60. Letter From the Assistant Administrator of the Agency for
International Development for Near East and South Asia (Macomber) to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Solbert)/1/
Washington, December 11, 1964.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center,
RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 121 Iran--11 Dec 64. Confidential.
A stamped notation on the source text indicates that Solbert saw
it.
Dear Peter:
The Country Team in Iran has requested us to clarify for the
Department of Defense the possibility of using P.L. 480, Title I, 104(c)
funds to finance the local currency costs of MAP projects in Iran. The
recent Title I agreements with Iran provide that the proceeds be used
for loans to support Iran's economic development. No provision has been
made to extend grants for defense purposes. Moreover, because of Iran's
long term favorable balance of payments position, it is unlikely that
further Title I agreements will be concluded. In the future, sales of
surplus commodities to Iran will be for dollars under Title IV and not
for local currency. In summary, there are no funds available for
military purposes under present agreements and future availability is
highly improbable.
The Department of Defense will also recall that in the Spring of
1962, the Shah was informed of the United States decision to terminate
budgetary support for the Iranian defense establishment. An allocation
of P.L. 480 local currency proceeds for defense purposes would represent
another form of budgetary support and a reversal of policy which, in our
judgment, would not be warranted in view of Iran's improved economic
position./2/
/2/A handwritten notation on the source text
reads: "General Strickland--No action called for by us, I take it.
PS."
Sincerely yours,
Bill
61. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency/1/
SC No. 00649/64CWashington, December 11, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Iran, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1/64-12/65.
Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA's Office of Current
Intelligence. Attached to a December 14 memorandum from McCone to the
President that reads: "Your questions concerning the current
situation in Iran prompt me to submit the attached special report,
'Reform in Iran: Progress and Prospects.' This represents the Central
Intelligence Agency's most recent appraisal of the situation and
reflects in detail points I made briefly in our conversation Saturday
[December 12] morning."
REFORM IN IRAN: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
For over two years the Shah has been trying to effect fundamental
economic and political reforms in Iran, with the primary aim of building
a broad popular base for his regime. The most dramatic changes are
occurring in the traditional system of land tenure, as villages are
taken from individual owners and distributed among the peasants. The
program, as expected, is alienating the Shah's supporters among the
wealthy classes, whose influence in the country's administration has not
lessened significantly. Moreover, the Shah has not yet achieved his
desired mass political support; peasants still lack effective
instruments to register their approval of his program, and the urban
population is skeptical of his motives. Disruptions brought on by the
reforms meanwhile threaten an economic crisis and a possible reversal of
what he terms his "White Revolution."
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
62. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State
Rusk/1/
Washington, December 19, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Tiger and cleared by Acting
Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker and Jernegan.
SUBJECT
Serious Problem with Iran re the Gudarzian Case
Discussion
Foreign Minister Aram has requested urgently that you receive him
again to discuss the Gudarzian case, which he mentioned to you when he
met with you on December 5. I feel strongly that, despite your heavy
schedule, you should receive him again while he is in Washington
December 21 and 22. There are two major reasons why such a meeting is
required at this time:
1. This affair has incensed the Shah more than any previous incident
in U.S.-Iranian relations during the past ten years. He cannot
understand how the USG could allow a "known crook" such as
Gudarzian first to testify falsely before a Congressional committee
regarding corruption in United States aid to Iran, as he did to the
McClellen Committee in the summer and fall of 1963, and now obviously to
abuse the New York court system for the purpose of harassing the royal
family and disturbing U.S.-Iranian relations. Worst of all, the Shah has
gained the impression from Aram's reporting from New York that there is
insufficient high-level U.S.G. interest in bringing Gudarzian to book,
as indicated in Tehran's telegram 659. (Tab D)/2/
/2/All of the tabs were attached but not
printed.
2. Since you saw Aram on December 5 there has been a new development
that has further outraged the Shah and other Iranian officials.
Gudarzian's attorneys on December 11 entered an action in the New York
courts charging that an Iranian lawyer, Khosro Eghbal, came to this
country to remove assets of Princess Fatemeh and was served with a
summons which he evaded by leaving the country on the advice of Donald
Wehmeyer (L/NEA) and Ambassador Foroughi. Court orders were issued
calling upon Wehmeyer and the Ambassador (who however has not been
served) to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court.
The charges against Wehmeyer and the Ambassador are groundless, but the
Shah has gained the impression that Iranian immunity in this country has
been breached by the court's action in entertaining a charge against his
Ambassador. This court action was publicized in the New York Times of
December 12 and is described further in Tehran's telegram 666, (Tab E)
and in the Department's telegram 505, (Tab F).
Our foreign policy interests in this problem are substantial. The
Shah has just rammed through the Iranian Parliament, at our insistence
and with considerable risk to his domestic position, a highly unpopular
measure extending immunities and privileges to American military
personnel in Iran. He has also responded in very forthcoming manner so
far to our suggestions that he take a hand in the affair of Robert
Bredin, an American engineer who has been sentenced by an Iranian court
to three years for the presumed murder of his wife, in the face of
evidence clearly indicating death from other causes. We have ahead of us
some possibly delicate representations on the subject of a new oil
agreement with the Consortium, negotiations for which are now
deadlocked. We will also shortly be wanting to raise the subject of
Iran's participation in the supply of military units and equipment to
South Viet Nam. We must anticipate difficulties in these endeavors and
in all other aspects of our relations so long as the Shah can feel that
he has been obliging in meeting all of our requests whereas we do not
lift a finger to keep his family from being harassed unjustly in our
courts or his Ambassador from being falsely accused, all by one he
considers a proven scoundrel whom we do not even expose through
publicity channels.
We have, of course, been for months taking measures designed to curb
Gudarzian's activities within the limits of our relationship to a state
court system. These were described to Aram in some detail by the
Department's Deputy Legal Adviser on December 10, as covered in the
Department's telegram 486, (Tab G). When Ambassador Foroughi called on
me on December 18 to deliver a note of protest about the latest court
action and the entire Gudarzian affair (Tab H), Len Meeker and I assured
him in strongest terms of this Government's distress over the affair and
our determination at high levels to bring Gudarzian to justice. We also
persuaded Foroughi to help us in dispelling the false notion in Tehran
that he had actually been served with a subpoena and that Iranian
diplomatic immunity here had thereby been breached. I am entertaining
Aram at a small luncheon on December 21 and Governor Harriman is
scheduled to lunch privately with Aram on December 22. While these
meetings will provide further opportunity for expressions of concern and
determination, I am certain that nothing less than a direct expression
of this kind from you to Aram will suffice to begin repairing the damage.
At a meeting with Aram, you could explain to him that you found, upon
looking into the matter after your December 5 meeting, that the
Gudarzian affair had been occupying a great deal of attention in various
Government Departments for some months. Most recently these included
further detailed contacts by Federal Government officials with New York
State legal officials.
You could tell Aram that we too are outraged by the latest court
action and are determined to take every measure within our power to put
a stop to this evident abuse of our state courts by bringing the
evidence of possible violations of law forcefully to the attention of
the proper authorities. If you agree to send the letters to the Governor
of New York, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Acting Attorney
General which are attached as Tabs A, B and C respectively, you could
cite these as evidence of our determination to see this matter through.
(I do not recommend that you give him copies.) You could also tell Aram
that we expect developments in the near future to result in press
coverage that will help counteract the embarrassment caused to the royal
family and to Ambassador Foroughi by press coverage of the judicial
proceedings to date.
Recommendations
1. That you sign the letters to the Governor of New York, the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Acting Attorney General, attached as
Tabs A, B and C, respectively. I should like to deliver the letter to
the Acting Attorney General myself to give him some of the flavor of the
whole case and enlist his personal interest and support.
2. That you receive the Iranian Foreign Minister on Monday or
Tuesday, December 21 or 22 and discuss the Gudarzian case with him along
the foregoing lines./3/
/3/On December 21 Secretary Rusk initialed his
approval of Talbot's recommendations and agreed to a meeting with the
Iranian Foreign Minister at 3 p.m. on December 22. Telegram 511 to
Tehran, December 22, reported that at the meeting Aram pressed for more
effort to convict Gudarzian on criminal charges. The Secretary told the
Foreign Minister that the Department was in touch with New York
authorities and other U.S. Government agencies and was stepping up its
efforts in connection with criminal charges against Gudarzian.
(Ibid.)
63. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Office of South
Asian Affairs (Cameron) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 6, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files,
POL IRAN-U.S. Confidential. Drafted by Tiger and John G. Oliver in FSE;
cleared in draft by the Office of International Resources' Chief of
Fuels and Energy Division Andrew F. Ensor in the Bureau of Economic
Affairs and William D. Wolle (NEA/NE). A handwritten note on the source
text reads, "S saw."
SUBJECT
Your Appointment with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Thursday, January 7,
12:00 Noon
Foreign Minister Aram (see attached biographic sketch)/2/ is calling, on instruction from his
Government, to discuss problems being encountered in the final stages of
negotiation for a revised oil agreement with the Iranian Oil Consortium.
He will very likely request United States Government intercession with
American companies participating in the Consortium to modify certain
terms of the offer.
/2/Attached but not printed. Secretary Rusk met
with Foreign Minister Aram at 12:25 p.m. on January 7. No memorandum of
conversation of their meeting has been found.
When Iranian officials approached us, here and in Tehran, during the
past month to use our influence with the American companies, we have
reminded them that our influence is not sufficient to force the
companies to abandon a position which they consider important in their
operations abroad. While this remains true, our present difficulties
with the Shah over the Gudarzian affair would suggest a somewhat more
forthcoming approach to Mr. Aram on this occasion. I recommend that,
while reminding him again of the limits of our influence, you offer the
Department's services in contacting American companies, advising them in
detail of the Iranian position, and reporting back to the Iranian
officials on the results of these approaches.
Mr. Jernegan will accompany Mr. Aram in his call on you, as will Mr.
Ensor (E/FSE) and Mr. Tiger (NEA/GTI).
Background
The proposed agreement, which has been offered by the operating
companies to all of the Middle Eastern producing countries participating
in OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), involves an
agreement to treat royalty payments as an item of operating expenses
rather than as part of the country's 50 percent share of profits. This
would net the producing countries substantially higher revenues. The
companies agreed to make the offer retroactive for the calendar year
1964 if the producing countries would accept it by December 31, 1964.
This deadline has now been extended to January 26, 1965. As of December
31, the offer had been accepted by Saudi Arabia, in principle, and by
Kuwait, subject to parliamentary ratification.
On December 31 Iran finally accepted the fiscal provisions of the
offer, but it is still balking at other conditions, namely those
involving a quit-claim and arbitration procedures. The Consortium wants
a quit-claim (waiver) of all additional monetary demands by Iran for the
years preceding the new agreement, whereas Iran wants such a waiver
limited to questions involving the level of posted prices. As regards
arbitration, Iran contends that the current proposal provides the
Consortium with a unilateral right to demand arbitration in the event of
an alleged breach of the agreement, but denies a similar right to Iran.
Iran further claims that there are adequate arbitration mechanisms in
its existing agreement and demands special consideration for having
helped the companies work out arbitration arrangements with the Arab
countries, where no such mechanisms had existed. This special
consideration, in the Iranian mind, should take the form of exempting
Iran from the arbitration provisions worked out for Arab producing
countries.
During ten days of discussions in London (December 20-30) there was
apparently some progress on the quit-claim problem, but the arbitration
provision remains a sticking point. On December 31 the Prime Minister
told Ambassador Holmes that the Consortium's offer was "entirely
unacceptable," adding that "it would be utterly impossible for
his Government to present anything less than equal treatment to the
Iranian Parliament." The companies have taken an equally strong
position against retaining unique arbitration provisions for Iran.
However, as of December 31 it was evident that both sides had some
expectation of being able to settle these differences by January 26. The
Consortium was to have despatched three high-level representatives from
London to Tehran on January 5 to resume negotiations, but no word has
yet been received as to their progress./3/
/3/A supplemental briefing memorandum from
Jernegan to Rusk on January 6 reported that the Consortium
representatives in Tehran were prepared to yield significantly on the
arbitration issue, but that their new proposals would still fall short
of the completely reciprocal arbitration rights which the Iranians had
been seeking. They also pointed out to Holmes that any modification
agreed to with Iran would necessitate renegotiation to grant similar
concessions to the Arab countries. (Department of State, NEA/IRN Files:
Lot 70 D 552, CHRON FILE, IRAN 1965, Memoranda through S/S (Staff
Studies))
64. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files:
Lot 69 D 489, Iran 1965, POL 13-6 Religious Groups. Confidential.
Prepared by INR. Attached to a January 7 note that reads: "Rec'd
from WGM. This is a copy of an internal paper prepared for Mr. Spain's
use." WGM is William G. Miller of INR. The paper was sent to
Bracken, Howison, Tiger, and Mulligan in NEA/GTI. Another attachment to
the paper makes it clear that it was prepared in 1965.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KHOMEINI'S OPPOSITION TO THE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
The opposition of Ayatollah Maj Ruhollah Seyed Musavi Khomeini, the
leading Iranian religious figure, is symptomatic of widespread popular
opposition to Government policies. One aspect of these policies has been
to destroy the power of the clergy. To attempt to weaken the religious
structure of Iranian society, as the Shah appears to be doing, believing
this necessary to carry on his campaign to modernize Iran, has proven to
be a dangerous course of political action. Popular reactions to this
policy are already apparent. As reactionary as the present clergy is,
the very nature of religion in Iran is such that it is capable of change
and adaptation. Khomeini's opposition represents the reaction of
traditional Iranian society. As spokesman for the religious community
Khomeini's opposition is, in one sense, political protest; more
importantly, it indicates the troubled state of Iranian civilization.
During the past two years there has been a reawakened opposition
among the religious community to the regime's policies. This antipathy
has been extended in recent months to open criticism of American policy
in Iran. Speaking for the religious community, Khomeini has said that
American policy is responsible for many of Iran's ills and that it is
supporting an unpopular regime for its own purposes to the detriment of
the people as a whole as did the Russians and British before them. Given
this alienation from the regime and this antipathy to the American role
in Iran, and given the widespread support Khomeini's views have among
the traditional world of bazaar, village and small city, the reasons for
Khomeini's rise to political prominence herald resistance from quarters
of the Iranian population that have not been in active opposition
before.
Khomeini's education, learning and widespread support within the
clergy made him eligible to succeed Ayatollah Borujerdi as the leader of
Iranian Islam, a position made vacant by Borujerdi's death in 1961
before Khomeini became a political figure. Khomeini's political
abilities became evident in 1963 when he first spoke out against the
anti-religious policies of the Government. Khomeini's political stand is
not an isolated one; it is a view shared by a significant mass of
Iranians.
The religious community and the values they hold play an important
part in Iranian society. Because the ulema have expressed disapproval of
some of the Shah's goals and condemned almost all of the Shah's methods,
the Shah has decided to carry out his plans to change the Iranian social
structure without their support or assistance. He has branded the clergy
"black reactionaries" who are opposed to reform. He has gone
so far as to exile their leader Khomeini for anti-regime speeches and
for alleged anti-reform attitudes.
There is no question that Khomeini has opposed certain features of
the Shah's program. He has condemned completely the Shah's autocratic
methods. There is little question, too, that he is reactionary and
provincial in outlook, no matter how learned. Paradoxically, there are
few leaders in Iran who by training would be better able to formulate
for the devout a religious justification for modernization. Khomeini is
recognized as the leading philosophical exponent of ijtehad, the Shia
doctrine whereby change can be adapted to an Islamic framework. But it
is important to recognize that Khomeini does not speak only for himself.
He represents the point of view of traditional Iranian society.
Part of the conflict between the regime on the one hand and the
religiously-oriented masses on the other is over the pace and means of
carrying out reforms. The clergy has under great pressure grudgingly
recognized that reforms in Iranian society must be made. Khomeini says
he is not opposed to land distribution and that land distribution is
consistent with Islam if just compensation is made. He has opposed, for
example, the emancipation of women under present circumstances stating
that emancipation without education is meaningless. In almost every
instance the principle of a particular reform has been accepted; the
challenge has come over methodology. The clergy by its training and
philosophical outlook is tradition-bound. The basic changes implicit in
some of the Shah's reforms, such as land distribution, require
adaptations that will markedly alter the whole religious structure.
"What will the position of the ulema be without the waqf?" is
the kind of question that has deep philosophical and religious
implications for the ulema and Iran as a whole. That there has been
opposition on the part of the ulema is inevitable. But within the
traditional structure, the power of the ulema might have been used to
justify and institutionalize the changes taking place.
Had the Shah consulted with the leaders of the religious community,
considered their ideas, and had he given the ulema a limited
constructive role to play, opposition to his reforms from the religious
would have been considerably lessened. This was former Prime Minister
Ali Amini's belief and still is his position. However, these are
"might have been's." What is now clear is that Khomeini's
exile has aroused dormant nationalist feelings. The Shah and the United
States have been branded as both anti-nationalist and anti-religious.
This new attitude has tarnished our formerly favorable image, poses a
threat to our interests in Iran, and will certainly make our task there
far more difficult.
65. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek,
Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Howison) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/
Washington, January 18, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files:
Lot 69 D 426, AID Iran 1965, AID-1, General Policy, Plans, Coordination.
Confidential. Drafted by Mulligan (NEA/GTI). A handwritten note on the
memorandum reads: "GTI--A good paper. T."
SUBJECT
Your Appointment with Howard Parsons, AID Mission Director for Iran
10:30 a.m. Tuesday, January 19, 1965
In your meeting with Mr. Parsons you may wish to draw on the
following talking points.
1. Our security interests are too compelling for us to allow
favorable indications of Iran's increasing self-reliance to obscure its
continuing vulnerability and basic weaknesses or to conclude too early
that U.S. objectives can be achieved without significant participation
in Iranian affairs. Iran is in transition, deeply engaged in the process
of difficult adjustment to the initiation of basic reforms and the
effort to achieve rapid modernization. Although progress in this respect
is encouraging it is not yet self-sustaining and does not insure
continued internal stability.
2. Our leverage in the past has stemmed in large measure from the
inputs of our economic, technical and military assistance. These modes
of assistance on a large scale have contributed significantly to the
forward movement experienced during the past decade and secured our
entree into key administrative, economic and military avenues.
Fortunately, there is considerable acceptance among the present ruling
society of the value of Iran's ties with the West and increasing
agreement with the stress which we have placed on orderly modernization
and socio-economic development. Under a continuance of present
circumstances therefore we need not look forward to a drastic loss of
influence as our material sources of leverage disappear.
3. However, apart from military matters, where we may expect some
years more of close dependence on U.S. advance and support, we shall be
drawn less closely into the government's future decision making process
and shall probably adopt more nearly the role of trusted ally rather
than that of responsible senior partner.
4. We should exercise the influence and capabilities which derive
from our technical and economic assistance programs to lessen the impact
of our preponderantly military loan assistance and diminish our
vulnerability to the charge that the United States is pursuing a
militaristic policy in Iran with little concern for the economic and
social betterment of the Iranian people.
5. Although the administration of Iranian economic affairs has
improved, we shall want to continue to exercise our available influence
to persuade the Iranians to maximize their increasing resource
allocations for development and to take the difficult political
decisions involved in such critical areas as overhauling the tax system
and improving public administration.
6. We should endeavor to maintain flexibility in our aid policy so
as to assist in preventing the dissipation of important economic
advances, as well as to safeguard our own national interest by
developing for U.S. industry an appropriate share of the growing market
for capital goods which we have helped to create through our soft loans
and other assist-ance of the past. This is essential not only because of
our balance of payments problem but also as a further means of
preserving American influence and our presence in key undertakings in
the Iranian economy.
7. In the transitional period ahead, with Iran counting heavily upon
the success of a land reform program which initially, at least, is
adding to a now chronic shortfall of wheat production, our PL-480
programs should assume greater significance. In order to derive maximum
benefit from this type of assistance, both as a marketing aid for the
United States and as an instrument of foreign policy, we shall have to
work hard at both ends in streamlining the bureaucratic procedures
associated with PL-480.
66. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek,
Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Howison) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/
Washington, January 21, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files:
Lot 69 D 484, Iran 1965, POL 23-8, Demonstrations, Riots. Confidential.
Drafted by Howison. A notation on the source text indicates that it was
seen by Rusk.
SUBJECT
Attempt on Life of Iranian Prime Minister
At 10:00 a.m. (2:30 a.m. EST) Prime Minister Mansur was shot and
seriously wounded by a young man reportedly carrying a Koran and a
picture of Khomeini as the Prime Minister arrived at the Parliament to
present the new oil agreements. We tentatively infer that the assassin
may have been a conservative supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was
exiled to Turkey for anti-regime activity at the time of ratification of
our Status Bill. Although Khomeini's motivation is primarily opposition
to secularist reforms, he thus succeeded in getting official endorsement
of his nationalist (in this case, anti-American) pose. The attempt on
the Prime Minister's life, if the assassin's sympathy for Khomeini is
publicly established, has unfortunate implications of opposition to
Iran's relationship with the United States.
Though the event will tend to weaken the regime, it would require
genius in mishandling the situation for it to precipitate the kind of
chaos which has followed modern assassinations (successful) in Iran. The
Shah is in personal charge of the situation, having returned immediately
from the ski resort above Tehran.
The wire services have noted that the assassin is young, but have not
labelled him a religious fanatic yet. They have clearly labelled Mansur
a progressive reformist. The wire reports leave room for the almost
certainly unjustified inference that the assassin opposed the oil
agreements.
67. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 28, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Robert W. Komer Files, Iran, 1965-March 1966. Secret; No Foreign
Dissem.
SUBJECT
The Significance of the Assassination of Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur
The Character of Regime Will Remain Unchanged. The death of
Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur on January 26, five days after he was
shot by Mohamad Bokharai, a twenty-year-old ironmonger's assistant, will
not alter the character of the regime. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Minister of
Finance in the Mansur Cabinet, was named Prime Minister by the Shah.
Hoveyda's appointment may cause difficulties because he is believed to
be a member of the Bahai sect, which is deeply disliked by many Iranian
Muslims. The Cabinet remains essentially the same as Mansur's, except
for the appointment of SAVAK Chief (the Iranian Security Organization)
General Hasan Pakravan as Minister of Information. Shortly after
Mansur's death, the Shah, in a fiery speech, denounced "black
reactionaries" and reaffirmed his support for the reform program
formerly directed by Mansur.
Assassination Was Fanatic Expression of Widespread
Discontent./2/ There is no evidence
that the assassin and his accomplices, all members of a small religious
society called Maktab Towhid, were part of a larger movement. On the
contrary, the assassination seems to have been planned without outside
help. Anger caused by the exile to Turkey by the regime of the leading
Iranian religious figure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Haj Musavi Khomeini, seems
to have in part motivated Bokharai to shoot Mansur, but there was no
known connection between the Maktab Tow-hid and the movement headed by
Khomeini. There are hundreds of small religious groups like Maktab
Towhid that could cause religiously motivated violence of the sort that
has just taken place. The security measures taken by the regime have
prevented the formation of broadly based political or religious
opposition movements. At the same time, fragmentation of the opposition
and formation of small conspiratorial groups make effective surveillance
difficult. The fact that SAVAK was unaware of the activities of Maktab
Towhid is a case in point. There is considerable discontent in Iran
because of continued repression of opposition groups, exile of Ayatollah
Khomeini, unpopular measures passed by the government such as the recent
Status of Forces Bill, and the increase in the cost of basic fuels.
/2/A February 10 memorandum from Bracken to
Talbot noted that GTI considered the use of the phrase "widespread
discontent" in the January 28 INR briefing paper unfortunate,
allowing as it did for the inference that "discontent" arose
directly or solely from misgovernment and/or repressive government. On
the contrary, GTI judged that political dissidence in Iran was at a
relatively low point, viewed against the experience of the previous 50
years, and it saw the patterns of discontent in Iran as stemming
predominantly from the rate of social change that had been taking place.
(Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 489, Iran 1965, POL 23-8,
Demonstrations, Riots)
Problems Facing the Regime. The appointment of someone as
Prime Minister reputed to be a Bahai may arouse additional religious
antagonism. There are, however, signs that Mansur's assassination has
increased the regime's awareness of the necessity to resolve the
differences between the Shah and the religious opposition groups. The
circumstances under which an accommodation could be made would require
some loosening of political control and a greater measure of
participation in government by groups presently in opposition./3/
/3/In telegram 793 from Tehran, January 27,
Holmes reported that the appointment of Hoveyda to succeed Mansur would
ensure continuity of government policies and practices. He also noted
that the Shah's television broadcast had blamed Mansur's assassination
on an unholy alliance between Communists and reactionaries, but that the
Embassy had no evidence of such an alliance. What evidence it did have
pointed to a relatively small group of fanatics motivated by religious
and perhaps other factors. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN)
68. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department
of State/1/
Tehran, February 15, 1965, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files,
DEF 19-3 U.S.-IRAN. Secret. Repeated to DOD and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.
854. In recent conversations with Eckhardt and me Shah has asked for
annual review of military equipment program and acquisitions as provided
for in Memorandum of Understanding of July 4, 1964. Shah referred to
anticipated increases in oil revenues and indicated his desire to
consider purchase of additional military equipment, including high
performance fighter aircraft, armored reconnaissance vehicles, increase
in war reserve ammunition from 30 to 60 days, and second Hawk battalion.
He accepted my suggestion that review should begin with comprehensive
assessment of GOI's projected revenues and outlays, especially of
foreign exchange, over next several years; review to be carried out by
economic officials in consultation with Embassy-USAID economic officers.
As first step in consultation we have prepared lengthy questionnaire of
matters to be addressed and I will pass it to Prime Minister this week.
Details follow by airgram.
Holmes
69. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of
State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 18, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Iran, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1/64-12/65.
Confidential.
SUBJECT
Strong Reaction by Shah of Iran to Gudarzian Affair
A major irritant in our relations with Iran for some months has been
the affair of Khaibar Gudarzian, an Iranian national who has been
misusing the procedures of both our courts and our Congress. In cases
now pending in the New York courts the information available to us
indicates he is attempting to obtain money from the Shah's brother and
sister by means of false allegations, forged documents, and fraudulent
claims of service of process. As long ago as May 1963 he began airing
false charges of corruption in our aid program in Iran before the
McClellan Committee, through the press, and to the Department of
Justice. Investigations of practically all of those charges by the
Departments of State and Justice have disclosed that the evidence
submitted by Gudarzian consists of forgeries and fabrications, but there
has thus far been no public refutation by the Executive Branch or by the
McClellan Committee.
This Department has taken a number of steps during the past several
months to ensure that justice is done and to counteract the harmful
publicity Gudarzian's activities have generated. Late in December,
Secretary Rusk brought the problem directly to the attention of the
Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Governor of New
York. Background briefings were given to the press in early January. The
Department of Justice has been cooperating, within limits imposed by our
federal system and by the separation of executive and judicial powers on
its capacity to intervene where private litigation is involved.
Competent private counsel is defending the Prince and Princess and there
is good prospect that the default judgment previously awarded to
Gudarzian will be set aside. The New York Court has ordered that its
referee go to Tehran at an early date to hear witnesses who will testify
that the Prince and Princess were in Iran on the date they are alleged
to have been served with process in New York. A Federal grand jury
investigation into Gudarzian's activities was launched in December to
determine whether sufficient evidence could be obtained to try him on
criminal charges for some of his questionable activities.
Throughout these developments, the Shah has become increasingly
frustrated over our inability to halt Gudarzian's machinations once and
for all, bring him rapidly to book, and dispel in some dramatic fashion
the adverse publicity generated about the royal family and Iran in
general. On February 13, the Shah's anger erupted violently in the
decision to discharge his excellent Ambassador to Washington who has, in
fact, done all any Ambassador could have done. The Shah is clearly
over-reacting, and we cannot be sure that he will not take further and
even more extreme steps before there is any very decisive resolution of
the Gudarzian affair. Our relationship with the Shah must be maintained
at a tolerable level as it is a key factor in our efforts to extend the
stability and progress shown by Iran in the past decade.
The Department of State is exploring with the Department of Justice
whether there might be any extraordinary steps the Department of Justice
could take at this point that would quickly extricate the Prince and
Princess and end Gudarzian's abuse of our judicial system./2/
/2/A February 22 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy
to Attorney General Kennedy reads: "The so-called Gudarzian case is
causing great distress and no little annoyance to our good friend, the
Shah of Iran. Therefore, the President hopes that the Justice Department
will do what it can to help bring about a prompt resolution of this
matter, of course with all due regard for our judicial processes. I
understand that Secretary Rusk will also be in touch with you with the
same plea." (Ibid., Robert W. Komer Files, Iran--Gudarzian Case, 1965)
Benjamin H. Read/3/
/3/Signed for Read in an unidentified hand.
©Copyright 1964, U. S. Department of State