultivate the gift of intelligence, which is a God-given privilege (Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, March 1931, 78 ff., ref. to sūra XVII, 70). *'Aḳl* in reformist usage is not exactly the knowing consciousness or reasoning reason, which seeks to reach truth independently of faith and revelation. Orthodox reformist writers understand *'aḳl* in opposition to blind passion (*hawā*), which smothers the voice of "healthy nature" (*fiṭra* [q.v.]), and doubtless in opposition to the (hyper-) critical mind. The *'aḳil* is not a man who can perform speculative exercise with ease and is dedicated exclusively to the cult of reason, but a man capable of judicious balanced thinking, which implies a spirit of moderation, even a certain reluctance to attempt to submit everything to one's judgment, and to explain everything solely by the light of one's intelligence.

The debate on the subject of faith and reason points to one of the contradictions of reformist thought: *i.e.*, its desire to adopt a language, and sometimes even intellectual methods, that are in conformity with the modern mind, while at the same time clinging to principles and positions which they feel are in perfect agreement with the doctrines of the Salaf. It is notable in this respect that the liberal tendencies of certain reformist writers are held back by the fear that reasoning reason will encroach on areas reserved to faith, and the temptations of human passion (*hawā*) will conquer progressively the directing principles (*hudā*) of Revelation (cf. *Tafsir*, v, 416: opposition *hudā/hawā*).

However, the reformists are not particularly interested in theological and philosophical speculation. Apart from the *Risālat al-tawḥīd* by Muḥammad 'Abduh (which describes a fundamental schema rather than a theological totality), and the *Risālat al-shirk* by Mubārak al-Mīlī (which is a refutation of Maraboutic beliefs), no truly elaborated theology can be found in the doctrinal system of the Salafiyya. They were satisfied with massive affirmations, based on texts in the Ḳur'ān, which are, from their point of view, decisive arguments. Thus they never fail to underline everything in the Ḳur'ān which seems to encourage intellectual research and constitutes an incentive for the exploration of nature and its exploitation in the service of man. They underline those parts of the Revelation that encourage men to think, to understand things, to persuade others by means of demonstrative proofs (*burhān*); they make the utmost use of all the resources of the ḳur'ānic vocabulary which deal with knowledge and the activity of the mind (cf., the *Concordantiae* by G. Flügel, in which we can see the richness of the themes formed from the radicals *'br*, *'ḳl*, *'lm*, *ḥkm*, *fkr*,

fḳh); in short they attempt to show that Islam lets human reason play an important role, and that it encourages (in theory, if not in practice) human progress in the domains of knowledge and civilization (cf. the particularly vigorous doctrinal statement by Ra_sh_īd Riḍā in *Tafsir*, 244 ff., under the eloquent title: *al-Islām dīn al-fiṭra al-salīma wa 'l-'aḳl wa 'l-fikr wa 'l-'ilm wa 'l-ḥikma wa 'l-burhān wa 'l-ḥudjdja*).

The theme of knowledge and civilization plays an important role in reformist propaganda (cf. J. Jomier, *Le Comment. coran. du Manâr*, chap. IV; A. Merad, *Ibn Bādīs, commentat. du Coran* chap. IV, IIIrd). Thanks to the intelligence with which God has endowed him, man can rise above erroneous belief and superstition, cultivate the sciences and adopt healthy beliefs: using it, he should also be able to increase his power over nature, to profit by the various resources of Creation, in order to achieve material power (*'izz, ḳuwwa*) and know a happy moral well-being. Presented in this way by the reformists, Islam appears as a religion which is particularly attentive to the moral and material progress of humanity. It was therefore an effective refutation of arguments of the type put forward by Renan (Islam is contrary to the scientific spirit) and useful in revealing the inadequacy of Marxist-orientated criticism (Islam is a reactionary doctrine). The reformists deplore the judging of Islam by the behaviour and excesses of some of its followers who distort its image through their innovations, by superstitious beliefs born of ignorance, by the imposture of false "scholars", and by the immorality of its politicians (cf. the objections enumerated by Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 195-9; Fr. trans., 132-5; Eng. trans., 151-3). For when traced back to its authentic expression, to the Revelation and the *Sunna*, Islam is a religion compatible with science and civilization (*Tafsir* . . . , ix, 23); it encourages progress and science (*ibid.*, iii, 26, 34, 106); and exalts science and freedom of research, which are the conditions of man's greatness (*ibid.*, v, 258); Islam is capable of regenerating civilization in the East and saving that of the West (*ibid.*, ix, 22). What is more:

4.—*Islam is the reforming principle of mankind* (*iṣlāḥ naw' al-insān*, *Tafsir*, xi, 206). As a *dīn* and as a *sharī'a*, Islam is a progression beyond previous religions (*ibid.*, 208-88: the enumeration of the various domains in which Islam has been beneficial to mankind). Hence the Muslim duty to reveal the truth of Islam: this is part of the canonical obligation to "invite to Good" (Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 171; Fr. trans., 116; Eng. trans., 135; *Tafsir* iv, 26-46, on sūra III, 104) and to "call to God" (Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, April 1935, 6, ref. to sūras XVI, 125 and XII, 108). To call to God, in this case, consists in proclaiming the values of Islam, refuting, through its "proofs", the false ideas ascribed to it, and in making known its "beauties"; all this in order to fortify Muslims in their faith and to enlighten non-Muslims, less perhaps in order to convert them than to dissipate their prejudices and fanaticism. However, the notion of missionary work is not foreign to the reformists (cf. J. Jomier, *Le Comment. Coran. du Manâr*, chap. X). Nevertheless, Muḥammad 'Abduh gives priority to the duty of Islamic tolerance over conversion: "Islam is capable, through its own light, of penetrating the hearts of men" (*Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 172). In practice, the act of calling to God leads to a certain number of religious, moral and cultural attitudes, towards both Muslims and non-Muslims.

—a. Calling to God consists above all in leading a life that is in perfect agreement with the general commands of Islam. This is the best way to ensure that the influence of the ideals contained in the Ḳurʾān will grow. On a spiritual as well as a moral level, the Prophet's example, and that of the "pious forefathers", must inspire believers: "the more perfect their imitation, the more perfect their accomplishment of the mission of calling to God" (Ibn Bādīs).—b. Preaching the truths contained in the Ḳurʾān and thus helping to transmit the revealed message (tablīgh al-risāla) is also "calling to God": since this message has universal implications, each part of it must be made comprehensible to all men. This theme can be related to that of the djihād through the Ḳurʾān (cf. Shihāb, April 1932, 204 ff.): for Ibn Bādīs, this ḳurʾānic expression seems to justify a militant theology and an energetic conception of religious preaching, both to rouse the masses from their inertia and indifference and to denounce the blindness of "bad religious teachers" (ʿulamāʾ al-sūʾ) in the face of the spiritual riches of the Revelation and their reluctance to make them manifest to men.—c. Calling to God also implies the attempt to bring back to the Islamic fold those Muslims who, seduced by secular ideologies or intoxicated with modern scientific knowledge, regard Islam as "a worn-out piece of clothing that a man would be ashamed to be seen wearing", and deride its dogmas and precepts (Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Risālat al-tawḥīd, 198; Fr. trans., 134-5; Eng. trans., 153). —d. The idea of calling to God also implies a struggle against the corruption (fasād) spread in Muslim society in the name of "so-called modernism" (Tafsīr, x, 45) and against atheism like that of Kemāl Atatürk (ibid., ix, 322-3); warning against excessive individual freedom, which generates all sorts of abuse (ibid., viii, 530-1) and is more or less directly responsible for the "moral crisis of the West"; enlightening people on the dangers inherent in the separation of science and religion, the cult of science per se, and the frantic quest for material goods without any moral goal (ibid., xi, 243).—e. It also means unmasking professional politicians who may not be sincere and practising Muslims, but nevertheless use Islam for demagogic ends, either in subservience to government, or to serve their own personal ambition (ibid., ii, 440). Similar strictures could be passed on recent tendencies to use religious arguments in support of some socioeconomic ideology (cf. "Muslim Socialism" to which some theoreticians of "Arab Socialism refer) or political doctrine (cf. e.g. Khālid Muḥammad Khālid, La Religion au service du peuple, in Orient xx, (1961), 155-61). —f. In opposition to the type of nationalism encouraged by jingoistic modernists, and beyond particular fatherlands, the call to God gives pride of place to the religious link above ethnic and political ones (ibid., ii, 304). It means stressing the fraternity of Islam (ibid., iv, 21) and persuading Muslims that greatness and pride do not lie in the insistence on particularities of race or nationality— that new form of the age-old clan-spirit (ʿaṣabiyyat al-djāhiliyya)—but in belonging to the "Islamic human community" (ibid., xi, 256). This is one aspect of the ideology of panislamism (al-djāmiʿa al-islāmiyya) which corresponds to the political and cultural doctrine of the Salafiyya. Since Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, reformist authors have unceasingly called for not only the elimination of doctrinal disagreements above all in matters of the interpretation of religious

Law) between orthodox Schools and even between the Sunnī and Shīʿī worlds, but, by reminding Muslims of their duty to confessional solidarity, they have pleaded the cause of a policy of strengthening political ties and interislamic co-operation. Thus would the unity of the Umma be recreated, even if only symbolically, through the mediation of a supreme moral assembly that would represent every Muslim country —for example in the form of the permanent assembly (djamāʿat al-muslimīn) which Ibn Bādis suggested (cf. A. Merad, Le Réformisme musulman, 376 ff.). Even this would be second best compared with the organic unity of the Community under the banner of one supreme Imām, which had been Rashīd Riḍāʾs dream (cf. his Khilāfa; trans. H. Laoust, Le Califat dans la doctrine de R.R.).—g. In reply to those who proclaimed the social and cultural values of the West, the reformists exalted the values specific to Islamic ethics, if need be by referring to the "accounts" (shahādāt) of Western thinkers who were sensitive to the virtues of Islam and perturbed by the moral degradation that they perceived in the materialist civilization of the Western world (cf. Tafsīr, x, 412, 420; xi, 243).

Reformist apologetics reveal the attitude of the Salafiyya in the face of two realities: on the one hand the material and cultural seduction of Muslim intellectual élites and ruling classes by the West; and on the other the modernists' attempt at a systematic renewal of Muslim society so that it could face, as immediately and effectively as possible, the necessities of modern life. It is thus not simply a defensive reaction against, or even rejection of, certain aspects of western civilization, but a way of replying to Muslims who believed in progress and modernism (tadjdīd) and who wanted to look for a compromise between the fundamental demands of Islam and the necessary adaptation of Muslim life to the realities of the modern world.

The apologetic work of the Salafiyya was not simply episodic, for it demanded that they make an effort to understand their adversaries' point of view and develop a measure of cultural open-mindedness (often, it is true, timid), and sometimes led them to moderate those aspects of their theological and moral doctrine which might have seemed too fundamentalist. But at the same time it revealed the diversity of their temperaments and attitudes in the face of practical problems, especially when they had gone beyond discussing the place of absolute fidelity to the two sources in the liturgical and dogmatic spheres, and to the tradition of the Salaf in the general ethics of Islam. Apart from the more or less favourable historical and cultural conjuncture, the success of iṣlāḥ in the different parts of the Arab world has been linked, to some extent, to the way in which the Salafiyya have been able to cope with the concrete problems facing Muslim society as a result of its progressive entry into the social, economic, technical and cultural norms of the modern world.

D.—IṢLĀḤ IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB WORLD.— At the end of almost a century of development, we can assess the ground covered by the Salafiyya reformist movement from the time of al-ʿUrwa al-wuthḳā (1884) to the present day; at this moment the Arab world is the scene of important debates on the methods of interpreting the Ḳurʾān and the authenticity of Ḥadīth on the one hand, and the function and autonomy of religion on the other. This is particularly true in countries in which research and cultural activity are more or less "orientated" toward—if not "mobilized" in the service of—politic-

al and social objectives that are held to be sacred, and in which national energy is often geared primarily toward social reorganization and economic construction in an attempt to overcome underdevelopment. The development of *iṣlāḥ* in a changing Arab world can be divided into three important stages:

1. — *The heroic stage*, during which Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī laid the essential foundations of a total reform of Islam (cf. the programme defined in *Umm al-ḳurā*). Reformist action during this period aimed above all at the material and moral improvement of the Community, which had barely emerged from the Middle Ages. The social, political and cultural demands made by the three leaders of modern *iṣlāḥ* had more effect than their doctrinal intervention (with the exception of Muḥammad ʿAbduh's *Risālat al-tawḥīd* which is a sort of guide for a basic theology). The reformists' written and oral propaganda thus contributed to the Community's growing awareness of notions of evolution, progress and creative effort (*idjtihād*) on a spiritual and practical plane. It is true that the cultural climate of the period—end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century—was favourable to the adoption of these ideas in Muslim thought, for this was the era of scientism, the optimism brought about by technical progress, and the growth of the idea that efficiency was an essential element of economic prosperity and social success. Yet the function of the Salafiyya was to confer on these notions—and at first the idea of *idjtihād*—a legitimacy that would satisfy the *Umma*, by assimilating them to authentic principles of Islam (seen from an ethical and cultural angle). In its initial form the reformist current of contemporary Islam hastened the birth of Arabo-Muslim awareness of the modern world, but also gave rise to aspirations (of a socio-cultural nature etc.) and questions which the succeeding Muslim generation had to face.

2. — *The second stage* (approximately 1905 to 1950).—This period saw the emergence of a doctrinal system in which Raṣhīd Riḍā and *shaykh* Ibn Bādīs played a vital part. The example of these two strong personalities inspired writers whose numerous essays (in reviews like *al-Manār*, *al-Shihāb*, *Madjallat al-shubbān al-muslimīn*, *al-Risāla*, *al-Madjalla al-zaytūniyya*) enriched the thought of *iṣlāḥ* and consolidated its doctrinal positions. The principal reformist authors during the first half of the 20th century will now be briefly examined.

a) In Syria Djamāl al-Dīn al-Ḳāsimī (1866/7-1914) was a faithful disciple of the neo-Ḥanbalī tradition. His compatriot Ṭāhir al-Djazāʾirī (1851-1919) put his vast erudition at the disposal of *iṣlāḥ* (notably in the publishing field).—ʿAbd al-Ḳādīr al-Maghribī (1867-1956), who in his youth was influenced by direct contact with Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, made a very fruitful contribution to *iṣlāḥ* in Syria.—Shakib Arslān (1869-1946) a brilliant writer (called *amīr al-bayān*, "Prince of Eloquence") and politician, was a firm believer in Arabism (cf. his monthly revue, *La Nation Arabe*, Geneva 1930-9); a personal acquaintance of the editor of *al-Manār*, he made a greatly appreciated contribution to that review.—Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī (1876-1953), ex-president of the Arab Academy at Damascus (1920-53), although not properly speaking a reformist author, was a firm believer in Muḥammad ʿAbduh's ideas and can be counted among the literary and political personalities of the Arab world whose moral support of *iṣlāḥ* was greatly valued.

b) In Egypt there were many "spiritual sons"

of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, who were more or less faithful to the original ideas of their master: Muḥammad Farīd Wadjdī (1875-1954), the author of a ḳurʾānic commentary with concordist tendencies, was the energetic editor of the review *al-Risāla* (founded in 1933) and a fervent propagandist for Islam.—Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (1881-1945) was twice (1928, 1935) principal of al-Azhar, where he contributed to the spread of reformist ideals and struggled to strengthen the links between the orthodox schools; he attempted reforms in the spirit of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, of whom he was a worthy successor.—Maḥmūd Shaltūt (1893-1963): another grand master of al-Azhar (cf. *Djamāʿat al-taḳrīb bayn al-madhāhib* and his trimestrial revue *Risālat al-Islām*, Cairo, 1949-   ). —Aḥmad Amīn (1886-1954), author of an immense fresco of Islamic culture and history (*Fadjr-*, *Ḍuḥā-* and *Ẓuhr al-Islām*), was one of the principal artisans of the Arab-Islamic cultural renewal to which the promotors of modern *iṣlāḥ* aspired. By his teaching and his writing (cf. his revue *al-Thaḳāfa*, Cairo 1939), he attempted, like Muḥammad ʿAbduh, to guide Muslim thought towards a doctrine that was a sort of neo-Muʿtazilism.

c) In Tunisia the main representatives of orthodox reformist thought were Baṣhīr Ṣfar (d. in 1937), the much respected teacher of Ibn Bādīs, the two *shaykh*s Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir b. Āshūr (born in 1879) —author of a ḳurʾānic commentary (now being published, i-iii, Tunis 1956-71)—and his son Muḥammad al-Fāḍil b. ʿĀshūr (1900-1970) (cf. Muḥammad al-Fāḍil b. ʿĀshūr: *al-Ḥaraka al-adabiyya wa ʾl-fikriyya fī Tūnis*, Cairo 1956).

d) In Algeria, besides Ibn Bādīs, notable reformists were Mubārak al-Mīlī (1890-1945), the theologian of the Algerian reformist school (see *Biblio.*); Ṭayyib al-ʿUḳbī (1888-1962), a supporter of *iṣlāḥ* who was greatly influenced by Wahhābī tendencies (he had spent his childhood in the Ḥidjāz), and owned a newspaper, *al-Iṣlāḥ* (Biskra 1927-   ) which appeared irregularly; Muḥammad al-Baṣhīr al-Ibrāhīmī (1889-1965) [see AL-IBRĀHĪMĪ]; Aḥmad Tawfīḳ al-Madanī (born in 1899), historian and politician, who was very active in the cause of Algerian national culture in the context of the reformist movement.

e) In Morocco, where the orthodox reformism of the Salafiyya was diffused at a relatively late date, few important names and workes emerged (cf. J. Berque, *Çà et là dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maroc*, in *Etudes... dédiées à la mémoire d'E. Lévi-Provençal*, Paris 1962, ii, 471-94).

Amongst the representative personalities of *iṣlāḥ* in the Sherifian empire, we might mention: Abū Shuʿayb al-Dukkālī (d. 1937); Ibn al-Muwaḳḳit (1894-1949), who was more interested in censuring public morality than any real renewal of Islam (cf. the art. by A. Faure on Ibn al-Muwaḳḳit in *Hespéris*, 1952, 165-95); ʿAllāl al-Fāsī (born in 1910), a writer and political leader (Independence Party, *ḥizb al-istiḳlāl*) who claims to be a Salafī (cf. his *Autocritique*, *al-Naḳd al-dhātī*, Cairo 1952).

These various authors would seem to be continuators of the doctrinal and pedagogic work of the first teachers of *iṣlāḥ*. It is nevertheless worth noting that numerous writers and poets, such as Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm (1872-1932), Muṣṭafā Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī (1876-1924), ʿAbbās Maḥmūd al-Aḳḳād (1889-1964), Muḥammad al-ʿId (born in 1904) etc., indirectly helped to spread *iṣlāḥ* by employing its moral and social themes in their works.

Despite its undeniable fertility (which Brockelmann only partially describes in S III, 310-35, 435-6), the

fifty-year-long work of the reformists brought no
solutions which satisfied the problems of all social
classes within the Community. Their doctrines—social
and political as well as theological and moral—seemed
to correspond more closely to the aspirations of the
newly emergent urban middle class. As a group, it
was relatively enlightened, and sometimes combined
a minimum Arab-Islamic culture with a gloss of
modern culture in one of the European languages. It
wished to demonstrate its allegiance to a particular
form of tradition—that of the Salaf as defined above
—and at the same time to show a certain interest in
things modern. The ideals of this class were expressed
in terms of moderation and compromise; in the
religious sphere they sought "reasonable" positions
that excluded popular traditionalism (which they saw
as the sign of ignorance or a reactionary spirit), as
well as intransigent fundamentalism (represented by
certain Muslim Brothers (*al-ikhwān al-muslimūn*
[*q.v.*]). They also rejected modernism which they
judged excessive (such as the advocacy of a compl-
etely secular state). The orthodox reformism of the
Salafiyya was thus assured of a fairly wide public
which believed in order and prudent evolution, which
respected the moral authority of the religious leaders,
and was convinced that the Community needed
"guides" to take it along the road of a progress that
would be compatible with reformist faith. But the
apparently harmonious development of *iṣlāḥ* was to
suffer from the political upheavals and social and
moral changes reulting from the Second World War.

3. — *Recent developments (since the '50s).*—The
post-war period marked the beginning of a complete
change in the religious make-up of the Arab world.
The make-up of the reformist camp underwent pro-
found qualitative and quantitative changes. The
spokesmen of *iṣlāḥ* were no longer of the calibre of
Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) or ʿAbd al-Ḥāmid b. Bādīs
(d. 1940), and at the same time the Muslim Brothers
movement came to the forefront. It attracted attenti-
on by means of political action and through the
doctrinal works of several remarkable personalities,
like Ḥasan Ismāʿīl al-Huḍaybī, leading guide and
successor of Ḥasan al-Bannā [*q.v.*]; Muḥibb al-Dīn
al-Khaṭīb, a publicist of Syrian origin, ex-director
of al-Maṭbaʿa al-Salafiyya (in Cairo); the Syrian
Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī (d. 1965); Sayyid Ḳuṭb (executed
in 1966), author of a ḳurʾānic commentary, *Fī
ẓilāl al-Ḳurʾān*; Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, whose apo-
logetic and doctrinal works amount to more than
7,000 pp. (cf. *REI, Abstracta*, 1961, 105-6); and
Saʿīd Ramaḍān, founder and still editor of the revue
al-Muslimūn (Cairo-Damascus, 1951- ; Geneva,
1961-).—b. The reformist movement lost that place
in society which was its strength between the wars:
the supporters of the main current of *iṣlāḥ* (in direct
line from Rashīd Riḍā, for example) were quickly re-
garded as inheritors and supporters of a moral and so-
cial order already described as "traditional"—c. Para-
doxically, the historical success of the reformist move-
ment—in Algeria and, up to a point, in Egypt—
contributed to its disintegration and fall. Attracted
by power (and some actually absorbed into public
office), many missionaries of *iṣlāḥ* abandoned their
former zeal for the triumph of Islamic values and
settled for a prudent opportunism. Forced by events
to supply "official" religion with structures and a
doctrine, they in their turn became a conformist
force. The defence of pure Islam, which had been the
aim of *iṣlāḥ* in opposition, was taken up by men who
were enemies of any compromise with regimes which
they held to be unjust or illegal, the same men whom

their opponents happily called fascist or reactionary.
—d. The younger generation, less and less restricted
by the ability to speak Arabic only, succeeded in dis-
covering a new vision of social and moral realities
around the world (through the cinema, the illustrated
press, and foreign literature); new philosophies (cf.
the success of Existentialism after the War and the
increasing dissemination of Marxism—which followed
Communist penetration—in Arab countries); new
more or less revolutionary ideologies (anti-colonialism
and anti-imperialism, Arab Scoialism and unity); and
a new political ethic inspired by the "Spirit of Ban-
dung" (1955). All these factors made the young
generation sceptical about the virtues of *iṣlāḥ* and
doubtful of its fundamental principles, principles
which had seemed as satisfying to the mind as they
were reassuring to the faith of the preceding genera-
tion.—e. The rise to power of new social forces in
the newly independent countries (Syria-Lebanon:
1946; Libya: 1952; Sudan: 1955; Morocco and Tunisia:
1956; Algeria: 1962), or those whose monarchies were
supplanted by republican regimes (Egypt: 1952;
ʿIrāḳ: 1958; Tunisia: 1957; Libya: 1969), relegated
to the background the notables and national bour-
geoisie, who had held power in the shadow of the
previous regime. In taking over the apparatus of
state, the younger generation naturally sought to
extend its power to different sectors of public opinion,
in order to gain control of the "national orientation".
As a result, religion, wooed to an increasing extent by
politics, found itself involved in a struggle—if not in
a "revolution"—whose objectives were beyond its
scope. Religious leaders (*muftīs*, ʿulamāʾ) can hardly
constitute an independent class, as they did in the
past, which formulates doctrines (for example about
political ethics) in the name of an ideal Islam and
independently of the ideology in power, or of its
directives.—f. In those Arab societies engaged in a
process of political liberation and social and econo-
mic transformation, *iṣlāḥ* ceased to be a reformist
and progressive ideology. Its doctrinal positions on
social and economic matters seemed out of date. Its
calls for constant meditation of the Ḳurʾān as a source
of inspiration for Muslims, in both their private and
their public acts, went unheeded by young people,
who were presented by modern states with more im-
portant (and in some ways obligatory) terms of
reference in the form of programmes, charters, etc.
The tradition of the Salaf, which *iṣlāḥ* attempted to
present in an exalted light, was received by the young
people without enthusiasm. For them concrete reality
with its social, professional and material problems,
the collective tasks it imposes, the needs that it
creates (for consumer goods, leisure etc.), the amuse-
ments it offers (entertainment, sport, travel) was
much more important. Reflecting the moral and
aesthetic aspirations of their age, young people prefer-
red to seek happiness in this world rather than to aim
at the reformist goal of felicity in this world and the
next. In its values and in the problems it posed, *iṣlāḥ*
gave the appearance of being out of harmony with
the rising generation, who tended to see economic,
political and cultural problems as more important than
ethical and spiritual ones. The younger generation
willingly identified with the principles of liberalism
and secularism, seeing them the ideal guiding forces of
human relations and life in Muslim society today. If
young people considered religion at all, it was as a
secondary factor in the political strategy of the
regime, especially applicable in questions of the civic
and political education of the masses and as a means
of sanctifying national unity. *Iṣlāḥ* was thus often

invoked in support of official ideology, not for the religious values it represented or for its references to Islamic authenticity.

This complex of phenomena which has become apparent throughout the Arab world over the last few decades clearly shows two things: the striking weakening of *iṣlāḥ* as a "driving force" in Muslim society, and its replacement by politics, which is now becoming the moving spirit on every level of national life. Politics is the most important factor of life today, for, considerably helped by the mass media and propaganda techniques, it seizes public attention, concentrating it on the acts of its rulers; in this way the life of a whole nation hangs on the "historic" speeches and oracular utterances of national leaders, those heroes and demi-gods of modern times. (Thus it is that it is possible to talk of the charisma of such and such an Arab chief of state who has become idolized by the masses). Political language itself has acquired such prominence over other forms of expression (literature, religion, etc.) that it impregnates them with its concepts and its dialectic. (In many cases the religious vocabulary seems to be nothing more than the simple transposition of the political). New powers—the state, the party—have taken over the primary role in the life of the *Umma*, and have directed its social and cultural orientations. Sometimes these powers, armed with totalitarian might, try to force the citizen's duties and beliefs on him. From this moment, religion ceased to be the most important factor in Muslim life and found itself dispossessed of its traditional function as interpreter of symbols and record of the community's conscience.

In this social and cultural context, the voice of *iṣlāḥ* lost much of its strength and effectiveness. The reformist public itself moved in the direction of modernism and atheism or became reformist groups whose concept of the role of *iṣlāḥ* in the modern world differed from that held by the Salafiyya. Such tendencies seem to be the logical result of the ideas implicit in the two main strands of reformist thought since the beginning of the 20th century—the liberal trend, which favoured a global realignment of Muslim life to the modern world, and a strictly orthodox current that hoped to preserve the initial message of Islam in its entirety within contemporary civilization, despite all opposition and obstacles.

1.—The liberal tendency was already latent in several authors of the inter-war period. Claiming more or less explicitly to be the heirs to the spirit—if not the religious thinking—of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, they had some success after the war, during a period in which the differences between reformism and modernism made themselves felt more and more acutely. The *de facto* separation of political and religious affairs resulting from the institutional and cultural development of many Arab (and Muslim) countries— a development influenced by a certain liberal spirit— led some people to examine Islamic problems and subjects which until then had been taboo. This sort of free inquiry no longer exposed them to the vengeance of the administration or to persecution at the hands of conservative religious and university circles, as had been the case for ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziḳ in 1925, and Ṭāhir al-Ḥaddād in 1930. (Some delicate problems like the nature and mode of interpretation of the Ḳurʾān or the authenticity of *Ḥadīth* nevertheless continued to provoke violent arguments between orthodox *ʿulamāʾ* and avant-garde representatives of Muslim thought (cf., for example, J. Jomier, *Quelques positions actuelles de l'exégèse coranique en Egypte ...* (*1947-51*), in *MIDEO* (1954), 39-72, on the subject of

a thesis by Muḥammad Aḥmad Khalaf Allāh, *Al-Fann al-ḳaṣaṣī fi 'l-Ḳurʾān al-karīm*, Cairo 1951). The idea of a social and cultural modernism that would respect personal belief was gradually accepted. This liberalism included matters of political organization, but attempted to reform traditional teaching to eliminate those aspects of religion that were holding back the evolution of Muslim society. On the religious plane, this trend supported a more flexible interpretation of the Scriptures, which, while satisfying reason and the scientific spirit, would permit the resolution of difficulties arising between practical life and the principles of the *sharīʿa*, as they were formulated by traditional orthodoxy and taken over by the Salafiyya. Taken to its logical conclusion, this trend is identical to secular modernism, which had once been combatted vigorously by Rashīd Riḍā, Ibn Bādīs and their respective schools.

2.—At the same time, the partisans of energetic reformism, worried by the success of secular tendencies and by the growth of laxity in Muslim society, reacted in the direction of an Islamic renewal on the part of the individual and the state. By reinvigorating the doctrinal positions of moderate *iṣlāḥ*, they provided sympathizers and followers for the Muslim Brothers, whose fundamental principles (discounting the political activism of some of them) are very close to the strict orthodoxy professed by the Salafiyya (cf. the brief account of their doctrine by the first supreme guide of the Muslim Brothers, Ḥasan al-Bannāʾ (1906-1949 [q.v.] in his pamphlet: *Ilā ayy shayʾ nadʿu 'l-nās?*, Cairo, 1939 (?). Because it attempted to restore Islamic values in their original purity, and gave the appearance of deliberately ignoring the new values of modern culture and civilization, this trend did not gain the sympathy of either the modernists—fervent defenders of social and cultural liberalism and freedom of conscience— nor that of the young who were still attached to Islam, but aware of the social and political changes taking place around them. Fully committed to the "logic of history" and hoping to avoid both the ambiguities of a reformism that was not progressive enough for them and the intransigent fundamentalism of the religious movements, which they felt to be reactionary, the young opted for a populist *iṣlāḥ*, and, taking the part of the mass of the population which previous regimes had for so long ignored, fought for social justice (one of the dominant themes in the politico-religious literature of the post-war years; cf. Sayyid Ḳuṭb, *Al-ʿadāla al-idjtimāʿiyya fi 'l-Islām*, Cairo 1952; Eng. trans. J. H. Hardie, *Social Justice in Islam*, Washington 1953). They pleaded for the socialization of culture (cf. the Egyptian "Cultural Library", aimed at the popularization of science and making it accessible to the common people). They attempted to establish a new Arabo-Islamic humanism, based on a socialist state which would put and end to exploitation and oppression, without itself employing terror (cf. in this respect the principles set down by one of the theorists of Arab Socialism (*Baʿth*), Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Bayṭār, *Al-Siyāsa al-ʿarabiyya bayn al-mabdaʾ wa 'l-taṭbīḳ*, Beirut 1960; Fr. trans. by Marcel Colombe, in *Orient*, xl (1966), 173 ff.). Finally the reformist writers of this avant-garde group refused to adhere not only to social and political forms that they considered to be decisively condemned by History, but also to collective representations and ideas that they felt were the product of a medieval mentality. On the other hand, to the extent that they express, in the language of our day, something that is essential to the ḳurʾānic

message, they attempted to integrate with Muslim thought the leading concepts of contemporary culture (notably in relation to the Third World), even in the case of ideas that are the product of nominally aetheistic ideologies such as socialism (*ishtirākiyya* [*q.v.*]) and the revolution (*thawra* [*q.v.*]).

In conclusion, even though *iṣlāḥ* no longer appears to be a religious and cultural current with the force, homogeneity and unity of tone that it had had in the inter-war period, it continues to evolve different forms, some vehement, others more moderate. Whether we consider the liberal *iṣlāḥ* of the moderate intellectuals who claimed for Islam tolerance and freedom of investigation, preached the emancipation of peoples through education and instruction, and based their optimistic vision of human evolution of the triumph of Reason and Science; or the militant *iṣlāḥ* of the Muslim Brothers, with their mystique of fidelity to the Muḥammadan mission and their desire to give Islam an effective presence in the world; or the *iṣlāḥ* of the idealistic youth, expressed in "left-wing" terms and motivated by a desire for social justice and political morality; each of these trends represents one of the fundamental options preached by Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, and carried on by their faithful followers in the East and in the Maghrib.

At a time when cultures interact more rapidly than ever before, when the spirit of oecumenism is developing not merely in a Christian context, Muslim reformism could no longer remain enclosed within the static universe of the Salafiyya. By the very diversity of its current trends *iṣlāḥ* can escape from the rigid dogmatism which always haunts monolithic movements. In this way *iṣlāḥ* becomes the meeting-ground where many thinkers and university teachers who feel personally concerned with the future of Islam in the modern world can attempt to give Islamic culture a "new start". This has given rise to a proliferation of essays and critical works, claiming to be inspired by *iṣlāḥ*, everywhere in the Arab world (Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia etc.), and even in Pakistan, where the ideas of Muḥammad Iḳbāl, for example, continue to be a fertile source of inspiration.

Bibliography: 1. Background: C. Brockelmann, S III, 310-55; F. M. Pareja *et al.*, *Islamologie*, Beirut 1957-63, 724-43; H. Laoust, *Le Réformisme orthodoxe des "Salafiya" et les caractères généraux de son orientation actuelle*, in *REI*, 1932, 175-224; Ch. C. Adam, *Islam and modernism in Egypt*, London 1933, (reprinted American University at Cairo, 1968); H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern trends in Islam*, Chicago 1947 (on reformist *and* modernist trends); A. Hourani, *Arabic thought in the Liberal Age—1798-1939*, Oxford 1962; L. Gardet, *La Cité musulmane*, Paris ¹1954, ³ 1969 (especially *Annexe III*); Muḥammad Iḳbāl, *The Reconstruction of religious thought in Islam*, Oxford² 1934.

2. Historical account of modern *iṣlāḥ*: a) The neo-Ḥanbalī influence: basic ref. H. Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳi-D-Din Aḥmad b. Taymīya*, Cairo 1939, 541-75.—b) The Wahhābī antecedents: H. Laoust, *Essai...*, 506-40; 615-30, Bibliogr. 648-51; L. Massignon, *Les vraies origines dogmatiques du Wahhabisme...*, in *RMM*, xxxvi (1918-19), 320 ff.; WAHHĀBĪYA, in *EI¹*; IBN ʿABD AL-WAHHĀB, in *EI².

3. The main representatives of the modern reformist trend: a vast quantity of literature treats the subject from a general point of view. Cf.: Aḥmad Amīn, *Zuʿamāʾ al-iṣlāḥ fi 'l-aṣr*

al-ḥadīth, Cairo 1368/1949 (on ten reformist personalities of the Arab world and the Indian sub-continent). Special studies: a) Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897): *EI²*, s.v.; Brockelmann, S III, 311-5; Aḥ. Amīn, *Zuʿamāʾ al-iṣlāḥ...*, 59-120; Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī": a political biography*, Los Angeles 1972; E. Kedourie, *Afghani and ʿAbduh*, London 1966; Homa Pakdaman, *Djamal ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani*, Paris 1960, Bibliogr... 369-82 (tends to demystify the character by underlining the weakness in the man). Complementary study: A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, *Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. An annotated Bibliography*, Leiden 1970.—b) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1854?-1902): Brockelmann, S III, 380; R. Riḍā, *Muṣāb ʿazīm... (In memoriam)*, in *al-Manār*, v (1902), 237-40, 276-80; Aḥ. Amīn, *Zuʿamāʾ al-iṣlāḥ...*, 249-79; Muḥ. Aḥ Khalaf Allāh, *Al-K.*, *ḥayātuh wa-āthāruh*, Cairo 1962; Khaldūn S. al-Ḥuṣrī, *Three Reformers*, Beirut 1966, 55-112.—c) Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905): *EI¹*, s.v.; Brockelmann, S III, 315-21; the basic ref. still remains: R. Riḍā, *Taʾrīkh al-ustādh al-imām al-shaykh M. ʿA.*, 3 vols. Cairo, i, 1350/1931 (essentially biographical, with autobiographical notes by Muḥ. ʿAbduh, 20-5), ii, 1344/1925 (list of works and diverse writings), iii, 1324/1906 (funerary orations; obituary notices); H. Laoust, *Essai...*, 542 ff.; Aḥ. Amīn, *Zuʿamāʾ al-iṣlāḥ...*, 281-338; J. Jomier, *Le Comment. coran. du Manār*, chap. I. The personality of Muḥ. ʿAbduh has been the object of numerous studies, unequal in interest and often in the nature of an apologia (cf. ʿAbbās Maḥmūd al-ʿAḳḳād, *ʿAbḳarī al-iṣlāḥ wa 'l-taʿlīm al-ustādh al-imām Muḥ. ʿAbduh*, Cairo n.d.). A general bibliogr. on the life, work and thought of Muḥ. ʿAbduh still remains to be compiled.—d) Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935): Brockelmann, S III, 321-3; autobiographical notes in his *al-Manār wa 'l-azhar*, 129-200; Shakīb Arslān, *al-Sayyid R.R. aw ikhāʾ arbaʿīn sana*, Damascus 1356/1937; H. Laoust, *Essai...*, 557 ff.; J. Jomier, *Le Comment. coran. du Manār*, chap. I.—e) ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Bādīs (1889-1940). *EI²*. s.v.; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940*, 79-86 and *Index*; idem, *Ibn Bādis, Commentateur du Coran*, Paris 1971.—f) On secondary characters whose names are still linked to the history of the reformist trend in contemporary history, see above (*D*).

4. Works on doctrine. We will restrict ourselves here to the major works. For the rest, see the refs. mentioned in the article. a) Afghānī and Muḥ. ʿAbduh, *al-ʿUrwa al-wuthḳā*, Beirut 1328/1910, (new ed., Cairo 1958); Fr. trans. Marcel Colombe, *Pages choisies de Dj. al-D. al-A.*, in *Orient*, xxi-xxiv (1962), and xxv (1963).—b) Afghānī, *Ḥaḳīḳat-i madhhab-i nayshari wa-bayān-i ḥāl-i nayshariyān* (directed against Aḥmad Khān [*q.v.*]), Ḥaydarābād 1298/1880 (Arabic trans. by the author, same date and place); another Arabic version, based on the original Persian, by Muḥ. ʿAbduh: *Risālat al-radd ʿala 'l-dahriyyīn*, Beirut 1303/1886, then Cairo 1321/1903 (Fr. trans. based on the Arabic text): A. M. Goichon, *Réfutation des Matérialistes*, Paris 1944; (Eng. trans. based on the original Persian): Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism—Polit. and Relig. Writings of Sayyid J. al-D. "al-Afghānī"*, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1968.—c) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḳurā*, [Cairo 1899], fragments in *al-Manār*, v (1902), Cairo 1350/1931, Aleppo

1959: this little work gives a summarized form of all the main themes of reformist propaganda to be developed by R. Riḍā and Ibn Bādīs.—d) Idem, *Ṭabāᵓiᶜ al-istibdād*, Cairo 1318/1900, enlarged re-ed., Aleppo 1957. This essay was to have less impact in reformist cirles than the preceding work. —e) Muḥ. ᶜAbduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, Cairo, 1315/1897; new ed. (expurgated as far as the question of the "created Ḳurᵓān" is concerned), with notes, by R. Riḍā, Cairo 1326/1908. This ed. was considered as definitive for more than half a century (17th. reprint 1379/1960). A new ed. by Maḥmūd Abū Rayya uses the text of the original ed. revised and corrected by the author, Cairo, Maᶜārif, 1966). Fr. trans. based on the 1st. ed. by B. Michel and Moustapha Abdel Razik, *Rissalat al-Tawhid— Exposé de la religion musulmane*, Paris 1925; Eng. trans.: [Isḥāḳ] Musaᶜad and K. Cragg, *The Theology of Unity*, London 1966.—f) Idem, *Ḥāshiya ᶜalā sharḥ al-Dawānī li 'l-ᶜaḳāᵓid al-ᶜaḍudiyya*, Cairo 1292/1875; re-ed. in Sulaymān Dunyā, *Al-shaykh, M. ᶜA. bayn al-falāsifa wa-'l-kalāmiyyīn*, Cairo 1377/1958, 2 vols. In the Introduction (64 pp.) the ed. situates the thought of M. ᶜA. in relation to the problems of faith and reason, and criticizes the "excessive" rationalism of ᶜAbduh. For the same sort of approach note his *Risālāt al-wāridāt* (written in 1294/1877), 1st ed., Cairo 1299/1882. According to R. Riḍā the author reconsidered, towards the end of his life, a large part of his youthful work (which deals with *kalām*, Ṣufism and the *falsafa*). —g) Idem, *Al-Islām wa 'l-Naṣrāniyya maᶜa 'l-ᶜilm wa 'l-madaniyya*, Cairo 1320/1902 (replies and apologetic refutations).—h) Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Ḳurᵓān al-ḥakīm al-shahīr bi-Tafsīr al-Manār*, in 12 vols., Cairo 1346-53/1927-34 (this commentary stops at verse 52, sūrah XII, and thus only covers 2/5 of the ḳurᵓānic text).—i) Idem, *Taᵓrīkh al-ustādh al-imām al-Shaykh Muḥammad ᶜAbduh* (see above, 3, c).—j) Idem, *Al-Khilāfa aw al-imāma al-ᶜuẓmā*, Cairo 1341/1922-23 (Fr. trans. H. Laoust, *Le califat dans la doctrine de R.R.*, Beirut 1938. —k) Idem, *al-Manār wa 'l-azhar*, Cairo 1353/1934 (polemics with the conservative circles at al-Azhar). Many pamphlets which gather together the art. extracted from *Manār*, above all: 1) *Al-Waḥda al-islāmiyya wa 'l-ukhuwwa al-dīniyya*, Cairo 1346/1928 (on the themes of *taḳlīd* and *idjtihād*).—m) ᶜAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Bādīs, *Madjālis al-tadhkīr min kalām al-ḥakīm al-khabīr*, part. published with *Introd.* by M. B. Ibrāhīmī, by Ahmed Bouchemāl, Constantine 1948, 96 pp.; complete, but not critical ed., by Muḥ. Ṣāliḥ Ramaḍān and ᶜAbd Allāh Shāhīn, Cairo 1384/1964, 496 pp.—n) Mubārak al-Mīlī, *Risālat al-shirk wa-maẓāhirih*, Constantine 1356/1937 (a theologico-moral work strongly influenced by Wahhābī doctrine).—o) M. al-Bashīr al-Ibrāhīmī, *ᶜUyūn al-Baṣāᵓir*, Cairo 1963 (editorials from the paper *al-Baṣāᵓir*, Algiers 1947-56, on questions of relig., soc., polit., and culture, in pure reformist tradition. —p) Maḥmūd Shaltūt, *al-Islām ᶜaḳīda wa-sharīᶜa*, Cairo n.d. [1959].—q) Principal reformist papers and revues: *al-Manār* (monthly, Cairo, 1898-1935; ed. Rashīd Riḍā); *al-Fatḥ* (weekly, Cairo, founded in 1926; ed. Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb); *Madjallat al-shubbān al-muslimīn* (monthly, Cairo, founded in 1928; organ of the *Society of Young Muslims*); *al-Shihāb* (Constantine, 1925-39; monthly from 1927 on; ed. Ibn Bādīs); *al-Baṣāᵓir* (weekly, Algiers 1936-9; ed. Ṭayyib al-ᶜUḳbī; new series. 1947-56; ed. Bashīr Ibrāhīmī).

5. Analytical and critical studies: Besides the names of Muḥ. Iḳbāl, H. Laoust, H. A. R. Gibb, L. Gardet, J. Jomier, quoted above, cf.: I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*, Leiden 1920, repr. 1970 (Arab trans. ᶜAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Nadjdjār, *Madhāhib al-tafsīr al-islāmī*, Cairo 1374/1955; The *Introduction* to the Fr. trans. of *Risālat al-tawḥīd* (p. IX-LXXXV); Osman Amin, *Muḥ. ᶜAbduh: Essai sur ses idées philos. et relig.*, Cairo 1944 (Eng. trans., Ch. Wendell, *Muhammad ᶜAbduh*, Washington 1953. Cf. the corrections made to this trans. by Fr. Rosenthal in *JAOS*, lxxiv (1954), 101-2); idem, *Rāᵓid al-fikr al-miṣri, M. ᶜA.*, Cairo 1955 (enlarged version of preceding title); R. Caspar, *Le Renouveau du Moᶜtazilisme*, in *MIDEO*, iv (1957), 141-202 (very thorough study, indispensable ref. on the question); P. Rondot. *L'Islam et les Musulmans d'aujourd'hui*, Paris, i (1968), ii (1960) (work of popularization based on personal experience); J. Berque, J.-P. Charnay and others, *Normes et valeurs de l'Islam contemporain*, Paris 1966 (some interesting judgements on reformist currents of Muslim thought in the 20th C.); M. Kerr, *Islamic Reform (The Polit. and Legal Theories of Muh. ᶜAbduh and R. Riḍā)*, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1966 (underlines certain contradictions in reformist thought); A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940* (Book II, p. 211-432, is an examination of the doctrine); idem, *Ibn Bādīs, Commentateur du Coran* (thematic analysis of the ḳurᵓānic commentary of the *Shihāb*).

6. Periodicals which frequently deal with the problems of reformism in an Arab context: *L'Afrique et l'Asie*; *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*; *IBLA*; *Islamic Culture*; *JAOS*; *MIDEO*; *Orient*; *OM*; the old *Revue du Monde Musulman*; the *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* and its *Abstracta*, etc.   (A. MERAD)

ii.—IRAN

Islamic thought and expression bearing a distinctively modern stamp has been of less quantity and importance in Iran than either the Arab lands or the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. No figure has emerged comparable in influence or literary output to, for example, Sayyid Ḳuṭb or Muḥammad Iḳbāl [*qq.v.*]. This may be attributed in part to the relative isolation of Iran from intellectual currents in other parts of the Muslim world by virtue of its profession of Shī-ᶜism, and in part, too, to the very nature of Shīᶜism, which being in its essence an esoterism, is less susceptible to those storms of historical change that have provoked modernist reaction elsewhere. Traditional learning and institutions have, moreover, been unusually well preserved in Iran, and while Islamic modernism in other lands has frequently arisen from "lay" impatience with *ᶜulamāᵓ* attitudes to the faith and a desire to expound and implement its dictates independently of them, the Iranian *ᶜulamāᵓ* have, by contrast, maintained a high degree of influence and prestige. There have nonetheless been certain currents of modernist expression in Iran, elicited in large part by the western impact and tending to the presentation of Islam above all in terms of social and political reform and compatibility with modern science and rationality.

The beginnings of such expression are to be traced to the reign of Fatḥ ᶜAlī Shāh (1797-1834), when the crown prince ᶜAbbās Mīrzā invoked ḳurᵓānic sanction for the introduction of certain military reforms of western provenance. The depiction of social and

political reform as deriving from religious precept
and duty thereafter became a commonplace of re-
formist thought. It received little systematic exposi-
tion, however, and was frequently voiced by persons
themselves lacking in substantial religious belief and
concerned above all with the forging of a tactical de-
vice for gaining *ʿulamaʾ* and mass upport for reform
and westernization. Most prominent and influential
among this class was the Perso-Armenian Mīrzā
Malkum Khān (1834-1908). On the basis of his private
statements (particularly to his friend and confidant,
Ākhūndzāda), it may be concluded that he was a free-
thinker; yet he belongs to the history of Islamic mod-
ernism in Iran by virtue of his expedient and influ-
ential exposition of the Islamic acceptability, even
necessity, of reform. This theme he put forward in
a number of treatises, especially *Kitābča-yi Ghaybī*,
and above all in the celebrated journal *Ḳānūn*, pub-
lished in London from 1890 to 1898.

In the identification of religious duty with the need
to reform, the question of law played a crucial part:
whether the law of a regenerated state was to be the
sharīʿa or a code of western inspiration. The problem
was solved — if only in the most immediate sense
— by the equation of both on the basis of allegedly
shared fundamentals: the just and orderly functioning
of society for the increase of prosperity. This equa-
tion, implicit in the very title of Malkum's journal,
was set forth more clearly (and probably with a
greater degree of inward conviction) by Mīrzā Yūsuf
Khān Mustashār al-Dawla in his treatise entitled *Yak
Kalima* (1870). The "one word" of the title is law,
which constitutes the sufficient solution to all of Iran's
problems, and the law in question consists of the
French legal codes, which Mīrzā Yūsuf Khān attempts
to prove compatible with Islam by means of quotation
from the Ḳurʾān and *Ḥadīth*. He wrote another work
in similar vein, *Rūḥ-i Islām*, in which he stated:
"I have found proofs and evidences from the Glorious
Ḳurʾān and reliable traditions for all the means of
progress and civilization, so that none shall hence-
forth say, 'such-and-such a matter is against the
principles of Islam,' or, 'the principles of Islam are
an obstacle to progress and civilization'."

The influence of Sayyid Djamāl al-Dīn Asadābādī
(Afghānī) [*q.v.*] in Iran tended in a similar direction
of westernizing reform, although the religious tone
and content of his thought was far more considerable
than in the case of either Malkum or Mīrzā Yūsuf
Khān. It is now fully established that he was of Iran-
ian birth; yet his impact upon his homeland was al-
most certainly of less importance than his role in
other parts of the Muslim world. His major work
in "defence" of religion, *Ḥaḳīḳat-i madhhab-i nayčiri*,
was written and first published in Ḥaydarābād (1881),
largely in response to certain local Indian conditions,
and the Arabic version of the work, *al-Radd ʿala ʾl-
dahriyyin*, was probably more widely read than the
Persian orignal. Nonetheless, during Djamāl al-Dīn's
two trips to Iran in 1886-1887 and 1889-1891, he
came into contact with a variety of persons upon
whom he appears to have made a considerable im-
pression. Among these may be mentioned Sayyid Ṣādiḳ
Ṭabāṭabāʾī, father of Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī,
one of the most prominent *mudjtahid*s active in sup-
port of the constitutional revolution, and Mīrzā Naṣr
Allāh Iṣfahānī Malik al-Mutakallimīn, the celebrated
constitutionalist preacher. While taking refuge at the
shrine of Shāh ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm to the south of Tehran
in 1890, he also met many lesser persons, and he
may in general be presumed to have strengthened
the current of Iranian modernism, although to a de-

gree inferior to that claimed by posthumous legend.

Foremost among the themes traditionally asso-
ciated with the influence of Sayyid Djamāl al-Dīn was
Pan-Islamism [*q.v.*], which did indeed come to occupy
a certain place in Islamic modernism in Iran, despite
the separateness resulting from Shīʿism. It was felt
that both the Ottoman Empire and Iran were exposed
to the same danger of extinction at the hands of west-
ern imperialism, and that union under the Ottoman
ruler, as sultan thought not caliph, was a desirable
measure of defence. While in Istanbul in 1892, Sayyid
Djamāl al-Dīn formed a circle of Iranian exiles—Aza-
līs for the most part, strangely enough—to conduct
propaganda with a view to strengthening such feelings.
Letters were sent to the Shīʿī *ʿulamāʾ* both in Iran
and at the shrine cities of ʿIrāḳ which elicited a fa-
vourable response. Contacts between Istanbul and the
Shīʿī *ʿulamāʾ* survived Djamāl al-Dīn's death and
played a role of some importance in the affairs of
Iran for a number of years, particularly from 1900
to 1903. The only substantial treatment of Pan-Islam-
ism in Persian was the tract entitled *Ittiḥād-i Islām*
by the Ḳadjar prince Mīrzā Abu ʾl-Ḳāsim Shaykh al-
Raʾīs (published at Bombay in 1894). In recent years
aspirations towards Islamic solidarity have received
renewed expression in Iran, but with Sunnī-Shīʿī rap-
prochement as their aim rather than political union or
federation.

Certain modernist themes, in particular the re-
ligious desirability of social and educational reform
and the duty of acquiring modern scientific learning,
were adumbrated in works not primarily religious
in tone and intention: *Kitāb-i Aḥmad* (1896) and *Ma-
sālik-i Muḥsinin* (1905) of the Ādharbāydjānī Ṭālibov,
and the *Siyāḥatnāma-yi Ibrāhīm Bīg* (3 vols., 1903-
1909) of his compatriot Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn Marāghaʾī.

None of the works or tendencies indicated so far
emanated from the *ʿulamāʾ*, although they may have
been influenced by some among them to various de-
grees. It is not until the years of the constitutional
revolution (1905-1911) that we find a coherent and
serious statement on questions of political and social
reform, inspired by genuine concern and expressed
in scholarly terms, issuing from the *ʿulamāʾ* class.
The work in question is a treatise on constitutional
government from the viewpoint of Shīʿī Islam, entitled
*Tanbīh al-umma wa tanzīh al-milla dar asās wa uṣūl-i
mashrūtiyat* (first published 1909, reprinted with an in-
troduction by Sayyid Maḥmūd Ṭāliḳānī in 1955). The
author was Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Nāʾīnī (1860-
1936), a *mudjtahid* resident in Nadjaf who had been
a pupil of the celebrated Mīrzā Ḥasan Shīrāzī, author
of the *fatwā* so effective in the tobacco boycott of
1891-1892, and who enjoyed the close friendship of
the great constitutionalist divines, Mullā Kāẓim Khu-
rāsānī and Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Māzandarānī. The parti-
cipation of a large and significant number of the Iran-
ian *ʿulamāʾ* in the constitutional revolution has often
been regarded as a result of confusion and circum-
stantial pressure, as the continuation of traditional
ʿulamāʾ hostility to the state in a situation the novelty
of which they failed to recognize. Nāʾīnī's book de-
lineates the positive doctrinal reasons for their sup-
port of constitutionalism, firmly grounded in the
Ḳurʾān and *Sunna*. He defines the functions of the
state as the establishment of equilibrium within so-
ciety and its defence from external attack. The power
enjoyed by the state should be limited to that neces-
sary for fulfilling these functions; any excess tends
inevitably in the direction of tyranny, which in turn
tempts the ruler to usurp the divine attribute of sov-
ereignty, and thus to commit the cardinal sin of *shirk*.

Such perversion can be fully prevented only by the ʿiṣma of the ruler, his freedom from sin and error, and it was for this reason that legitimate rule belonged to the Imāms during their lifetime. After the occultation of the twelfth Imām, legitimacy has withdrawn from the earthly plane, and a degree of usurpatoriness is bound to haunt all existing regimes. It is nonetheless both possible and desirable to reduce that degree to a minimum by limiting the power of the ruler and instituting an assembly (madjlis) of representatives which shall implement the consultative principle enunciated in the Ḳurʾān. Such an assembly may act as a legislature only with regard to matters not already covered by the sharīʿa, or by giving specific implementation to items legislated for in general manner by Ḳurʾān and Sunna. The functioning of the assembly is to be regulated by a constitution, and objections that the constitution somehow vies with the sharīʿa as a new, comprehensive code are ill-informed or mischievous. There results from conceding to the assembly a limited legislative power a duality of religious and secular law; but the innocuity of secular law will be guaranteed by the presence in the madjlis of a number of mudjtahids, and in any event, perfect implementation of the sharīʿa, with all aspects of life integrated according to its ordinances, will be possible only with the return of the Imām to the plane of manifestation. Nāʾīnī's statement of the desirability of constitutional rule in Shīʿī terms indicates not only how the ʿulamāʾ were able, in later decades, to refer to both the Ḳurʾān and the constitution as sources of authority for political life, but also how it was possible for them to ally themselves with secular elements in the pursuit of common political objectives.

Modernist thought and expression, in Islamic terms, remained dormant throughout the reign of Riḍā Shāh (1926-1941), under whose auspices a nationalist ideology with secularist and anti-Islamic tendencies was fostered, although not as energetically as in neighbouring Turkey. After his deposition and the succession to the throne of Muḥammad Riḍā Shāh, a certain freedom of expression came into being of which use was made by various religious circles, and although the possibilities of uninhibited expression have since suffered a sharp decline, Islamic modernism in Iran has continually developed in the post-war period. During the last decade in particular, a large body of religious literature has made its appearance, modern in its tone of thought and its preoccupation with socioeconomic problems, the interrelations of science and religion, and the task of restating Islam in a manner comprehensible to secularly educated youth.

In the period between the accession of Muḥammad Riḍā Shāh and the overthrow of prime minister Muḥammad Muṣaddiḳ in July 1953, the resurgence of Islam as a visible factor in public affairs was marked by an extreme degree of political activism, largely unaccompanied by intellectual or literary activity. This observation applies both to the organization of the Fidāʾyān-i Islām [q.v.], under the leadership of Nawwāb Ṣafavī, and to the figure of Āyat Allāh Abu 'l-Ḳāsim Kāshānī. The Fidāʾyān never evolved a consistent ideology or any serious programme for reshaping the life of state and society in Islamic terms. Their organ, Zilzila, consisted largely of commentaries on questions of the day, with more permanent questions receiving only fragmentary treatment. Kāshānī, although temporarily co-operating with the Fidāʾyān, represented the tradition of the constitutionalist mudjtahids of the early part of the century and had indeed been one of the foremost

pupils of Mullā Kāẓim Khurāsānī in Nadjaf. In his speeches and correspondence, Kāshānī reflected the thinking of this earlier generation of ʿulamāʾ, accepting, like Nāʾīnī, the Ḳurʾān and the constitution as dual sources of political authority. His expression of the theme had an abrasive polemical edge that reflected the extreme tensions of the period.

At this time, the dominant figure in the religious life of Iran was not Kāshānī, but Āyat Allāh Ḥusayn Burūdjirdī (1875-1962), a figure universally acknowledged to have exceeded Kāshānī in piety and learning, while quietist—and even occasionally loyalist—in his political attitudes. Burūdjirdī cannot, in any important sense, be called a modernist, for he did not concern himself to any remarkable degree with political or social problems. Nonetheless, during the one-and-a-half decades that he functioned as sole mardjaʿ-i taḳlīd [q.v.] of the Ithnā ʿasharī Shīʿī community, he initiated a process of renewal and self-criticism within the religious institution which has gathered momentum after his death and largely contributed to the contemporary spate of religious concern and thought in Iran. Burūdjirdī established a network of communication reaching out from Ḳum to all regions of the country to regularize the collection of sahm-i imām, a measure that later proved useful for the dissemination of religious guidance and directives. In the field of pure scholarship, he revived the independent study of ḥadīth and instigated a critical revision of the fundamental Shīʿī manual, Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmulī's Wasāʾil al-shīʿa ilā taḥḳīḳ masāʾil al-sharīʿa. He demonstrated a serious concern for a Sunnī-Shīʿī rapprochement, and to this end entered into correspondence with successive rectors of the Azhar. With their co-operation, there was established in Cairo, with a branch in Ḳum, an institution called Dār al-taḳrīb bayna'l-madhāhib al-islāmiyya, issuing an organ under the title of Risālat al-Islām. This concern of Burūdjirdī has survived his death, and while the absence of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Cairo for a number of years made it difficult to pursue contacts with the Azhar, this obstacle was removed in September 1970, and the rector of the Azhar, Muḥammad al-Faḥḥām, paid an extended visit to Iran in the summer of 1971 in the course of which he met a number of leading mudjtahids, including Ayat Allāh Muḥammad Hādī Mīlānī in Mashhad. Another initiative of Burūdjirdī which has continued to bear fruit was the dispatch of Shīʿī emissaries to western Europe, both to cater to needs of Iranians abroad and to propagate Shīʿī Islam among interested Europeans.

The death of Burūdjirdī deprived the Shīʿī community of its sole mardjaʿ, and the problem of leadership and direction posed itself in an unusually acute manner. It was widely felt that the traditional process whereby one or more of the mudjtahids, qualified by piety and pre-eminence in religious learning, had emerged to be sources of guidance, was defective and incapable of answering the true needs of the community. For all the deep respect that Burūdjirdī had enjoyed, his failure to provide authoritative guidance during the events that had convulsed Iran in the Muṣaddiḳ period was felt to be a defect from which his successors should ideally be free. It was recognized, moreover, that the mastery of the traditional religious disciplines was by itself no longer an adequate training for the effective guidance of society and the application of Islamic solutions to contemporary problems. On the other hand, acquisition of the various branches of specialized knowledge that seemed necessary for the task was clearly beyond the capacities

of a single individual. Some therefore concluded that a collective *mardja*ᶜ was desirable. Many of these considerations, together with suggested solutions, were adumbrated in a collective volume entitled *Baḥthī dar bāra-yi mardjaᶜiyat wa rūḥānīyat*, first published in 1963 and since reprinted with supplementary material. This book, the work of seven authors, including both ᶜ*ulamā*ᵓ and lay writers, was probably the most influential and substantial piece of religious writing to appear in Persian since Nāᵓīnī's discussion of constitutional government. It concluded a brief and clear exposition of certain fundamental concepts such as *taḳlīd*, *idjtihād* and *walāyat* (treated by Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāᵓī and Murtaḍā Muṭahharī), and of the proper social function of the religious classes in general and the *mardja*ᶜ in particular (discussed by Mahdī Bāzargān and Sayyid Muḥammad Bihishtī). Possibly the most important sections were those in which Muṭahharī discussed the need to provide an independent financial basis for the religious institution, thus freeing it of subservience to either state or populace, and those in which Bāzargān and Sayyid Murtaḍā Djazāᵓirī proposed the replacement of an individual by a collective *mardja*ᶜ (termed by the latter *shaurā-yi fatwā*).

In addition to such discussion of problems peculiar to Shīᶜism in the present age, the postwar religious scene in Iran has also witnessed the translation into Persian of modernist works produced elsewhere in the Islamic world. Some of the authors most frequently translated are Sayyid Ḳuṭb, Muḥammad Ḳuṭb, Yūsuf al-Ḳarḍāwī and others associated with the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [*q.v.*], and Mawlānā Abu ᵓl-Aᶜlā Mawdūdī, leader of the Pakistani Dhamāᶜat-i Islāmī. Among the more influential of the works translated, special mention may be made of Sayyid Ḳuṭb's *al-ᶜAdāla al-idjtimāᵓiyya fī ᵓl-Islām*. The translations are occasionally supplied with footnotes to indicate Shīᶜi divergent opinions when deemed necessary.

The most prolific and influential writer of original modernist literature in Iran today is Mahdī Bāzargān, one of the contributors to the collective volume already mentioned. His work is characterized by the clear influence of certain Sunnī modernists, a concern with demonstrating the confluence of scientific fact with religious truth, and a fluent and persuasive style. His first book was *Muṭahhirāt dar Islām* (1943; later reprinted), a detailed demonstration of the biological and hygienic utility inherent in the Islamic prescriptions for ritual purity. Of his later production, totalling some twenty titles to date, mention may be made of *ᶜIshḳ wa parastish* (1963), a work subtitled "the thermodynamics of man"; *Duᶜā* (1964), discussing the psychological benefits of prayer; and *Dars-i Dīndārī* (1965), stressing the continuing need of man and society in the modern world for religion. Bāzargān has also been politically active as one of the moving spirits behind the Nihḍat-i Āzādī, a religiously orientated component of the proscribed oppositional National Front. One of his associates in this venture has been Sayyid Maḥmūd Ṭāliḳānī, author of a number of works including the significant treatise *Djihād wa Shahādat* (1965).

Most of the works of Bāzargān and Ṭāliḳānī have been published by a Tehran house known as Shirkat-i Intishār, which continues to put out an ever-increasing volume of modernist religious literature. A few specimens may be cited by way of example: ᶜAlī Ghaffūrī's *Islām wa iᶜlāmiyya-yi djahānī-yi ḥuḳūḳ-i bashar* (1964), aiming to show how Islam has prefigured the notion of universal human rights; Muḥammad Taḳī Sharīᶜatī's *Tafsīr-i Nuvīn* (1967), a commentary

on the last *djuz*ᵓ of the Ḳurᵓān, markedly rationalist in tendency; and Muḥammad Mudjtahid Shabistarī's *Djāmiᵓa-yi insānī-yi Islām* (1969), a work stressing the universalist and fraternal aspects of Islam.

There are too certain special classes of religious literature worthy of note. One is the popular religious biography, of which the chief exponent is Zayn al-ᶜĀbidīn Rahnamā. His immensely successful biography of the Prophet, *Payāmbar*, first published in 1937, has gone through more than fifteen editions and been translated into French (Paris 1957). Rahnamā's work is characterized by skilful narrative technique and a free use of invented dialogue. A two-volume *Zindagānī-yi Imām Ḥusayn* (new edition 1966) has enjoyed similar popularity. Also deserving of mention in the same genre is the Persian translation of C. V. Gheorghiu's French biography of the Prophet under the title of *Muḥammad, payghambarī ki az nau bāyad shināḵht* (1964).

Polemical literature forms another notable division of contemporary religious writing. Numerous works have been written stressing the unique identity of the Shīᶜa, partly as an adjunct to and partly in contradiction of, moves towards a Sunnī-Shīᶜī rapprochement. Probably the best work in this category is Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāᵓī's *Shīᶜa dar Islām* (1969). The vast work in Arabic on the supposed appointment of ᶜAlī as successor to the Prophet at the pool of Khumm, Shaykh ᶜAbd al-Ḥusayn Amīnī's *al-Ghadīr*, has been partially translated into Persian. A more popular treatment of the same subject is the anonymous and collective work *Ḥassāstarīn farāz-i tārīkh yā dāstān-i ghadīr* (1969). Other works are aimed at refuting the attacks made on Shīᶜi Islam by the radical anti-clerical Aḥmad Kasravī in his frequently reprinted *Shīᶜagarī*. In this category mention may be made of Ḥādidi Sirādji Anṣārī's *Shīᶜa chi mīgūyad* (third edition, 1966), and Muḥammad Taḳī Sharīᶜatī's *Fāᵓida wa luzūm-i dīn* (1965). Finally, there exists an extensive literature in refutation of Bahāᵓīsm, chiefly in pamphlet form.

In addition to the printed word, the broadcast lecture on religious subjects has played a part of importance in the diffusion of contemporary Islamic thought, particularly in an era of decreasing mosque attendance. The names of Muḥammad Taḳī Falsafī and Ḥusayn Rāshid stand out among the especially celebrated preachers; the texts of their lectures have been collected and published in book form.

Another innovation of the postwar period has consisted of societies and organizations devoted to *tablīgh*, to the propagation of the faith by means of the printed and spoken word. The earliest of these was the Andjuman-i Tablīghāt-i Islāmī, founded in 1943 by Dr. ᶜAṭā Allāh Shihābpūr with headquarters in Tehran and branches in a number of provincial cities. It published a number of booklets on the fundamentals of religion, as well as a magazine entitled *Nūr-i dānish* and a yearbook bearing the same name. The activities of the organization seem to have faded out in the late 1950s.

In 1965 there was established in Ḳum an institution called the Dār al-Tablīgh al-Islāmī, the fulfilment of the wishes of the late Burūdjirdī and under the auspices of another *mudjtahid*, Āyat Allāh Muḥammad Kāzim Sharīᶜatmadārī. The institution trains students in the religious science, not, like the traditional *madrasas*, for the sake of pure knowledge, but with a view to the effective propagation of religion among the masses. English is among the subjects taught, and it is intended to institute missionary activity abroad. On the occasion of the fourth anniversary

of the institution, a lavish volume entitled *Sīmā-yi Islām* was published, containing contributions by leading contemporary religious writers. Closely associated with the activities of the Dār al-Tablīgh is an author by the name of Sayyid Hādī Khusraushāhī, a figure well-known in international Islamic circles and editor of the popular religious magazine *Maktab-i Islām* (appearing since 1958).

More recently still, there has been founded in Tehran the institution known as Ḥusayniya-yi Irshād, a centre where well-attended lectures on religious subjects are given by prominent figures both from the *ʿulamā*ʾ and the world of learning. It too has publications to its credit, the most notable being a two-volume collection of papers entitled *Muḥammad, khātam-i payghambarān* (1969). During the *ḥadjdj* season, the Ḥusayniya establishes a temporary branch at Minā, where Iranian pilgrims go to receive guidance and hear lectures on the significance of the pilgrimage.

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(HAMID ALGAR)

iii.—TURKEY

Within the Ottoman-Turkish context *iṣlāḥ* seldom meant modernism in religion. The word has more often been associated with political reform which, in turn, meant at first (during the 11th/17th and 12th/18th centuries) the restoration of the old political order, and later (approximately after 1800), a reconstitution of the political system on the basis of principles more and more remote from those of sultanate and caliphate. There is no word consistently used to denote the idea of religious modernism, as distinct from the modernization of religious institutions such as the *madrasas*, where again the term used was *iṣlāḥ*. There is no major movement of religious modernism comparable with those found elsewhere in the Islamic world.

The absence of a concept and movement of religious modernism seems to be a result of the characteristic Ottoman fusion of religion and state, symbolized by the frequent use of the term *dīn-u-devlet* by Ottoman writers. In an institutional or in a theological sense, very little scope was left for the rise of a religious modernism independent of political reform movements. The Ottoman polity had succeeded more than any other in maintaining Islam and its representatives, the *ʿulamā*ʾ, within the framework

of the state organization. The religious institution, which represented no spiritual or ecclesiastical authority, was merely a segment of the ruling institution, and was organized into an order or *odjaḳ* [*q.v.*]. Its role lay mainly in the cultivation of jurisprudence (*fiḳh*), the giving of opinions on legal matters (*iftā*ʾ), and the execution of the *sharīʿa* law and the *ḳānūn* (*ḳaḍā*ʾ). The *madrasa* was not primarily a school of theology, but was chiefly a training centre of jurisprudence. Through its judiciary, the state had adopted Sunnī orthodoxy, with an emphasis on Māturīdī theology and the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence, and thus limited the possibilities for theological controversies.

However, besides the orthodox religious institution, with its educational and judicial regimentation and hierarchy, scope was also given to another stream of religious institutionalization which came closer to what might be regarded as an autonomous spiritual institution. These were the mystic orders or *ṭarīḳas*, of which there was a rich variety as a result of their tendency to split and multiply. Most of them, however, adhered, at least ostensibly to one or other of the main conservative, moderate, and extremist trends in terms of their attitudes toward the world and the state. It was only when a clash took place within the accepted limits of discrepancy between the *ʿulamā*ʾ and Ṣūfī orders that there was the possibility of some kind of religious controversy. When such a clash extended to the basic tenets of orthodoxy, the *ʿulamā*ʾ tended to view it more in political than religious terms and treated the exponents of such views as heretical. In all such cases the *ʿulamā*ʾ easily obtained the support of the political power. The majority of the *ṭarīḳa*s, however, avoided open antinomianism and maintained their position within the framework of the Ottoman polity. They adopted quietism or indifferentism on theological-political matters and were inclined more and more to ritualism and incantation or to poetry and art. This tendency not only safeguarded their existence, but also added prestige and enhanced their popularity among various classes of society, particularly among the artisans, the military, and the bureaucracy. The *ṭarīḳa* thus represented another example of the union between religion and state, attracting the participation not only of the *ʿulamā*ʾ but also of high ranking statesmen, often even of the rulers themselves. Furthermore, the Ottoman state succeeded, in the later period, in making the *ṭarīḳa*s a semi-official pillar of the state by recognizing the *mashāyikh* alongside the *ʿulamā*ʾ in various ceremonial affairs.

After a fairly long period of partnership between the state, the *ʿulamā*ʾ, and the *ṭarīḳa*s, religious and spiritual controversies arose when in the 11th/17th century all of them faced the earliest challenges of the modern world. The objects of their controversies, such as coffee-drinking, smoking, intoxication, the use of silk or jewellery, emotional extravagance in daily life or in religious observance, belief in powers above or beyond the state and God may seem unimportant, but they were innovations partly introduced by the material affluence of the ruling class and the monetary and fiscal crises caused by the advent of an inflated economy and the concomitant disruption of the traditional orders of the Ottoman polity, accompanied by the impoverishment of the masses. The confluence of these factors made the problem of innovation (*bidʿa*) the central theme of religious controversies. The *ʿulamā*ʾ and the *mashāyikh* accused each other of such innovations while the state, perhaps the real culprit, took the occasion to tighten its grip upon both.

However, no basic change in the traditional out-
look of the *'ulamā'* and Şūfī orders took place before
the challenge of the modern world, although one
should not conclude that the *'ulamā'* always took a
negative attitude toward innovations. Because of
their vested interest in the maintenance of the
Ottoman system, their attitude to change was
dictated by their principle of *maşlaḥa*, political
expediency. Only in a few cases did the *'ulamā'*
openly oppose government policies and attempts
at reform. In periods of tension the *'ulamā'* turn-
ed against the Şūfīs rather than against the state,
and under their attacks, the *ṭarīḳa*s became more
docile. This was an important stage on the road
towards their later decline and discredit. The *'ulamā'*
as a whole stood firmly on the side of the state,
although with a relative degree of elasticity, but
they survived the first phase of the crisis only with
a tangible loss of religious vitality and initiative.
Both of these religious institutions were thus in de-
cline, long before 1800. Already in the middle of
the 11th/17th century Ḳoči Beg [*q.v.*], in his *Risāla*,
had described the corruption of the corps of *'ulamā'*,
and later Ḥādjdjī Khalīfa (Kātib Čelebi [*q.v.*]) in his
Mīzān al-ḥaḳḳ fī iḫtiyār al-aḥaḳḳ (English trans-
lation by G. L. Lewis, *The balance of truth*, London
1957) ridiculed the nonsensical controversies raging
between the *'ulamā'* and the *shaykh*s and deplored
the depth of ignorance in rational and religious
sciences in the *madrasa*s. While the *'ulamā'* had
become thoroughly worldly, the *ṭarīḳa*s tended to
become more removed from reality.

The reign of Selīm III (1789-1807), as the first
period of serious attempt at comprehensive reforms,
found the *'ulamā'* more active in worldly affairs than
interested in religious reform. Among the reform
projects submitted to this ruler the best one was pre-
pared by 'Abd Allāh Molla, a high ranking member
of the *'ulamā'*. None of his recommendations for the
reforming of the religious institution, however, had
any effect upon the *Shaykh al-Islām*, the head of the
'ulamā', nor upon his colleagues, and produced no-
thing tangible which could be called modernism in
religion. The *ṭarīḳa*s fell into further disrepute and,
at least one of them, the Bektashiyya, received a
deadly blow from the *'ulamā'*-supported destruction
of the Janissaries under Maḥmūd II in 1826, because
of the alleged association between the two. Since then,
the *ṭarīḳa*s have never recovered, with the exception
of two intervals, the first during the reign of 'Abd
al-Ḥamīd II (1876-1909) and the second from the
1940s on.

The earliest sign of a fundamental change in the
position of the religious institution only appeared
when some of the provisions of the *Tanẓīmat* charter
were implemented. At first, the *'ulamā'* managed to
ignore the implications of the *Tanẓīmat* reforms for
religious modernism. While the *Tanẓīmat* proved to be
a new step in further involving the religious insti-
tution in politics, at the same time it marked the first
split between religion and state. For example, while
the *Shaykh al-Islām*, as the head of the religious insti-
tution, was given a permanent and prominent position
in the cabinet, half of the judiciary was reserved
for the new Ministry of Justice, the regulation of all
pious foundations was assigned to the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of *Awḳāf*, and all newly formed schools
were put under the Ministry of Education [see BĀB-ı
MASHĪKHAT].

Despite this trend of laicization of the institutions
which were traditionally under the control of the re-
ligious institution, the *Shaykh al-Islām*, the *'ulamā'*

and the *madrasa*s continued to play conspicuous roles
in wordly affairs. That these activities varied from
combating the laicized institutions, or sabotaging the
codification of the *Medjelle*, to backing the state
against the interference of the European Powers aimed
at further secularizing reforms and participating in
secret conspiracies for the deposition of rulers, is
an indication of the fact that the *'ulamā'* had lost
their internal unity, and their association with the
state had become tenuous.

During the *Tanẓīmat*, as well as the constitutional
movement of the young Ottomans, the *'ulamā'* pro-
duced no prominent religious thinker. The only out-
standing figure who came from the *'ulamā'* class was
Aḥmad Djewdet Pasha (1822-1895 [*q.v.*]), but he be-
came prominent only after he left the religious in-
stitution and became a secular statesman. Djewdet
was perhaps the greatest reformer of the period, but
as a legal reformer and not as a religious thinker.
He succeeded in curbing the tendency of the *Tanẓīmat*
statesmen toward a wholesale adoption of new codes
from France on the one hand, and, on the other, re-
cognized the inability of the *'ulamā'*, as the spokes-
men of the *sharī'a*, to fulfil the requirements of a
modern legal system. The *Medjelle* [*q.v.*] (1870-77)
and the *Ḳānūn-u-Erāḍī* (1858) were the major pro-
ducts of his attempts at the modernization and codi-
fication of Islamic law. His enlightened modernism,
however, did not extend to constitutionalism. While
he received the acclaim of the Young Ottomans as a
modernist on matters of *fiḳh*, he sided with 'Abd al-
Ḥamīd II against the constitutionalists, although it
was the very same ruler who interrupted Djewdet's
work in codification under pressure of the famous
reactionary *Shaykh al-Islām*, Ḥasan Fehmī [*q.v.*].

The reign of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd II (1876-1909 [*q.v.*])
was a period of total eclipse for any type of religious
reform. It became instead a period of resurgence
for the *ṭarīḳa*s, particularly for those which had no
historic position in the Ottoman empire but were
imported, mostly from North Africa, and which 'Abd
al-Ḥamīd seems to have encouraged in order to re-
new Ottoman influence in Arab countries. These *ṭa-
rīḳa*s became centres of obscurantism, and the attempt
to use them for political purposes sealed the fate
of these once vigorous foci of popular religiosity. It
is to be noted that during the reign of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd,
who espoused pan-Islamism, no trace of the modernist
ideas of men like Muḥammad 'Abduh [*q.v.*] is dis-
cernible, although there was an abundance of the
literature of the "Refutation of the Materialists" type
inspired by Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī [*q.v.*].

Some influence of Muḥammad Abuh's modernism
was found, on the other hand, in pre-1908 writings
of the secular intelligentsia who were at war with
'Abd al-Ḥamīd. Dr. 'Abd Allāh Djewdet, who is re-
garded as one of the most extreme atheists among
the Young Turks, was the first to give space to Mu-
ḥammad 'Abduh's ideas in his review *Idjtihād*, pub-
lished in exile. After the restoration of the consti-
tutional regime in 1908, the first modernist review,
Sırat-ı Mustaḳīm (later *Sebīl ul-Reşad*), appeared as
the organ of the younger *'ulamā'*, who no longer
constituted a clerical order in the Old Ottoman sense.
The leading figures of this modernist review, how-
ever, were handicapped by the complications created
by the impending clash between the Pan-Ottomanism
of the Young Turks and the Islamic-Arab nationalism
of the Egyptian modernists. The review appeared to
be more in the footsteps of Rashīd Riḍā than Mu-
ḥammad 'Abduh. In reality, very little space was
given to 'Abduh in *Sırat-ı Mustaḳīm*; only two arti-

cles were published about him, both being trans-
lations. What was believed to be modernism in Arab
countries thus appeared in Turkey to be a religious
reaction against the Ottoman caliphate. The secular
Westernists also denounced these modernists as
reactionaries. A controversy between the two poets
of the two camps, Tewfīk Fikret and Meḥmet ʿĀḳif
[Ersoy], has remained ever since as the model of the
conflicting views of the secularists and the modernists.

While the modernists of the *Sirāt-ı Mustaḳīm*
steadily turned conservative in *Sebīl ul-Reṣad* as they
were challenged by Westernists and nationalists, the
cause of religious modernism was taken up more
strongly by the secularist intelligentsia. ʿAbh Allāh
Djewdet [see DJEWDET] and Kılıçzāde Ḥaḳḳī, both
writing in *Idjtihād,* launched attacks against the tra-
ditional *ʿulamāʾ* as well as the modernists. The most
prominent and influential figure, however, appeared
from among the ranks of the Turkist nationalists.
This was Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924 [see GÖKALP]). Un-
like his contemporay Mūsā Djār Allāh or Bigief
(1875-1949), the theologian and reformer of the Turk-
ish Muslims of the Russian Empire, Gökalp was
neither a theologian nor a religious thinker. As a
romantic populist and nationalist sociologist he
developed a three-principled ideology, in which Islam
was significant only within the limitations of western-
izing modernism and of the cultural revival of the
Turkish nationality. In the scattered writings of
Gökalp (ed. and trans. by N. Berkes) we find his
views on Islamic modernism inseparable from his
ideas of the secular state and national culture.

The religious modernism of Gökalp paved the way
for the more radical secularism of the Kemalist era
(1923-1938). Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) was even
more remote from the tradition of the "Islamic sci-
ences", the *ʿulamāʾ,* the *madrasas* and the *ṭarīḳas,*
which he always associated with backwardness, ig-
norance, superstition and conspiracy, and he saw no
place for them in the increasingly laicized political
and social institutions. The most spectacular of his
revolutionary changes were the abolition of sultanate,
caliphate, and Islamic law. The *ʿulamāʾ* organization,
the *madrasas,* and *zāwiyas* of the *ṭarīḳas* were closed
and their properties transferred to the *waḳf* ad-
ministration, which had already become a depart-
ment of government.

It would be misleading to regard the Kemalist re-
forms as a total eradication of Islam in Turkey.
What was really eradicated was Islam in its entangle-
ments with the Ottoman pattern of state and religion.
To the extent to which Islam had been institutional-
ized within this historic polity, within which it had
always suffered from formalism and sterility, it
inevitably suffered from the disestablishment of that
polity. Islam was now made dependent upon the
voluntary adherence of the believer; the places of
worship were kept open and their administration put
under a department of religious affairs financed by the
state, but deprived of any prerogative of theological
or dogmatic authority. While the recognized religions
(Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) were taken under
the protection of the law, any political formation in
association with any of these religions was banned,
and the establishment of any new sect or *ṭarīḳa* was
prohibited. The decline, stagnation, and corruption of
the old religious institutions, which were nothing but
aspects of the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire,
made the Kemalist reforms easier and more accept-
able than we are some imes led to believe.

It was only after the cooling of the national fervour
(which had greatly facilitated the implementation and

acceptance of the Kemalist religious reforms) after
World War II that a new interest in Islam re-appeared.
Here again we see no sign of *iṣlāḥ* in the sense of
modernism, as was always the case in the Turkish
tradition. Four lines of development may be distin-
guished. (1) Scholarly interest in Islam. Works of a
historical nature, editions or translations of texts,
and some sociological studies. (2) A growing interest
of the rising bourgeoisie in religion, mainly expressed
in raising funds for repairing old religious buildings
or for the construction of new mosques, and in various
manifestations of religiosity such as the observance
of religious holidays, recitals of the Ḳurʾān or *Maw-
lid* poetry, alms-giving, pilgrimage, and fasting (3).
The rise of new illegal *ṭarīḳas,* mostly of non-tra-
ditional types, as sectarian protest groups, favoured
on the whole by artisans, small shopkeepers and
traders. (4) Anti-secular ideological tendencies clam-
ouring for the restoration of the *sharīʿa* and even of
an Islamic state. This decidedly anti-Kemalist trend
is mostly favoured by dissatisfied groups of Western-
ized intelligentsia and a faction of the nationalist
youth. The fact that all of these were given a free
hand, partly because of the rise of the multi-party
system in opposition to single party rule, and partly
because of the relative consolidation of democratic
freedoms, has led those who took them as signs of
a religious modernism and those who believed that
they are the signs of a reactionary return to the
past to attach an exaggerated importance to them as
representing a stage going beyond the Kemalist con-
ception of religious reform. That all appear to have
class, occupation, region, and party motivations and
alignments indicates that the Kemalist reforms suc-
ceeded in changing the Ottoman polity into one in
which religion can become a point of political conflict
as it is in all modern democracies.

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iv.—INDIA-PAKISTAN

Indian Muslims were among the first Muslim
peoples to come in contact with Western civilization;
but it was only after the establishment of the rule
of the British East India Company in the wake of
the Battle of Plassey (1757) that the direct impact
of western institutions came to effect their lives and
minds. The reform of the civil and criminal, but
not the personal branches of the *sharīʿa* law into the
form of Anglo-Muhammedan law, which developed
in the last decades of the 18th century [see
SHARĪʿA], was the first major injection of reformism
affecting the legal and social life of the Indian Mus-
lims. But in the formulation and development of this
reformism they played no part.

The direct impact of Europe was felt by some
Indo-Muslim travellers during the late 18th and early
19th centuries. These included Iʿtiṣām al-Dīn, Yūsuf
Khān Kammalpūsh, and Mīrzā Abū Ṭālib Khān. Of
these the last [*q.v.*] was by far the most receptive
and analytical. The influence, if any, of these trav-
ellers on the formation of opinion among the Indo-
Muslim élite was insignificant.

The apologetic formulation of modernism is traced
usually to Sayyid Aḥmad Khān [*q.v.*], whose writings
are, no doubt, the foundation of its subsequent de-
velopment; but the actual pattern of this apologetic
was formulated a decade or so earlier by Karamat
ʿAlī Djawupūrī (d. 1873) in his *Maʾākhidh al-ʿulūm*
(Eng. tr. ʿUbaydī and Amīr ʿAlī, Calcutta 1967).
He presents the later quite familiar apologetic thesis
that modern scientific discoveries not merely coin-
cide with, but have actually resulted from the inspi-
ration of the Ḳurʾān, transmitted to Europe through
Spain; and that in absorbing the discoveries of mod-
ern Western sciences, Muslisms would really be re-
verting to the truth implicit in their own religion.

The towering figure of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān domi-
nates the entire edifice of Indo-Muslim modernism.
He equates the implied and interpreted truth of
ḳurʾānic revelation with his understanding of two
19th-century criteria of judgement, "reason" and
"nature". Revelation is the word of God, and "nature"
the work of God; between the two there can be no
contradiction. Of the four traditional sources of Is-
lamic law, he rejects *idjmāʿ* (consensus) [*q.v.*]; sub-
stitutes *ḳiyās* (analogy [*q.v.*] by *idjjtihād* (use of indi-
vidual reasoning) [*q.v.*], which he considers to be the
right of every educated and intelligent Muslim;
doubts the authenticity, and therefore the validity, of
much of the corpus of *ḥadīth* [*q.v.*]; and concentrates
almost exclusively on a re-interpretation of the
Ḳurʾān. In his ḳurʾānic exegesis he denies the
validity of *naskh* (abrogation) [*q.v.*], considering it
relevant only to the historical sequence of Jewish,
Christian and Muslim scriptures, the later scriptures
abrogating the earlier ones. His eschatology, angelo-
logy and demonology is non-material and based on
rationalizations. In his interpretation of the social
structure of Islam he argues against the permissibility

of either slavery or polygamy. On the other hand, he
justifies interest on capital and property, equating
the forbidden *ribā* (usury) with compound interest.

Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's work was supplemented by
that of his associates, of whom Čirāgh ʿAlī, who
wrote extensively of the possibilities of reform in a
modern Muslim state and on *djihād* [*q.v.*], was more
radical. Mahdī ʿAlī Khān Muḥsin al-Mulk, who was
also Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's successor in implementing
his educational and political policies, was compara-
tively more moderate in his religious views. The
apologetics of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his colleagues
were only partly accepted by the Indo-Muslim upper
middle class élite; they were rejected in various de-
tails, but on the whole broadened the horizon and
liberalized the concept of religious faith. They were
totally repudiated by the *ʿulamāʾ*.

Amīr ʿAlī [*q.v.*], who wrote exclusively in English,
with a mixed Muslim and western readership in
mind, did not belong to Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's
Aligarh movement, but was very considerably in-
fluenced by it, and propagated its apologetic and
reformist formulations.

Whereas Sayyid Aḥmad Khān was opposed to re-
vivalism as backward-looking, it became a recurrent
theme in the drama of modernization with the *Mu-
saddas* and other poems of his associate Ḥālī [*q.v.*];
this element reached its zenith in the pan-Islamic
verse of Iḳbāl [*q.v.*].

Muḥammad Iḳbāl (1875?-1938) is the most out-
standing figure of 20th-century Indo-Muslim
modernism; but compared to Sayyid Aḥmad Khān his
modernist orientation and analysis is more subtle, va-
gue, less easy to grasp in its totality and at times even
contradictory. His appeal is primarily poetic, to some
extent intellectual, but not effectively theological.

The set of values which Iḳbāl more or less ar-
bitrarily selects as necessary for the development
of the individual self and the community are not
directly derived from the Ḳurʾān, but traced to it
apologetically. These values are movement, power
and freedom, which form the recurring leitmotifs
of his poetic work and of much of his sustained
writing. In his religious thought intuition is a basic
concept and defined as a higher form of intellect;
at certain stages it is equated with prophethood; and
it plays an important role in Iḳbāl's Bergsonian view
of evolution, which is basically moral despite its
reliance on the value of power. In law Iḳbāl also
places a great deal of emphasis on *idjtihād*; but un-
like Sayyid Aḥmad Khān he accepts the validity and
broadens the concept of *idjmaʿ* equating it with de-
mocracy or a parliamentary system of government;
at the same time making some concessions to the
view that the *ʿulamāʾ* have also a role to play in
any movement aimed at reformism in order to balance
it—a view which to a great extent has influenced the
pattern of constitution-making in Pakistan. For Indian
Islam he proposes a role of conservatism which may
counter-balance the secularism adopted by Turkey.

His contemporary Abuʾl-Kalām Āzād (1888-1958)
is not exactly a modernist; but he liberalizes and
humanizes Islamic belief, in his exegesis of the
Ḳurʾān, by stressing the attributes of God as the
Nourisher, the Provider, the Merciful One and the
Beautiful One. Whereas Iḳbāl had placed man at the
centre of the universe as God's vicegerent with lim-
itless potentialities, Āzād again restores God to
the supremely authoritative position in the scheme
of the universe, and leaves man little choice but to
admire, obey, worship and follow Him.

Both Iḳbāl and Āzād influenced the thought of

Ghulām Aḥmad Parwīz (Parwez) whose modernism is, on the whole, this-worldly and pragmatic, but based on an untenable extravagant and far-fetched interpretation of the ḳurʾānic terminology. Because of his exegetical extravagance his influence on the modernist élite has been minimal.

These landmarks of the intellectual history of modern Islam in India had some effect on the social modernization of the Muslim upper classes up to 1947. Only after that date did the great debate between westernization and orthodoxy begin in Pakistan, and it still continues. In terms of social reform the one precarious gain so far made by modernism in Pakistan has been confined to the revision of Muslim family law, which has made polygamy a little more difficult and divorce a little less easy. The élite which created Pakistan and which has been ruling it subsequently is, on the whole, modernist and westernized in social outlook as well as in the processes of administrative decision-making; but in politics and in constitution-making modernism is heavily under the pressure of orthodoxy, especially of the fundamentalist movement of Abu 'l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī.

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(AZIZ AHMAD)

v.—CENTRAL ASIA [see Supplement]

ISLĀM, submission, total surrender (to God) — maṣdar of the IVth form of the root S L M.

I. DEFINITION AND THEORIES OF MEANING.

1.—Ḳurʾānic references.—The "one who submits to God" is the Muslim, of which the plural Muslimūn occurs very often throughout the sūras. Islām, on the other hand, occurs only eight times there; but the word must be considered in conjunction with the fairly common use of the verb aslama in the two meanings which merge into one another, "surrender to God"(an inner action) and "profession of Islām", that is to say adherence to the message of the Prophet. The eight occurrences of Islām are as follows:—

a). Three verses stress its quality of interiority: "Whomsoever God desires to guide, He expands his breast to Islam" (VI, 125); Islām is a "call " from God, which must prohibit falsehood (LXI, 7) and which places whoever receives it "in a light from his Lord" (XXXIX, 22).

b). Three other texts, constantly quoted through the centuries, stress the connection between islām and dīn [q.v.]. It is certainly appropriate in this context to translate dīn as "religion", though without forgetting the idea of debt owed to God which it connotes. "Today, I have perfected your religion (dīn) for you; I have completed My blessing upon you; I have approved islām for your religion" (V, 3), and "the religion, in the eyes of God, is islām" (III, 19). The surrender of the whole Self to God can alone render to Him the worship which is His due; whosoever should seek for another religion, his search would not be approved (cf. III, 85).

c). The action which operates islām supposes a "return" to God, tawba, a conversion. The Ḳurʾān speaks of "conversion to islām"—to condemn the unbelief (kufr) of those who had nevertheless made a profession of faith (IX, 74). Similarly it condemns the complacency of the Bedouins who boast of their islām "as if it were a favour on their part" (XLIX, 17). In addition: "Say: 'Do not count your islām as a favour to me; nay, but rather God confers a favour upon you, in that He has guided you to belief, if it be that you are truthful" (ibid.). A little earlier, the very important verse XLIX, 14 had made a clear distinction between islām and imān: "The Bedouins say: 'we believe'. Say: you do not believe; rather say, 'We surrender' (aslamnā). Faith has not yet entered into your heart".

It would therefore be an exaggeration to state, with A. J. Wensinck (The Muslim Creed), Cambridge 1922, 22), that "in the Ḳurʾān the terms islām and imān are synonymous". It is true that to recognize oneself as a Muslim and to be a believer are two existential realities which together take possession of a man's whole being to ensure his salvation (ibid.). But the Ḳurʾān (XLIX, 14 and 17, and still more IX, 74) evokes an explicit profession of islām which is in no way a guarantee against the sin of kufr, and has no saving value unless it is the expression of faith. On comparing these verses with III, 19 and V, 3 (insistence on the idea of dīn), we see that the ḳurʾānic statements themselves urge men to make islām not merely a (general) act of submission and surrender to God, and not merely obedience to God's commandments, but also an affirmation which grants