In A Blue Haze:
Smoking and Baha'i Ethics
by Udo Schaefer
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chapter 3 | start page | single page | chapter 5 |  |
Chapter 4
On a Bahá'í Doctrine of Duty
1. Ethical duties, i.e. to do or to avoid something, are the result of all normative values, of the sum total of all the many virtues to be found in the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh. We must therefore examine every behaviour (even if it is not explicitly prohibited) with respect to the sum total of all these virtues, so that we can ascertain whether this specific behaviour is in conflict or in harmony with the duties we find there.
As is the case in law, in ethics concrete behaviour must be subsumed under norms. This indispensable subsumption is not possible without exegesis since the application of a norm presupposes its comprehension. The sense and purpose of a norm, the ratio legis, must be clear as well as its relationship to other norms in the hierarchy of values. Furthermore, one must examine other implications, such as the extent of its limits.
In the Synopsis and Codification of the Laws and Ordinances of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas the "prohibition of interpretation" is enumerated[59] which has led many to the assumption that in the community of Bahá'u'lláh there are no interpretations aside from those of 'Abdu'l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi. Is this a religion without exegesis?
This conception is obviously based on a misunderstanding of what "interpretation" is. Exegesis is a methodical search for meaning without which the Word of God would be inapplicable and pointless. Every proclamation of the Faith that goes beyond pure quotation, every translation into another language, even reflection about the revealed Word, the search for meaning in pectore, is ultimately exegesis. Prohibiting this would be equal to prohibiting thinking, and nothing would be more contrary to the Purpose of God than the intellectual castration of His believers.
Interpretations by the believers are not at all forbidden. In fact, they "constitute the fruit of man's rational power"[60]. However, Bahá'u'lláh has monopolised authoritative interpretation by transferring it to 'Abdu'l-Bahá in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas[61] and the Kitáb-i-Ahd[62]. 'Abdu'l-Bahá in turn designated Shoghi Effendi as the authoritative interpreter of Scripture in His Will and Testament. Establishing an auctoritas interpretativa simultaneously implies the exclusion of any other interpretation that claims authority. In his Law-i-Ittid (Tablet of Unity) Bahá'u'lláh abolished the institution of the clergy.[63] Thus, there is no separate class of divines in the community of Bahá'u'lláh who, such as the 'ulamá' in Islam, expound religious law with binding authority.
Beyond this the Kitáb-i-Aqdas does not contain a general prohibition of interpretation, but merely the prohibition of any interpretation of a verse that "altereth its obvious meaning" and perverts "the Sublime Word of God"[64]. This is actually a matter of course since such an interpretation contrary to "clear meaning" is neither allowed in jurisprudence[65] nor in theology[66]. Yet it is a prohibition which is legitimate enough in view of historical experience. Thus the Kitáb-i-Aqdas presents an outer limit for its interpretation within which believers have a right to state their own opinions and have the freedom to express them as long as no claim to authority is made.[67]
2. In this context we should remind ourselves that the establishment of the World Order of Bahá'u'lláh which is identical to the advent of the "Kingdom of God on Earth", means that all private and public life shall be brought in accord with the demands of the new revelation. In this respect the Bahá'í Faith resembles Judaism and Islam more than it does Christianity because it places more emphasis on right conduct than on the wording of both dogmatic speculations and sterile mysticism. Hence we have orthopractice rather than orthodoxy. As of yet, a doctrine of religious duties, comparable to, for example, the sharí'a in Islam, has not begun to appear in even a rudimentary form. This means that we are moving in virgin territory if we try to proceed in systematic categories.[68]
To begin with, duties are something we have towards God[69] and towards others. But we may also consider the duties we have toward ourselves. Such duties are, so to speak, the prerequisites for a meaningful life. They correspond, not to a short-sighted, but rather to an enlightened, self-interest, that is to the true self-interest of a human being. In the religious ethics of values, the resulting duties are based on the divine Revelation. In the final analysis moral values and duties are not based on reason. Behind them stands the authority of the divine Law-giver. All duties, including those towards ourselves, are simultaneously owed to God, otherwise they would not really be binding.[70]
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